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THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

On the Impact of September 11:

Walter LaFeber — The Post September 11 Debate Over Empire, Globalization, and Fragmentation

Richard K. Betts — The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror

Robert Jervis — An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not

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

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THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

Because of the events of September 11, *Political Science Quarterly* has commissioned articles by eminent scholars that will be published in each of our next few issues:

WALTER LAFEBER proposes that the September 11 attacks resulted from processes of globalization that had begun a generation earlier. He explains that those processes triggered an uneven distribution of wealth and, especially, a decentralization of power that led to an attack on the United States by an individual, nonstate, terrorist group that utilized some of the most advanced methods provided by globalization technologies. The article uses these contexts to explore the Clinton and Bush administrations' responses to the globalization/decentralization phenomena that climaxed in the September 11 tragedies.

RICHARD BETTS argues that the September 11 attacks were a response to American primacy and then applies offense-defense theory to explain the intense advantages that terrorist groups have in launching offensive strikes and in exploiting the defenses that a nation can put up in this era of globalization and asymmetric warfare.

ROBERT JERVIS argues that contrary to much conventional wisdom, terrorism has not weakened most states, understanding the "root causes" of terrorism is not a firm foundation for policy, the concept of a war on terrorism is flawed, and American policy is likely to be more unilateral than multilateral.

CLAIRE JEAN KIM explores why President Clinton launched the Presidential Initiative on Race in 1997 despite the apparent political risks associated with confronting the black-white breach on racial issues. She argues that Clinton launched the race initiative precisely because he calculated that he could please blacks and whites alike, thus conquering the racial breach in public opinion and boosting his overall popularity. The race initiative was an extension of breach management strategies that Clinton had developed and pursued for years.

BARRY C. BURDEN uses data to show that governors have done far better as presidential candidates than senators, though they are less likely to run. Four explanations connected to the notion of campaign investment are offered to account for the fates of 139 presidential contenders who ran between 1960 to 1996.

ANTHONY W. MARX argues that nation-building has been miscast. He explicates a political process of binding a core national solidarity via purposeful exclusions.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

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The Post September 11 Debate Over Empire, Globalization, and Fragmentation

WALTER LAFEBER

Months before the September 11 attacks, a few observers, working almost entirely within the Washington, DC beltway, argued that the United States was an empire and its people the fortunate Chosen who were to spread an imperialism beneficial to all, apparently whether already stable and functioning parts of the world wanted it or not. Americans, these observers elaborated, were imperial not in the old sense of wanting to hold territory, but in their determination to expand globally American ideas based on capitalism and democracy—two concepts that actually have often been at cross-purposes throughout most of the post-1900 so-called American Century. The new imperialists rightly noted that earlier U.S. imperialism had been linked to American Progressivism and especially to the international, supposedly progressive ideals of Woodrow Wilson and the big-stick diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt. The twenty-first-century imperialists, however, who defined themselves as Reagan conservatives, concluded that large political payoffs could bless their wing of Republicanism if they could sell the idea of an imperial foreign policy that combined American political and economic principles, unilateralism, a McDonald's-Disney culture, and—the necessary accompaniment—a military that absorbed nearly as much of the gross national product as it did during the height of the cold war, when the GNP was considerably smaller.[1] Such military costs were nevertheless logical, given the ambition.

[1] Thomas E. Ricks, "Empire or Not? A Quiet Debate over U.S. Role," *Washington Post*, 21 August 2001; Kevin Baker, "The Fear in Ideas: American Imperialism, Embraced," *New York Times Magazine*, 9 December 2001, 53.

WALTER LAFEBER is a professor of government at Cornell University. He is the author of *America, Russia, and the Cold War* whose just-published 9th edition has a chapter explaining more fully the September 11 aftermath in U.S. foreign relations.

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A particular relationship between the old, Progressive imperialists and their early twenty-first-century, self-styled namesakes was notable: both sets of imperialists had to work within a context of rapid globalization. The first age of globalization began in the mid-nineteenth century and expanded until it hit the cataclysm of World War I. The second began with the new technologies of the 1970s and the American triumphalism of the late 1980s and 1990s, then lasted until the September 11 attacks. For both generations of imperialists, the globalization process turned out to be crucial. It gave them the tools and reach to shape and reshape other societies, but it simultaneously destabilized important parts of the globe by widening the gaps between rich and poor, while ironically providing better communications so those gaps became glaringly apparent to the poor. Globalization thus became both a cause and a result of the imperialism.

Evaluation of these themes of globalization and imperialism should briefly note the outcomes of the early, Progressive imperialism. Roosevelt and Wilson's racism and parochial nationalism led to military interventions in Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Cuba, among other places. These created severe problems, not solutions, in twentieth-century American foreign relations. Leaving such unfortunate results aside, imperialism is still defined as "the policy of extending the rule or authority of an empire or nation over foreign countries." "Imperial," according to *Webster's*, characterizes "the rule or authority of a sovereign state over its dependencies." Applying such definitions to the early twenty-first century seems archaic by a hundred or so years. And especially so since the world of the past quarter-century has become less amenable to a single sovereign state ruling over foreign countries. That is not to say, however, that governments, including American administrations, have not continued to think within the usual box of the 1940s to 1960s world of state-to-state relations, even when such thinking evolved into the belief that properly directed globalization was beneficially reordering the world.

The Present Era of Fragmentation

The globe has instead undergone a fragmentation on a number of levels, which accelerated even as the United States emerged as the sole superpower. The claim that the United States should become a new imperial power is actually a debate over how Americans can (or should) take the lead in retarding the fragmentation and, somehow, create order where division, small self-determining nationalisms, and privatization have produced crises. The debate is ironic in that Americans often espoused the principles and policies that helped generate the chaos of division, self-determination, and privatization. It is doubly ironic in that many analysts who believe nongovernment institutions and trends are the wave of the future, and political officials and observers who hope that multilateralism can ride that wave, are suddenly faced after September 11 with the resurrection of the state, that old agent and protector of interventionism and imperialism.

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The September 11 attacks were in one sense a climax of the globe's growing fragmentation, and the U.S.–led response demonstrated how great states attempted to reimpose needed order. Some voices on both sides of the conflict claimed that the response formed part of an attempt to impose an American-led imperial order. Another revealing irony was how the language describing an American empire was used by those who sought to extend its values and also those who used terror to fight it—as if the Americans insisted on using the same language to make a different case, which from the terrorists' perspective appeared to confirm their own claims about the ambitions of U.S. power. Much of the post-1898 American century has been shaped by United States attempts to bring its version of order out of a hundred years of political and economic upheavals, and, especially since the 1950s, political fragmentation. September 11 did mark something new, in part because of the extent of the horror, in part because so many lives were brutally taken on U.S. soil, in part because Americans formed a consensus in back of the president. Such a consensus was not always apparent earlier in the American century when the nation's interests came under attack. The strength of the consensus was surprising, because contrary to the popular Caspar Weinberger/Colin Powell doctrine that the U.S. military should be committed only when the objective and an exit strategy are clearly defined, the Bush administration warned this could be a war lasting many decades, with objectives necessarily changing in a complex, highly unpredictable, global chess game for which the other side made its own rules.

But the attacks in New York City and Washington and the nature of the U.S. response can best be viewed as part of a longer historical process.[2] In 1914, globalization integrated the world according to some criteria (as the percentage of gross domestic product devoted to overseas investments) to a larger degree than in 2000. Only a few imperial powers ordered large parts of that world. If a United Nations had existed in 1500 it could have included more than 300 sovereign units. In 1900 it would have had only thirty to fifty members, but by 2000 the membership was above 190 and rising—an overly simplified but revealing indication of the political fragmentation that occurred during the American century. World War I and the post-1929 economic depression destroyed the momentum of globalization and by the 1930s produced a fragmented world whose major political units attempted to be self-contained, even if in the cases of Germany and Japan this meant undertaking military conquests to achieve an empire. After 1945, U.S. foreign policy, above all, was directed against every effort to fragment and compartmentalize the world along lines bearing any resemblance to the 1930s. Americans are internationally re-

[2] A most useful overview, important for its review of the literature as well as its argument, is Ian Clark, *Globalization and Fragmentation; International Relations in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 2. Clark believes that fragmentation "suggests disintegration, autarchy, unilateralism, closure, and isolationism," which occur not only internationally, but "at multiple levels, affecting commitments to internationalism, patterns of regionalism, and even the very cohesion of states themselves."

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known for their lack of historical knowledge. But their historical memory of the 1930s has shaped the last half-century of their foreign policy. Or more likely, that policy espousing openness and inclusion resulting in open markets and political confederations (as in post-1947 Europe) goes back at least to the 1780s and is so historically rooted that it is part of the political DNA in most Americans who make or seriously study foreign relations.

The superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union primarily ordered the world for a period after World War II, but quite early that bipolar order began to break down. Tito, deGaulle, Castro, Mao, and above all, the massive decolonization that accelerated after 1956 fractured the so-called two camps. By the 1970s, the political fragmentation was complemented by the new technology of computers, earth satellites, and cables that performed an apparent contradiction by centralizing power in the hands of those who controlled the satellites and cables, while decentralizing power to those who (as in the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979), discovered how to use new technology to overthrow governments supported by the leading superpower. As Secretary of State George Shultz understood during the 1980s, a fatal weakness of Soviet leadership was its inability to exploit the new technology without modifying the Soviet system to the point where it was modified out of existence. Results included not only a series of independent nations once part of the Soviet empire, but an Afghanistan left fragmented by retreating Soviet troops.

At the same time, another evidence of fragmentation appeared, and again governments were directly challenged, even divided. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as Alexis de Tocqueville noted in the 1830s, are an American strength even (some would say especially) as they can weaken the effectiveness of governmental institutions. A decade after the onset of the cold war, the two superpowers jockeyed back and forth, for example, while the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations rearranged the playing field by conducting their own private foreign policies, not least by sponsoring much of the green revolution that fundamentally changed parts of the globe. By the 1970s, NGOs had grown to the tens of thousands and had become internationalized and adroit in translating their interests into political action.[3] In a pioneering account, Matthew Evangelista has argued that NGOs, especially those involved in arms control, played a critical role in transforming the Soviet Union until it finally fragmented after 1991.[4] In the United States, privatization's influence reached the level of billions of dollars, a level not attainable by many national economies. Thus Ted Turner helped pay for the U.S. debt to the United Nations, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation gave huge grants, often beyond the capacity of indi-

[3] An important short historical overview that anticipates his soon-to-be-published monograph is Akira Iriye, "A Century of NGOs," *Diplomatic History* 23 (no. 3, 1999): 421–435; Mark Lytle provides an overview of recent work in "NGOs and the New Transnational Politics," ibid. 25 (no. 1, 2001): 121–128.

[4] Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

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vidual nations, to combat diseases. These and similar actions, such as George Soros privately financing education and media, especially in eastern Europe, occurred in part because government, including the United States, refused to handle such obligations, even those involving the United Nations. As Tina Rosenberg observed, such NGO activities could be "profoundly subversive" not only in challenging authoritarian governments, but—as with Ford's grants to women's causes and family planning programs—in Third World societies.[5]

Triumphalism and Terrorism

Terrorism built on and accelerated a part of this general fragmentation made possible by the new technologies and post-1950s' political changes. U.S. policy inadvertently helped the terrorists by sending aid to the Afghan resistance to the post-1979 Russian invasion, then leaving Afghanistan after the Soviets retreated in the late 1980s. Out of the resistance movements came leading terrorists who found safety in the chaos of post-1989 Afghanistan, which had successfully defied Moscow's attempts to integrate it into one of the supposed two camps.[6] Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 871 Americans died worldwide from terrorism, an average of about forty-four each year. As Barton Gellman noted in his important *Washington Post* analyses of pre-2001 terrorism, however, "in actuarial terms, chicken bones were deadlier."

But Gellman and others spelled out how terrorists, led by the al Qaeda network, exploited the political times and new technologies by decentralizing their operations. Not all nongovernmental groups shared Western liberal values or used the new high-tech means for the realization of those values. Instead of using money transfers within the formal international banking system, the network utilized the *hawala* method of quietly transferring money across borders through trusted, informal partners working in such private, small businesses as tea shops, without physically moving the money itself. The Clinton administration rapidly increased antiterrorist funds, especially after 1996, but it could find no government agency in the Treasury Department or out that would try systematically to monitor the *hawala* transactions. As al Qaeda and other terrorist networks decentralized operations and exploited the fragmentation that increasingly characterized the post-1980s world, the United States and other leading governments continued to think within the decreasingly important box of government-to-government relations, whether those relations involved traditional political and strategic questions, or dealing with the different types of diffuse economic networks being established by the terrorists. When Clinton issued the top-secret Presidential Decision Directive 35 in 1995, it gave priority

[5] Tina Rosenberg, "Building Their Own Private State Departments," *New York Times*, 12 August 2001.

[6] David M. Shribman, "Campaign May Portend a New Cold War," *Boston Globe*, 23 October 2001, succinctly outlines the process and context.

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for intelligence collection to the traditional state enemies of Russia, China, Iraq, and Iran; only in the third tier of priorities did it consider terrorism.[7]

Ironies again appeared. A quality of the American style that Tocqueville and later observers admired—the strength of the nongovernmental organizations and the informal networks they established to create an admirable civil society—was developed with new sophistication by terrorists for considerably less admirable purposes. U.S. officials only slowly realized what was happening. The end of the cold war, for which the first Bush administration happily took credit ("By the grace of God," the President proclaimed in January 1991, "America Won the Cold War"),[8] helped lead not only to the fragmenting of the Soviet Union and a few other states, such as Czechoslovakia, but to the opening of borders and a rapid increase in the free movement of people and goods. Since 1945, Americans had led the fight for this free movement, partly because it would weaken the communist iron curtain, mostly because it fit in with several centuries of American social and economic beliefs. Osama bin Laden understood the double-edged irony of the cold war's end. His al Qaeda network expanded in the early 1990s into as many as twenty countries, and some—Tajikistan and Bosnia—were created by the fragmentation that resulted from the end of the superpower rivalry and the victory of the United States. And bin Laden despised the American triumphalism and the policy, as well as the hubris, that easily flowed from winning the cold war. "The collapse of the Soviet Union," he declared, "made the U.S. more haughty and arrogant and it has started to look at itself as a master of this world and established what it calls the New World Order."[9]

The postwar world and American triumphalism were ready-made for private terrorist networks, which resembled ju-jitsu experts who moved to use the strength of the opponent to defeat that enemy. As al Qaeda broadened its informal, decentralized networks, U.S. officials hoped to use state regimes, especially in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, to undercut the terrorists. The Saudis not only refused to cooperate, but covertly sent funds to al Qaeda in an attempt to buy protection. Pakistan continually promised to help, but as relations with the United States deteriorated during the 1990s never followed through on its promises. When the Pentagon suggested attacking the *hawala* network, perhaps electronically, others in the Clinton administration doubted it would work; Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin was especially concerned that an electronic attack would be construed as an act of war and open the world's largest banking center, the United States, to a similar kind of new-technology retaliation.[10] Rubin was correct in believing that an integrated, nation-based banking system was

[7] Barton Gellman, "Struggles inside the Government Defined Campaign," *Washington Post*, 20 December 2001.

[8] Text is in the *New York Times*, 29 January 1992.

[9] The bin Laden quote is given and set in context in Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (New York: The Free Press, 2001), 19–22.

[10] Gellman, "Struggles Inside the Government."

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more vulnerable to cyberwar than were the *hawala* networks. More open to question was the extent to which Clinton administration officials could think outside traditional banking categories that were becoming dangerously irrelevant, given the dangers increasingly posed by the decentralized terrorist networks. After all, as the *New York Times* phrased it, Osama bin Laden "fundamentally changed the nature of terrorist financing" by undertaking "a privatization of terror" and "creating a far more diffuse network than any faced in the past." Al Qaeda's evolving, decentralized financial system "transformed the nature of international terrorism."[11]

The course of bin Laden's attacks after 1993 (when terrorists attacked New York City's Trade Center and, according to bin Laden himself, his al Qaeda network was involved with the killing of eighteen U.S. soldiers in Somalia, which forced Clinton to pull the remaining troops out of the East African clan war) until 1998 (when al Qaeda bombed two U.S. embassies in Africa) climaxed with an American response that perfectly caught the fragmentation and privatization of the danger. In retaliation for the embassy attacks, Clinton ordered missiles fired at an area in Afghanistan, where bin Laden was thought to be hiding, and at a plant in Sudan suspected of producing materials for chemical weapons. Sudan was doubly suspect because political chaos in the country had allowed bin Laden to have a safe haven until the Sudanese government finally expelled him in 1996. The missiles missed bin Laden and, as evidence later indicated, the suspected chemical weapons facility had a relationship neither to chemical weapons nor to al Qaeda. Peter Bergen's analysis is revealing: the Clinton administration had earlier attacked Iraq and Serbia, but these targeted governments who were in conflict with the United States; the attacks on the Sudanese plant and the Afghanistan region, however, were "highly unusual" in that "now an *individual* and his followers were the subject of missile attacks directed at two sovereign nations where al Qaeda had some presence."[12]

In the months leading to the September 11 attacks, it seems clear that the Clinton and Bush administrations understood the potential dangers posed by bin Laden and the al Qaeda network, which by now, according to some officials, reached into as many as sixty countries. But they had little sense of how to deal with this brutal and corrupted version of fragmentation and privatization. While the Clinton administration multiplied its resources for fighting terrorism, U.S. officials hoped that the threat could be contained through the assassination of bin Laden; the cooperation of states such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which were familiar with the terrorists's operations; or the destruction of regimes suspected of supporting and supplying the al Qaeda network—above all, Iraq. Clinton, however, could never discover bin Laden's whereabouts long enough to launch an effective military strike; could never convince the Saudis,

[11] Kurt Eichenwald, "Terror Money Hard to Block, Officials Find," *New York Times*, 10 December 2001.

[12] Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.*, 119. (Emphasis in original.)

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Pakistanis, or any other related state to cooperate in dismantling al Qaeda; and failed utterly to deal with Saddam Hussein's supplying of terrorist networks or his work on weapons of mass destruction.

The reasons for these fatal failures of the 1990s are multiple. Clinton's diplomacy refused to pressure supposed friends such as the Saudis, especially when they were needed for both cheap oil to keep the economy booming and strategic U.S. military bases that institutionalized the power accumulated from the Gulf War. Certainly the failure to continue at least the international inspections of Iraq's plants capable of producing weapons of mass destruction was due to French, Russian, and Chinese resistance, as well as to Saddam Hussein's ability after 1997 to outmaneuver Clinton at every turn. At a more fundamental level, U.S. officials could not recreate a more centralized cold war framework for international relationships (that is, a framework that posited an overwhelming outside threat) in order to achieve dual objectives: force the recalcitrant nations to cooperate against that threat, which in the 1990s appeared to be only a sporadic danger; and convince Americans that privatized terrorism merited the same kind of attention given earlier to the Soviet Union.

This last point needs emphasis, especially since it has received too little emphasis since the September 11 attacks. Tocqueville predicted 170 years ago that Americans would encounter grave difficulties carrying out foreign policies beyond the North American continent, because they paid relatively little attention to diplomacy (little, that is, relative to domestic policy and the drive to make money, which Tocqueville analyzed at length). Nor, he believed, did Americans culturally embody the characteristics needed to wage diplomacy successfully over a period of time—the need for secrecy and consistency, or the understanding (that is the history) of the national interests. The 1990s provided a case study for the accuracy of Tocqueville's thesis. The United States was immersed in the triumphalism that followed the end of the cold war and the Gulf War, consumed after mid-decade with a booming stock market, governed by an administration that put economic success first in its hierarchy of national priorities, and ruled after 1994 by a Republican Congress that unlike the Republican Congresses of 1947–1949 prided itself on ignoring overseas needs and demands while it tried to pass a "Contract for America" that was almost entirely focused on the domestic arena. Thus the years leading up to the September 11 attacks were too much shaped by the parochial priorities of the political elite, media, and public.

A larger question, however, is whether the elite, media, and public, even if they had paid more attention to foreign policy, could have understood what was happening, given the complex and confusing fragmentation that had overtaken much of the globe. Even as Americans celebrated and utilized the growth of NGOs for such purposes as protecting the environment, arms control, human rights, and fighting diseases, and even as many of these Americans preached the values of privatization (and preached even louder when the audience was European or Latin American), they had little interest and less understanding

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of how terrorist networks were utilizing the approaches of NGOs and privatization, as well as exploiting that third American principle, globalization. The problem posed by Tocqueville—how a highly pluralistic U.S. democracy might somehow formulate and conduct a coherent foreign policy—was solved during the cold war by the threat of communism, possessing nuclear weapons, which forced Americans into a consensus well shaped by Harry Truman and his successors down through Ronald Reagan. Despite Clinton's well-founded reputation for being an exceptionally shrewd politician and communicator, he apparently had little idea of how to deal with this new, post-1989 Tocqueville problem. In any event, he placed his priorities elsewhere and was too often preoccupied with topics associated with tabloids rather than with Tocqueville.

Clinton usually made the right economic choices while too often making the wrong cultural and foreign policy choices. His legacy will not be what many, including the former President himself, think of as the Clinton Doctrine—that is, using U.S. military intervention in such areas as Bosnia and Kosovo to halt further fragmentation, prevent the spread of brutality, and short-circuit possible strategic threats to U.S. interests. The real Clinton doctrine was more closely associated with the astonishing stock market of the 1990s. That doctrine's cornerstones were the North American Free Trade Agreement, the creation of the World Trade Organization, and the President's successful battle for American agreement to China's inclusion in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Clinton was the globalization president during the 1990s, when the processes of globalization and fragmentation went hand-in-hand.[13]

"Globalism Under Siege"

The September 11 attacks with horrible symbolism utilized some of the technologies of globalization to climax a decade of rapid globalization and as a consequence threatened to bring globalization to a standstill, if not throw it into retreat. Within a hundred or so days after the attack, articles appeared in prestigious publications questioning the values, success, and future of the process. The *Wall Street Journal* justifiably headlined a long analysis, "Globalism Under Siege." *Foreign Affairs* labeled several important articles, "Globalization and Its Discontents."[14] At the local levels, antiglobalization protesters who had made headlines with their sometimes violent actions at meetings of international organizations in Seattle, Genoa, and Goteborg, moved into the background after September 11. By mid-December 2001, however, some 80,000 protesters led by labor unions rallied against a European Union summit in Brussels. The antiglobalization leaders in Brussels notably did not oppose the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan, but argued that a military response was

[13] Clark, *Globalization and Fragmentation*, is helpful on the important links and reciprocal relationships between the two processes, esp. 172–196.

[14] John Micklethwait and Adrian Woolridge, "Globalism under Siege," *Wall Street Journal*, 9 November 2001; *Foreign Affairs* 81 (January/February, 2002).

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not enough to deal with terrorism's roots. Globalization, they argued, had resulted in ever-widening gaps between rich and poor in key areas of the world, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, two countries that notably provided the terrorist leadership that carried out the September 11 attacks. To stop the globalization, and the resulting fragmentation, the Brussels protesters asked for government-sponsored massive aid programs to fight poverty and to provide greater protection for domestic industries that could put the impoverished to work.[15]

Other antiglobalization efforts were less constructive. For example, in Pakistan, whose government was the most important U.S. ally in the military campaign against Afghanistan's Taliban government, crowds organized by radical Islamic groups smashed and looted Kentucky Fried Chicken and McDonald's outlets, while burning American flags outside another McDonald's. Rioters also threatened Pizza Huts, Dunkin Donuts stands, a Nike store, and billboards advertising American multinational brands. Henry Kaufman, an economist and former vice chair of Salomon Brothers, concluded that "globalization is going to be at a standstill for awhile, until this high level of uncertainty diminishes." The multinationals tried to deal with these protests by emphasizing how their companies believed in fragmentation, localism, and decentralization. McDonald's was not an American company, the firm insisted, but "a confederation of very local companies" owned and run by local people: "We don't act local; we are local. It's localization, not globalization." One observer who closely studied this apparent fragmentation concluded that the combination of the intense belief that growing profitability rested on globalization, and the consequent threat to local cultures and businesses resulting from the globalizing process, gave multinationals no choice but to emphasize the benefits of decentralization. "McDonald's is like the British empire was," observed Eric Schlosser. "It looks enormous on the map, but it expanded because there were core economic problems at home."[16]

Historians have long observed how empires can be most vulnerable at their outer limits. President John F. Kennedy translated such an observation into a much larger U.S. commitment to Vietnam. Those who want to create or maintain empires, whether formal (as in the British case) or informal (as in the multiple political, economic, military, and cultural levels of the American example) quickly discover the high costs of such commitments. To extend Schlosser's conclusion, not only are McDonald's and other American franchises global, but U.S. troops are also positioned around the globe, including in Saudi Arabia where their presence on soil Islam considers sacred helped drive bin Laden to launch terrorism aimed principally at overthrowing the Saudi ruling families. These franchises and military units are overseas not primarily because of the

[15] Philip Shishkin, "Globalization's Foes Reappear in Force at Brussels Project," *Wall Street Journal*, 14 December 2001.

[16] David Barboza, "When Golden Arches Are too Red, White, and Blue," *New York Times*, 14 October 2001; Pamela Constable, "Pakistani Mobs Destroy KFC Outlet and U.S. Flags, *Washington Post*, 13 October 2001.

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attractiveness of American culture and military protection, but because of the needs of the United States. The fragmentation of American multinationals and, in a not dissimilar fashion, the post-1980s world, has a price. Those who espouse a new imperial policy in the early twenty-first century understand some of the processes of decentralization and fragmentation, so much so that they demand a much larger U.S. military either to protect or stop (depending on which will more benefit American interests), the process. It is not clear that the new imperialists understand either the complexities of the fragmentation that narrow choices or the price that might be required to bring about the desired order in such a complex empire.

"Hence the worry," as two op-ed writers phrased it in the *Wall Street Journal* two months after September 11, "that the attack on the World Trade Center will prove a turning point [for globalization], just as the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 marked the end of the first age of globalization." Given the editorial page on which they wrote, the authors were necessarily optimistic; more, not less, globalization, they concluded, was the proper solution for dealing with those areas such as Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Islamic world, which had been left out of the process and were now failing to cooperate sufficiently in tracking down terrorists. But even these authors had to admit that "the danger is . . . a process of gradual reversal," because even before September 11 antiglobalization efforts were gathering force. The attacks of that day accelerated those "efforts." For example, "the war against terrorism is . . . demanding tighter controls on immigration and capital." Groups stretching from "European farmers and South Carolina textile workers to African dictators and French culture bureaucrats" were pushing "for more barriers."[17] The authors were twice correct. The post-September 11 antiglobalization efforts had indeed gathered strength and had done so in part because they could point to severe problems within the process that had become apparent before the attacks on New York City and Washington.

One such problem grew from globalization's inability to solve highly dangerous problems of poverty in certain parts of the world out of which the terrorists came. This inability was due less to globalization's excesses than to its limits. It could produce wealth, but it could not necessarily distribute it more equitably or with the necessary intelligence. One analysis concludes that when Tocqueville wrote, the richest country had about three times as much income as the poorest. By 2001, after two long eras of twentieth-century globalization, the richest nation had thirty times the income.[18] During the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. policy makers had mistaken high growth rates in Central America as promises for economic and political stability. Because the growth was so badly distributed, however, it produced a series of revolutions. In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. policy makers and important members of the business community mistook

[17] Micklethwait and Woolridge, "Globalism Under Siege."

[18] Jeff Madrick, "Economic Scene," *New York Times*, 1 November 2001.

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globalization for beneficial integration and stabilizing wealth, especially when it was accompanied by the joys of American mass culture. Because the globalization led to an often undesired U.S. presence and a fragmentation caused by local and even national resistance, and because the benefits of globalization were either doubtful or badly distributed, one result was a terrorism that exploited both the globalization and fragmentation.

Americans seemed to understand only one part of the process, globalization; terrorists understood and utilized both parts, globalization and its related fragmentation. U.S. and World Trade Organization officials began in a most preliminary fashion to consider how to fix these fundamental problems in November 2001, when they met in Doha, Qatar to try to establish new guidelines for key parts of the globalization process. The Doha guidelines revealed a notable retreat by the United States and some of its industrialized partners. The Bush administration agreed, for example, to lessen patent protection for brand-name drugs so, at least in emergencies, poorer nations could acquire inexpensive generic versions—especially for AIDS-plagued nations in Africa. Freer trade principles that exploited weaker nations were modified to allow those nations some self-protection. Champions of globalization continued to worry about the post-September 11 onslaught on the process. In the long run, it might provide the rising economic tide to lift all boats. In the short run, however, it did not promise to alleviate the problems of poverty and terrorism that washed over much of the globe. Meanwhile, John Maynard Keynes's dictim about where everyone ends up in the long run still applied.

The Revenge of the State

Keynes's legacy also proved interesting on a related front. Facing a growing recession already in place before September 11, but considerably worsened by the attacks, the George W. Bush administration necessarily ignored its earlier principle that government was best that spent least, and passed a large fiscal stimulus package that in some respects was Keynesian. In other respects, the targeting of wealthier Americans and large corporations for most of the package's benefits, the legislation seemed to recall Andrew Mellon more than Lord Keynes. Worldly Europeans understood what was happening, but expressed puzzlement. For years, they claimed, Americans had preached that the market should decide, subsidies and tariffs be eliminated, and globalization prevail. Then as the U.S. economy headed downhill during the weeks after September 11, the Bush administration threatened to impose antidumping fines to protect the American steel industry. As an anthrax scare settled over the U.S. Post Office and the heavily populated region between New York City and Washington, the administration forgot about its view that drug patents must be protected and instead threatened to bypass Bayer's patent for Cipro so Americans could have cheaper protection against anthrax. Elie Cohen, a leading economist and political adviser in France, where contradictions in U.S. policy never go unno-

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ticed, declared that when "Americans are facing the same problems" Europe and other parts of the world have long faced, the Americans "seem to forget the universal laws of the market."[19]

But this contradiction was only apparent. Americans have seldom been reluctant to fix markets when they deem it in their interest, regardless of their rhetoric. In any event, contradiction was not the most interesting characteristic of the Bush response. The administration's indication about the economic role now to be played by government was only a part of the much larger political, economic, and, especially, military responsibility that was being accepted by Washington both at home and internationally. On a trivial level, President Bush, who while campaigning for the office did not know the names of heads of governments and seemed not to care, conferred with forty-six such figures in the three months after September 11. With some of those leaders, including Vladimir Putin of Russia and Tony Blair of Great Britain, he formed surprisingly close personal and policy ties. On the most important level, the President oversaw the creation of a wartime state apparatus that was as powerful and centralized as any since World War II and gave him executive powers unmatched in perhaps a half-century.

To rephrase, the fragmentation and privatization that helped produce terrorism and an increasingly unstable economic world after September 11 was now to be countered by a new, evolving, considerably more centralized U.S. government that happened to be in the hands primarily of the political party known for urging privatization and decentralization. The world, however, had grown too dangerous for private, marketplace solutions even before the September attacks, and the attacks vividly and literally brought home the dangers.[20] Governmental powers mushroomed until one conservative writer appropriately called it the relegitimation of central institutions.[21] The author was correct in the broad sense, but the institutions had to be relegitimated in part because of Bush and the Republican right's attack on them during the 1990s. Democrat and Republican liberals, although they seldom wanted any longer to identify themselves with the term, had less trouble supporting the revitalization of governmental institutions so they could fight what promised to be a long and costly war against international terrorism. Strong presidential powers were in the tradition of many Democratic chief executives, especially during the frequent wartime years of the twentieth century. Americans not only supported such powers after September 11, but for the first time in more than a generation, a majority told pollsters they trusted the government to do the right thing most of the time.

[19] Alan Cowell, "European Converts to Laissez-Faire," *New York Times*, 25 October 2001.

[20] Robert Gilpin, with the assistance of Jean Millis Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), esp. chaps 10–11, presents the case that the pre-September 11 world of international economics and globalization was in dangerous disarray, indeed, in a race to the bottom, because of the lack of political leadership and involvement.

[21] Michael Kelly, "The Left's Great Divide," *Washington Post*, 7 November 2001.

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Bush's centralization of power in the White House after the attacks was breathtaking. He justified it by constantly declaring that this terrorism was an act of war. The country was in a war even though Congress, which according to the Constitution held final authority, had never formally declared war. It was, moreover, a peculiar kind of conflict unlike World Wars I and II or even the Korean war, in which Americans were mobilized and sacrifices demanded. Bush asked not for sacrifice, except from the volunteer military and reserves; instead he pleaded with Americans to spend as much as possible in order to restore a sense of normality and, above all, pump-prime a slowing economy. He centralized power so that Congress and many non–U.S. citizens lost prerogatives, but the rest of the population little noticed or apparently cared—as long as they were told the military campaigns went according to plan, they believed the economy would soon improve, and above all, they felt some confidence that no further major terrorist attacks would occur on American soil.

Bush established a Homeland Security office to oversee continental defense against terrorism. He opposed having Congress grant statutory authority to it, thus its director could refuse congressional requests for him to testify. Attorney General John Ashcroft ruled, without the usual waiting period to hear public comment, that the Justice Department could listen to lawyer-client conversations if Ashcroft believed it necessary, even if the people involved had not been charged and even in the absence of a court order allowing wiretaps. The attorney general ordered the arrest of more than 540 persons charged with only immigration violations. He then held them while refusing to make public why they were being held at such length and declining even to reveal their names. An uproar followed the disclosure by Bush and Ashcroft that military tribunals would be established to try non–U.S. citizens who were suspected of terrorism. The President justified this action on precedents set by Abraham Lincoln and, especially, Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II. But Bush's order went beyond such previous acts by forcing defendants to testify in secret, allowing evidence to be withheld from defendants, providing for a death sentence if only two-thirds of the judges agreed (instead of the usual required unanimity), and giving those convicted the right of appeal to the Pentagon or the White House instead of to the Supreme Court. Using the military campaigns as cover, Bush also issued an executive order allowing a sitting president to block the release of an earlier president's papers. He thus arbitrarily nullified a law passed by Congress and agreed to by previous chief executives that those papers had to be open (as they were for 200 years) so Americans and their representatives could be properly informed as they made decisions. Cynics noted that Bush's action could prevent disclosure of his father's activities which, for example, included working with Panama's dictator Manuel Noriega and Iraq's Saddam Hussein before the United States decided to go to war against both in 1989–1990. When Bush tried to cut intelligence briefings to congressional intelligence committees, Republican Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska said the President "put out a public document telling the world he doesn't trust the Congress."

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Bush worked out a compromise, but made the same point again by refusing to send a few treaties that required congressional debate and ratification to Capitol Hill, and instead dealt with some (as the Biological Weapons Convention) so Congress could be circumvented.[22]

Information from the military campaigns in Afghanistan was sketchy as reporters on the scene worked under restrictions that had not been in place during the Vietnam conflict. But this was precisely the point: since that conflict, when factual reporting had undermined the often misleading daily handouts from the White House and Pentagon and fueled an antiwar movement, the military and the White House had determined a certain amount of censorship to be necessary so that the right message would reach Americans. Bush's father had used this censorship successfully in the Panama invasion of 1989 and the Gulf War. Clinton did not get it in place in Somalia during 1993, when the killing and mutilation of American military personnel, graphically shown by new technology earth satellites on American television screens, forced the President to withdraw the remaining troops. The lesson from the past forty years thus seemed clear: the less Americans knew, the more likely they were to support the President's actions overseas. There was also another lesson: the new technology of globalization did not necessarily decentralize knowledge and power, but in certain hands under the right circumstances, could be used to centralize and increase governmental powers.

The White House and the State Department also set up a new office to get its controlled message overseas, especially to Islamic audiences who had been strongly influenced by Osama bin Laden's observations distributed on videos. A former advertising executive, Charlotte Beers, was brought in "to try to make American values as much a brand name as McDonald's hamburgers or Ivory soap," according to one observer. When she briefed foreign journalists in Washington, however, U.S. journalists were excluded. The State Department explained, "We can't give out our propaganda to our own people."[23] Nearly all of these post-September 11 initiatives were excused by the claim that it was a new kind of war, and anyway the President's approval ratings were at historic highs. E. S. Corwin famously noted a half-century ago that in the realm of foreign policy, the Constitution was an "invitation" to a struggle between the President and Congress. After September 11, Congress rapidly lost the struggle.

President Bush's actions were part of the broad campaign to stop the fragmentation of power that had marked the post-1980s era. When he visited China in October 2001, the campaign was explicit. Human rights groups and other NGOs had long criticized and tried to slow the U.S. relationship with China

[22] Dana Milbank, "In War, It's Power to the President," *Washington Post*, 20 November 2001, has an overview of the presidential actions; Editorial, "Justice Deformed," *New York Times*, 2 December 2001, critically summarizes the attorney general's actions; while ibid., 18 November 2001, provides a long analysis placing the civil liberty versus security argument in context.

[23] Elizabeth Becker, "In the War on Terrorism, A Battle to Shape Opinion," *New York Times*, 11 November 2001.

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because of the communist regime's brutal treatment of dissidents. After September 11, the President made it clear that his administration's desire for China's cooperation against terrorism shaped Washington's approach to the exclusion of nearly all else, including human rights. China's willingness to go along with many of the American initiatives against Osama bin Laden warmed relations between Washington and Beijing that had been under considerable strain before September 11. Leaders of the dissident movements understood Bush's priority, but many, such as He Xingtong, whose husband was serving a thirteen-year prison sentence for establishing a short-lived political party, bitterly complained that the President apparently never even mentioned the growing human rights problems to China's leaders.[24] Interests that had especially driven nongovernmental groups had given way to the government-defined and conducted war.

War in Afghanistan targeted the al Qaeda terrorist network and Osama bin Laden. In this sense, it was a different war than Americans had ever fought before. It was a war against an amorphous, decentralized, privatized terrorism instead of a war primarily against formal states. Al Qaeda, however, needed some state support in order to survive, and that need made it easier for the Bush administration to wage the war and explain it to Americans. Thus four months after September 11, and after a series of vigorous military campaigns, the al Qaeda network had been weakened but not destroyed; few of its leaders had been captured; and bin Laden had evaded search teams. But the Taliban regime of Afghanistan that had protected and been handsomely bought off by bin Laden had fallen. The country came under a more traditional and notably decentralized government. It seemed to be only a matter of time until bin Laden, stripped of state support, would be found. The question then became where the U.S. antiterrorist campaign would move next. Again, this question was defined in terms of dealing primarily with states, not only with dispersed, informal terrorist networks. And the state that a growing American and especially Washington consensus seemed to target was Saddam Hussein's Iraq, which had been labeled the K-Mart for international terrorists.

Concluding Themes

If the Bush administration were to decide to overthrow the Iraqi dictator, it would further confirm three broad themes that appeared after September 11. First, a new emphasis on state-to-state relations, especially since a decision to attack Iraq would require the kind of extensive, sensitive, multilateral diplomacy that the Bush administration seemed to relish denigrating before the attacks, was now necessary to bring into a coalition key nations that were most reluctant to wage an all-out military campaign to overthrow Saddam, especially without further evidence of Saddam's involvement with the attacks on New

[24] Philip P. Pan, "Disappointed Dissidents," *Washington Post*, 27 October 2001.

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York and Washington. Second, the new importance of nation-building, a task Bush and some of his closest advisers had said before September 11 to be beneath U.S. purposes and beyond American capabilities, now had to be undertaken in Afghanistan and perhaps later elsewhere on a much grander, complex, and dangerous scale. Third, centralized governmental decision making in the United States would necessarily drastically increase both the powers of the President and the importance of state-to-state relations.

The September 11 attacks, therefore, seemed to mark, if not the end, at least a major modification of the post-1980s era of fragmentation. That era had its roots in the cold war, then was notably shaped by the appearance of new, supposedly decentralizing technologies and the end of the Soviet empire. If a new American empire, espoused by some conservative observers in Washington, was to be realized, and a supposedly beneficent American imperialism was to stabilize the world by creating out of the pre-2001 fragmentation an order based on U.S. values, it would be the kind of full-time job that could fully tax Americans' limited attention-span toward foreign policy, not to mention their willingness to sacrifice meaningfully over a long period of time for the sake of the imperium.

During and even before the post-cold-war era of the 1990s, Americans enjoyed democracy on the cheap. Government and political participation were deemphasized. Economic growth, American cultural and technological globalization, and decision-by-marketplace became the conventional answers to the questions of why many Americans grew rich, the stock market went ever upward, and other people loved Nikes and McDonalds. Globalization, however, created a mirror image of fragmentation. Out of that fragmentation came the evil of terrorism, while key governments, following Washington's lead, increasingly defined themselves out of the picture, unless it was to remove barriers to globalization or save such unfortunate parts of the new empire as Mexico and Russia, who could not quite get their roles straight without devaluations and bail-outs. The post-September 11 world will, one hopes, be less shaped by the globalization, unilateralism, and fragmentation that helped produce that world, than it will be by the people who shape governments that are open, cooperative, and knowledgeable about the past that produced the crisis. Nor will that world be shaped by some amorphous transglobal cultural currents that supposedly make all people equally interesting for study in the world's international arena. Simply because of their power, Americans are more equal than others. The question thus becomes not what kind of empire Americans will have, but what kind of democracy. Given the events of the past decade, there is no automatically optimistic answer to that question.

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

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The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror

RICHARD K. BETTS

In given conditions, action and reaction can be ridiculously out of proportion. . . . One can obtain results monstrously in excess of the effort. . . . Let's consider this auto smash-up. . . . The driver lost control at high speed while swiping at a wasp which had flown in through a window and was buzzing around his face. . . . The weight of a wasp is under half an ounce. Compared with a human being, the wasp's size is minute, its strength negligible. Its sole armament is a tiny syringe holding a drop of irritant, formic acid. . . . Nevertheless, that wasp killed four big men and converted a large, powerful car into a heap of scrap.

—Eric Frank Russell[1]

To grasp some implications of the new first priority in U.S. foreign policy, it is necessary to understand the connections among three things: the imbalance of power between terrorist groups and counterterrorist governments; the reasons that groups choose terror tactics; and the operational advantage of attack over defense in the interactions of terrorists and their opponents. On September 11, 2001, Americans were reminded that the overweening power that they had taken for granted over the past dozen years is not the same as omnipotence. What is less obvious but equally important is that the power is itself part of the cause of terrorist enmity and even a source of U.S. vulnerability.

There is no consensus on a definition of "terrorism," mainly because the term is so intensely pejorative.[2] When defined in terms of tactics, consistency

[1] William Wolf in Eric Frank Russell, *Wasp* (London: Victor Gollancz, 2000, originally published 1957), 7.

[2] "The word has become a political label rather than an analytical concept." Martha Crenshaw, *Terrorism and International Cooperation* (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1989), 5.

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falters, because most people can think of some "good" political cause that has used the tactics and whose purposes excuse them or at least warrant the group's designation as freedom fighters rather than terrorists. Israelis who call the Khobar Towers bombers of 1996 terrorists might reject that characterization for the Irgun, which did the same thing to the King David Hotel in 1946, or some Irish Americans would bridle at equating IRA bombings in Britain with Tamil Tiger bombings in Sri Lanka. Anticommunists labeled the Vietcong terrorists (because they engaged in combat out of uniform and assassinated local officials), but opponents of the Saigon government did not. Nevertheless, a functional definition is more sensible than one conditioned on the identity of the perpetrators. For this article, terrorism refers to the illegitimate, deliberate killing of civilians for purposes of punishment or coercion. This holds in abeyance the questions of whether deliberate killing of civilians can ever be legitimate or killing soldiers can be terrorism.

In any case, for all but the rare nihilistic psychopath, terror is a means, not an end in itself. Terror tactics are usually meant to serve a strategy of coercion.[3] They are a use of force designed to further some substantive aim. This is not always evident in the heat of rage felt by the victims of terror. Normal people find it hard to see instrumental reasoning behind an atrocity, especially when recognizing the political motives behind terrorism might seem to make its illegitimacy less extreme. Stripped of rhetoric, however, a war against terrorism must mean a war against political groups who choose terror as a tactic.

American global primacy is one of the causes of this war. It animates both the terrorists' purposes and their choice of tactics. To groups like al Qaeda, the United States is the enemy because American military power dominates their world, supports corrupt governments in their countries, and backs Israelis against Muslims; American cultural power insults their religion and pollutes their societies; and American economic power makes all these intrusions and desecrations possible. Japan, in contrast, is not high on al Qaeda's list of targets, because Japan's economic power does not make it a political, military, and cultural behemoth that penetrates their societies.

Political and cultural power makes the United States a target for those who blame it for their problems. At the same time, American economic and military power prevents them from resisting or retaliating against the United States on its own terms. To smite the only superpower requires unconventional modes of force and tactics that make the combat cost exchange ratio favorable to the attacker. This offers hope to the weak that they can work their will despite their overall deficit in power.

Primacy on the Cheap

The United States has enjoyed military and political primacy (or hegemony, unipolarity, or whatever term best connotes international dominance) for barely

[3] For a survey of types, see Christopher C. Harmon, "Five Strategies of Terrorism," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 12 (Autumn 2001).

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a dozen years. Those who focus on the economic dimension of international relations spoke of American hegemony much earlier, but observers of the strategic landscape never did. For those who focus on national security, the world before 1945 was multipolar, and the world of the cold war was bipolar. After 1945 the United States had exerted hegemony within the First World and for a while over the international economy. The strategic competition against the Second World, however, was seen as a titanic struggle between equal politicomilitary coalitions and a close-run thing until very near the end. Only the collapse of the Soviet pole, which coincided fortuitously with renewed relative strength of the American economy, marked the real arrival of U.S. global dominance.

The novelty of complete primacy may account for the thoughtless, indeed innocently arrogant way in which many Americans took its benefits for granted. Most who gave any thought to foreign policy came implicitly to regard the entire world after 1989 as they had regarded Western Europe and Japan during the past half-century: partners in principle but vassals in practice. The United States would lead the civilized community of nations in the expansion and consolidation of a liberal world order. Overwhelming military dominance was assumed to be secure and important across most of the domestic political spectrum.

Liberal multilateralists conflated U.S. primacy with political globalization, indeed, conflated ideological American nationalism with internationalist altruism.[4] They assumed that U.S. military power should be used to stabilize benighted countries and police international violence, albeit preferably camouflaged under the banner of institutions such as the United Nations, or at least NATO. They rejected the idea that illiberal impulses or movements represented more than a retreating challenge to the West's mission and its capacity to extend its values worldwide.

Conservative unilateralists assumed that unrivaled power relieved the United States of the need to cater to the demands of others. When America acted strategically abroad, others would have to join on its terms or be left out of the action. The United States should choose battles, avoid entanglements in incompetent polities, and let unfortunates stew in their own juice. For both multilateralists and nationalists, the issue was whether the United States would decide to make an effort for world welfare, not whether a strategic challenge could threaten its truly vital interests. (Colloquial depreciation of the adjective notwithstanding, literally vital U.S. interests are those necessary to life.)

[4] Rationalization of national power as altruism resembles the thinking about benign Pax Britannica in the Crowe Memorandum: ". . . the national policy of the insular and naval State is so directed as to harmonize with the general desires and ideals common to all mankind, and more particularly . . . is closely identified with the primary and vital interests of a majority, or as many as possible, of the other nations. . . . England, more than any other non-insular Power, has a direct and positive interest in the maintenance of the independence of nations, and therefore must be the natural enemy of any country threatening the independence of others, and the natural protector of the weaker communities." Eyre Crowe, "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany," 1 January 1907, in G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914*, vol. 3: *The Testing of the Entente, 1904–6* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1928), 402–403.

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For many, primacy was confused with invulnerability. American experts warned regularly of the danger of catastrophic terrorism—and Osama bin Laden explicitly declared war on the United States in his *fatwa* of February 1998. But the warnings did not register seriously in the consciousness of most people. Even some national security experts felt stunned when the attacks occurred on September 11. Before then, the American military wanted nothing to do with the mission of "homeland defense," cited the Posse Comitatus act to suggest that military operations within U.S. borders would be improper, and argued that homeland defense should be the responsibility of civilian agencies or the National Guard. The services preferred to define the active forces' mission as fighting and winning the nation's wars—as if wars were naturally something that happened abroad—and homeland defense involved no more than law enforcement, managing relief operations in natural disasters, or intercepting ballistic missiles outside U.S. airspace. Only in America could the nation's armed forces think of direct defense of national territory as a distraction.

Being Number One seemed cheap. The United States could cut the military burden on the economy by half after the cold war (from 6 percent to 3 percent of GNP) yet still spend almost five times more than the combined military budgets of all potential enemy states. And this did not count the contributions of rich U.S. allies.[5] Of course the margin in dollar terms does not translate into a comparable quantitative margin in manpower or equipment, but that does not mean that a purchasing power parity estimate would reduce the implied gap in combat capability. The overwhelming qualitative superiority of U.S. conventional forces cuts in the other direction. Washington was also able to plan, organize, and fight a major war in 1991 at negligible cost in blood or treasure. Financially, nearly 90 percent of the bills for the war against Iraq were paid by allies. With fewer than 200 American battle deaths, the cost in blood was far lower than almost anyone had imagined it could be. Less than a decade later, Washington waged another war, over Kosovo, that cost no U.S. combat casualties at all.

In the one case where costs in casualties exceeded the apparent interests at stake—Somalia in 1993—Washington quickly stood down from the fight. This became the reference point for vulnerability: the failure of an operation that was small, far from home, and elective. Where material interests required strategic engagement, as in the oil-rich Persian Gulf, U.S. strategy could avoid costs by exploiting its huge advantage in conventional capability. Where conventional dominance proved less exploitable, as in Somalia, material interests did not require strategic engagement. Where the United States could not operate militarily with impunity, it could choose not to operate.

[5] At the end of the twentieth century, the combined military budgets of China, Russia, Iraq, Yugoslavia (Serbia), North Korea, Iran, Libya, Cuba, Afghanistan, and Sudan added up to no more than $60 billion. *The Military Balance, 1999–2000* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999), 102, 112, 132, 133, 159, 186, 275.

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Finally, power made it possible to let moral interests override material interests where some Americans felt an intense moral concern, even if in doing so they claimed, dubiously, that the moral and material stakes coincided. To some extent this happened in Kosovo, although the decision to launch that war apparently flowed from overoptimism about how quickly a little bombing would lead Belgrade to capitulate. Most notably, it happened in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For more than three decades after the 1967 Six Day War, the United States supported Israel diplomatically, economically, and militarily against the Arabs, despite the fact that doing so put it on the side of a tiny country of a few million people with no oil, against more than ten times as many Arabs who controlled over a third of the world's oil reserves.

This policy was not just an effect of primacy, since the U.S.–Israel alignment began in the cold war. The salience of the moral motive was indicated by the fact that U.S. policy proceeded despite the fact that it helped give Moscow a purchase in major Arab capitals such as Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad. Luckily for the United States, however, the largest amounts of oil remained under the control of the conservative Arab states of the Gulf. In this sense the hegemony of the United States within the anticommunist world helped account for the policy. That margin of power also relieved Washington of the need to make hard choices about disciplining its client. For decades the United States opposed Israeli settlement of the West Bank, terming the settlements illegal; yet in all that time the United States never demanded that Israel refrain from colonizing the West Bank as a condition for receiving U.S. economic and military aid.[6] Washington continued to bankroll Israel at a higher per capita rate than any other country in the world, a level that has been indispensable to Israel, providing aid over the years that now totals well over $100 billion in today's dollars.[7] Although this policy enraged some Arabs and irritated the rest, U.S. power was great enough that such international political costs did not outweigh the domestic political costs of insisting on Israeli compliance with U.S. policy.

Of course, far more than subsidizing Israeli occupation of Palestinian land was involved in the enmity of Islamist terrorists toward the United States. Many of the other explanations, however, presuppose U.S. global primacy. When American power becomes the arbiter of conflicts around the world, it makes itself the target for groups who come out on the short end of those conflicts.

[6] Washington certainly did exert pressure on Israel at some times. The administration of Bush the Elder, for example, threatened to withhold loans for housing construction, but this was a marginal portion of total U.S. aid. There was never a threat to cut off the basic annual maintenance payment of several billion dollars to which Israel became accustomed decades ago.

[7] The United States has also given aid to friendly Arab governments—huge amounts to Egypt and some to Jordan. This does not counterbalance the aid to Israel, however, in terms of effects on opinions of strongly anti-Israeli Arabs. Islamists see the regimes in Cairo and Amman as American toadies, complicit in betrayal of the Palestinians.

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Primacy and Asymmetric Warfare

The irrational evil of terrorism seems most obvious to the powerful. They are accustomed to getting their way with conventional applications of force and are not as accustomed as the powerless to thinking of terror as the only form of force that might make their enemies do their will. This is why terrorism is the premier form of "asymmetric warfare," the Pentagon buzzword for the type of threats likely to confront the United States in the post-cold war world.[8] Murderous tactics may become instrumentally appealing by default—when one party in a conflict lacks other military options.

Resort to terror is not necessarily limited to those facing far more powerful enemies. It can happen in a conventional war between great powers that becomes a total war, when the process of escalation pits whole societies against each other and shears away civilized restraints. That is something seldom seen, and last seen over a half-century ago. One does not need to accept the tendentious position that allied strategic bombing in World War II constituted terrorism to recognize that the British and Americans did systematically assault the urban population centers of Germany and Japan. They did so in large part because precision bombing of industrial facilities proved ineffective.[9] During the early phase of the cold war, in turn, U.S. nuclear strategy relied on plans to counter Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe with a comprehensive nuclear attack on communist countries that would have killed hundreds of millions. In the 1950s, Strategic Air Command targeteers even went out of their way to plan "bonus" damage by moving aim points for military targets so that blasts would destroy adjacent towns as well.[10] In both World War II and planning for World War III, the rationale was less to kill civilians per se than to wreck the enemy economies—although that was also one of Osama bin Laden's

[8] Theoretically, this was anticipated by Samuel P. Huntington in his 1962 analysis of the differences between symmetrical intergovernmental war and asymmetrical antigovernmental war. "Patterns of Violence in World Politics" in Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 19–21. Some of Huntington's analysis of insurrectionary warfare within states applies as well to transnational terrorism.

[9] The Royal Air Force gave up on precision bombing early and focused deliberately on night bombing of German cities, while the Americans continued to try precision daylight bombing. Firestorms in Hamburg, Darmstadt, and Dresden, and less incendiary attacks on other cities, killed several hundred-thousand German civilians. Over Japan, the United States quickly gave up attempts at precision bombing when weather made it impractical and deliberately resorted to an incendiary campaign that burned most Japanese cities to the ground and killed at least 300,000 civilians (and perhaps more than half a million) well before the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which killed another 200,000. Michael S. Sherry, *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 260, 413n43.

[10] The threat of deliberate nuclear escalation remained the bedrock of NATO doctrine throughout the cold war, but after the Kennedy administration, the flexible response doctrine made it conditional and included options for nuclear first-use that did not involve deliberate targeting of population centers. In the Eisenhower administration, however, all-out attack on the Soviet bloc's cities was integral to plans for defense of Western Europe against Soviet armored divisions.

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rationales for the attacks on the World Trade Center.[11] In short, the instrumental appeal of strategic attacks on noncombatants may be easier to understand when one considers that states with legitimate purposes have sometimes resorted to such a strategy. Such a double standard, relaxing prohibitions against targeting noncombatants for the side with legitimate purposes (one's own side), occurs most readily when the enemy is at least a peer competitor threatening vital interests. When one's own primacy is taken for granted, it is easier to revert to a single standard that puts all deliberate attacks against civilians beyond the pale.

In contrast to World War II, most wars are limited—or at least limited for the stronger side when power is grossly imbalanced. In such cases, using terror to coerce is likely to seem the only potentially effective use of force for the weaker side, which faces a choice between surrender or savagery. Radical Muslim zealots cannot expel American power with conventional military means, so they substitute clandestine means of delivery against military targets (such as the Khobar Towers barracks in Saudi Arabia) or high-profile political targets (embassies in Kenya and Tanzania). More than once the line has been attributed to terrorists, "If you will let us lease one of your B-52s, we will use that instead of a truck bomb." The hijacking and conversion of U.S. airliners into kamikazes was the most dramatic means of asymmetric attack.

Kamikaze hijacking also reflects an impressive capacity for strategic judo, the turning of the West's strength against itself.[12] The flip-side of a primacy that diffuses its power throughout the world is that advanced elements of that power become more accessible to its enemies. Nineteen men from technologically backward societies did not have to rely on home-grown instruments to devastate the Pentagon and World Trade Center. They used computers and modern financial procedures with facility, and they forcibly appropriated the aviation technology of the West and used it as a weapon. They not only rebelled against the "soft power" of the United States, they trumped it by hijacking the country's hard power.[13] They also exploited the characteristics of U.S. society associ-

[11] In a videotape months after the attacks, bin Laden said, "These blessed strikes showed clearly that this arrogant power, America, rests on a powerful but precarious economy, which rapidly crumbled . . . the global economy based on usury, which America uses along with its military might to impose infidelity and humiliation on oppressed people, can easily crumble. . . . Hit the economy, which is the basis of military might. If their economy is finished, they will become too busy to enslave oppressed people. . . . America is in decline; the economic drain is continuing but more strikes are required and the youths must strike the key sectors of the American economy." Videotape excerpts quoted in "Bin Laden's Words: 'America Is in Decline,' the Leader of Al Qaeda Says," *New York Times*, 28 December 2001.

[12] This is similar to the concept of political judo discussed in Samuel L. Popkin, "Pacification: Politics and the Village," *Asian Survey* 10 (August 1970); and Popkin, "Internal Conflicts—South Vietnam" in Kenneth N. Waltz and Steven Spiegel, eds., *Conflict in World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1971).

[13] Soft power is "indirect or cooptive" and "can rest on the attraction of one's ideas or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences that others express." It "tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions." Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Changing Nature of World Power," *Political Science Quarterly* 105 (Summer 1990): 181. See also Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

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ated with soft power—the liberalism, openness, and respect for privacy that allowed them to go freely about the business of preparing the attacks without observation by the state security apparatus. When soft power met the clash of civilizations, it proved too soft.

Strategic judo is also apparent in the way in which U.S. retaliation may compromise its own purpose. The counter offensive after September 11 was necessary, if only to demonstrate to marginally motivated terrorists that they could not hope to strike the United States for free. The war in Afghanistan, however, does contribute to polarization in the Muslim world and to mobilization of potential terrorist recruits. U.S. leaders can say that they are not waging a war against Islam until they are blue in the face, but this will not convince Muslims who already distrust the United States. Success in deposing the Taliban may help U.S. policy by encouraging a bandwagon effect that rallies governments and moderates among the Muslim populace, but there will probably be as many who see the U.S. retaliation as confirming al Qaeda's diagnosis of American evil. Victory in Afghanistan and follow-up operations to prevent al Qaeda from relocating bases of operation to other countries will hurt that organization's capacity to act. The number of young zealots willing to emulate the "martyrdom operation" of the nineteen on September 11, however, is not likely to decline.

Advantage of Attack

The academic field of security studies has some reason to be embarrassed after September 11. Having focused primarily on great powers and interstate conflict, literature on terrorism was comparatively sparse; most of the good books were by policy analysts rather than theorists.[14] Indeed, science fiction has etched out the operational logic of terrorism as well as political science. Eric Frank Russell's 1957 novel, from which the epigraph to this article comes, vividly illustrates both the strategic aspirations of terrorists and the offense-dominant character of their tactics. It describes the dispatch of a single agent to one of many planets in the Sirian enemy's empire to stir up fear, confusion, and panic through a series of small covert activities with tremendous ripple effects. Matched with deceptions to make the disruptions appear to be part of a campaign by a big phantom rebel organization, the agent's modest actions divert large numbers of enemy policy and military personnel, cause economic dislocations and social unrest, and soften the planet up for invasion. Wasp agents are infiltrated into numerous planets, multiplying the effects. As the agents' handlers tell him, "The pot is coming slowly but surely to the boil. Their fleets are being widely dispersed, there are vast troop movements from their overcrowded home-system to the outer planets of their empire. They're gradually

[14] For example, Bruce Hoffmann, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and American Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001); Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley S. Thayer, *America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998).

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being chivvied into a fix. They can't hold what they've got without spreading all over it. The wider they spread the thinner they get. The thinner they get, the easier it is to bite lumps out of them."[15]

Fortunately al Qaeda and its ilk are not as wildly effective as Russell's wasp. By degree, however, the phenomenon is quite similar. Comparatively limited initiatives prompt tremendous and costly defensive reactions. On September 11 a small number of men killed 3,000 people and destroyed a huge portion of prime commercial real estate, part of the military's national nerve center, and four expensive aircraft. The ripple effects, however, multiplied those costs. A major part of the U.S. economy—air travel—shut down completely for days after September 11. Increased security measures dramatically increased the overall costs of the air travel system thereafter. Normal law enforcement activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were radically curtailed as legions of agents were transferred to counterterror tasks. Anxiety about the vulnerability of nuclear power plants, major bridges and tunnels, embassies abroad, and other high-value targets prompted plans for big investments in fortification of a wide array of facilities. A retaliatory war in Afghanistan ran at a cost of a couple billion dollars a month beyond the regular defense budget for months. In one study, the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were estimated to cost the U.S. economy 1.8 million jobs.[16]

Or consider the results of a handful of 34-cent letters containing anthrax, probably sent by a single person. Besides killing several people, they contaminated a large portion of the postal system, paralyzed some mail delivery for long periods, provoked plans for huge expenditures on prophylactic irradiation equipment, shut down much of Capitol Hill for weeks, put thousands of people on a sixty-day regimen of strong antibiotics (potentially eroding the medical effectiveness of such antibiotics in future emergencies), and overloaded police and public health inspectors with false alarms. The September 11 attacks and the October anthrax attacks together probably cost the perpetrators less than a million dollars. If the cost of rebuilding and of defensive investments in reaction came to no more than $100 billion, the cost exchange ratio would still be astronomically in favor of the attack over the defense.

Analysts in strategic studies did not fall down on the job completely before September 11. At least two old bodies of work help to illuminate the problem. One is the literature on guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency, particularly prominent in the 1960s, and the other is the offense-defense theory that bur-

[15] Russell, *Wasp*, 64. The ripple effects include aspects of strategic judo. Creating a phony rebel organization leads the enemy security apparatus to turn on its own people. "If some Sirians could be given the full-time job of hunting down and garroting other Sirians, and if other Sirians could be given the full-time job of dodging or shooting down the garroters, then a distant and different life form would be saved a few unpleasant chores. . . . Doubtless the military would provide a personal bodyguard for every big wheel on Jaimec; that alone would pin down a regiment." Ibid., 26, 103.

[16] Study by the Milken Institute discussed in "The Economics: Attacks May Cost 1.8 Million Jobs," *New York Times*, 13 January 2002.

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geoned in the 1980s. Both apply well to understanding patterns of engagement between terrorists and counterterrorists. Some of the axioms derived from the empirical cases in the counterinsurgency literature apply directly, and offense-defense theory applies indirectly.

Apart from the victims of guerrillas, few still identify irregular paramilitary warfare with terrorism (because the latter is illegitimate), but the two activities do overlap a great deal in their operational characteristics. Revolutionary or resistance movements in the preconventional phase of operations usually mix small-unit raids on isolated outposts of the government or occupying force with detonations and assassinations in urban areas to instill fear and discredit government power. The tactical logic of guerrilla operations resembles that in terrorist attacks: the weaker rebels use stealth and the cover of civilian society to concentrate their striking power against one among many of the stronger enemy's dispersed assets; they strike quickly and eliminate the target before the defender can move forces from other areas to respond; they melt back into civilian society to avoid detection and reconcentrate against another target. The government or occupier has far superior strength in terms of conventional military power, but cannot counterconcentrate in time because it has to defend all points, while the insurgent attacker can pick its targets at will.[17] The contest between insurgents and counterinsurgents is "tripartite," polarizing political alignments and gaining the support of *attentistes* or those in the middle. In today's principal counterterror campaign, one might say that the yet-unmobilized Muslim elites and masses of the Third World—those who were not already actively committed either to supporting Islamist radicalism or to combating it—are the target group in the middle. As Samuel Huntington noted, "a revolutionary war is a war of attrition."[18] As I believe Stanley Hoffman once said, in re-

[17] Mao Tse-Tung's classic tracts are canonical background. For example, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War" (especially chap. 5) in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), vol. i, and "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan," in *Selected Works*, vol. ii (1967). Much of the Western analytical literature grew out of British experience in the Malayan Emergency and France's role in Indochina and Algeria. For example, Franklin Mark Osanka, ed., *Modern Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Free Press, 1962); Gerard Chaliand, ed., *Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Roger Triniquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, Daniel Lee, trans. (New York: Praeger, 1964); David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964); Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (New York: Praeger, 1966); Richard L. Clutterbuck, *The Long Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1966); George Armstrong Kelly, *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947–1962* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), chaps. 5–7, 9–10; W. P. Davison, *Some Observations on Viet Cong Operations in the Villages* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1968). See also Douglas S. Blaufarb, *The Counter-Insurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present* (New York: Free Press, 1977); D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Timothy J. Lomperis, *From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

[18] Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics," 20–27.

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bellions the insurgents win as long as they do not lose, and the government loses as long as it does not win. If al Qaeda-like groups can stay in the field indefinitely, they win.

Offense-defense theory applied nuclear deterrence concepts to assessing the stability of conventional military confrontations and focused on what conditions tended to give the attack or the defense the advantage in war.[19] There were many problems in the specification and application of the theory having to do with unsettled conceptualization of the offense-defense balance, problematic standards for measuring it, and inconsistent applications to different levels of warfare and diplomacy.[20] Offense-defense theory, which flourished when driven by the urge to find ways to stabilize the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance in Europe, has had little to say directly about unconventional war or terrorism. It actually applies more clearly, however, to this lower level of strategic competition (as well as to the higher level of nuclear war) than to the middle level of conventional military power. This is because the exchange ratio between opposing conventional forces of roughly similar size is very difficult to estimate, given the complex composition of modern military forces and uncertainty about their qualitative comparisons; but the exchange ratio in both nuclear and guerrilla combat is quite lopsided in favor of the attacker. Counterinsurgency folklore held that the government defenders need something on the order of a ten-to-one advantage over the guerrillas if they were to drive them from the field.

There has been much confusion about exactly how to define the offense-defense balance, but the essential idea is that some combinations of military technology, organization, and doctrine are proportionally more advantageous to the attack or to the defense when the two clash. "Proportionally" means that available instruments and circumstances of engagement give either the attack or the defense more bang for the buck, more efficient power out of the same level of resources. The notion of an offense-defense balance as something conceptually distinct from the balance of power means, however, that it cannot be identified with which side wins a battle or a war. Indeed, the offense-defense balance can favor the defense, while the attacker still wins, because its overall

[19] George Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System*, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988); Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978); Jack L. Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), chaps. 6–8; Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" *International Security* 22 (Spring 1998).

[20] For critiques, see Jack S. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology," *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (June 1984); Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited," *International Security* 11 (Fall 1986); Jonathan Shimshoni, "Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship," *International Security* 15 (Winter 1990/91); Richard K. Betts, "Must War Find a Way?" *International Security* 24 (Fall 1999); Betts, "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence," *World Politics* 37 (January 1985).

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margin of superiority in power was too great, despite the defense's more efficient use of power. (I am told that the Finns had a saying in the Winter War of 1939–40: "One Finn is worth ten Russians, but what happens when the eleventh Russian comes?") Thus, to say that the offense-defense balance favors the offensive terrorists today against the defensive counterterrorists does not mean that the terrorists will prevail. It does mean that terrorists can fight far above their weight, that in most instances each competent terrorist will have much greater individual impact than each good counterterrorist, that each dollar invested in a terrorist plot will have a bigger payoff than each dollar expended on counterterrorism, and that only small numbers of competent terrorists need survive and operate to keep the threat to American society uncomfortably high.

In the competition between terrorists on the attack and Americans on the defense, the disadvantage of the defense is evident in the number of high-value potential targets that need protection. The United States has "almost 600,000 bridges, 170,000 water systems, more than 2,800 power plants (104 of them nuclear), 190,000 miles of interstate pipelines for natural gas, 463 skyscrapers . . . nearly 20,000 miles of border, airports, stadiums, train tracks.[21] All these usually represented American strength; after September 11 they also represent vulnerability:

> Suddenly guards were being posted at water reservoirs, outside power plants, and at bridges and tunnels. Maps of oil and gas lines were removed from the Internet. In Boston, a ship carrying liquefied natural gas, an important source of fuel for heating New England homes, was forbidden from entering the harbor because local fire officials feared that if it were targeted by a terrorist the resulting explosion could lay low much of the city's densely populated waterfront. An attack by a knife-wielding lunatic on the driver of a Florida-bound Greyhound bus led to the immediate cessation of that national bus service. . . . Agricultural crop-dusting planes were grounded out of a concern that they could be used to spread chemical or biological agents.[22]

Truly energetic defense measures do not only cost money in personnel and equipment for fortification, inspection, and enforcement; they may require repealing some of the very underpinnings of civilian economic efficiency associated with globalization. "The competitiveness of the U.S. economy and the quality of life of the American people rest on critical infrastructure that has become increasingly more concentrated, more interconnected, and more sophisticated. Almost entirely privately owned and operated, there is very little redundancy in this system."[23] This concentration increases the potential price of vulnerability to single attacks. Tighter inspection of cargoes coming across the

[21] Jerry Schwartz, Associated Press dispatch, 6 October 2001, quoted in Brian Reich, "Strength in the Face of Terror: A Comparison of United States and International Efforts to Provide Homeland Security" (unpublished paper, Columbia University, December 2001), 5.

[22] Stephen E. Flynn, "The Unguarded Homeland" in James F. Hoge, Jr. and Gideon Rose, eds., *How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), 185.

[23] Ibid., 185–186.

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Canadian border, for example, wrecks the "just-in-time" parts supply system of Michigan auto manufacturers. Companies that have invested in technology and infrastructure premised on unimpeded movement "may see their expected savings and efficiencies go up in smoke. Outsourcing contracts will have to be revisited and inventories will have to be rebuilt."[24] How many safety measures will suffice in improving airline security without making flying so inconvenient that the air travel industry never recovers as a profit-making enterprise? A few more shoe-bomb incidents, and Thomas Friedman's proposal to start an airline called "Naked Air—where the only thing you wear is a seat belt" becomes almost as plausible as it is ridiculous.[25]

The offense-dominant character of terrorism is implicit in mass detentions of Arab young men after September 11, and proposals for military tribunals that would compromise normal due process and weaken standard criminal justice presumptions in favor of the accused. The traditional liberal axiom that it is better to let a hundred guilty people go free than to convict one innocent reflects confidence in the strength of society's defenses—confidence that whatever additional crimes may be committed by the guilty who go free will not grossly outweigh the injustice done to innocents convicted, that one criminal who slips through the net will not go on to kill hundreds or thousands of innocents. Fear of terrorists plotting mass murder reversed that presumption and makes unjust incarceration of some innocents appear like unintended but expected collateral damage in wartime combat.

Offense-defense theory helps to visualize the problem. It does not help to provide attractive solutions, as its proponents believed it did during the cold war. Then offense-defense theory was popular because it seemed to offer a way to stabilize the East-West military confrontation. Mutual deterrence from the superpowers' confidence in their counteroffensive capability could substitute for defense at the nuclear level, and both sides' confidence in their conventional defenses could dampen either one's incentives to attack at that level. Little of this applies to counterterrorism. Both deterrence and defense are weaker strategies against terrorists than they were against communists.

Deterrence is still relevant for dealing with state terrorism; Saddam Hussein or Kim Jong-Il may hold back from striking the United States for fear of retaliation. Deterrence offers less confidence for preventing state sponsorship of terrorism; it did not stop the Taliban from hosting Osama bin Laden. It offers even less for holding at bay transnational groups like al Qaeda, which may lack a return address against which retaliation can be visited, or whose millenialist aims and religious convictions make them unafraid of retaliation. Defense, in turn, is better than a losing game only because the inadequacy of deterrence leaves no alternative.[26] Large investments in defense will produce appreciable reductions in vulnerability, but will not minimize vulnerability.

[24] Ibid., 193–194.

[25] Thomas L. Friedman, "Naked Air," *New York Times*, 26 December 2001.

[26] See Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, "America and the New Terrorism," *Survival* 42 (Spring 2000): 59, 66–69, 74.

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Deterrence and defense overlap in practice. The U.S. counteroffensive in Afghanistan constitutes retaliation, punishing the Taliban for shielding al Qaeda and sending a warning to other potential state sponsors. It is also active defense, whittling down the ranks of potential perpetrators by killing and capturing members of the Islamist international brigades committed to jihad against the United States. At this writing, the retaliatory function has been performed more effectively than the defensive, as the Taliban regime has been destroyed, but significant numbers of Arab Afghans and al Qaeda members appear to have escaped, perhaps to plot another day.

Given the limited efficacy of deterrence for modern counterterrorism, it remains an open question how much of a strategic success we should judge the impressive victory in Afghanistan to be. Major investments in passive defenses (airline security, border inspections, surveillance and searches for better intelligence, fortification of embassies, and so forth) are necessary, but will reduce vulnerability at a cost substantially greater than the costs that competent terrorist organizations will have to bear to probe and occasionally circumvent them. The cost-exchange ratio for direct defense is probably worse than the legendary 10:1 ratio for successful counterinsurgency, and certainly worse than the more than 3:1 ratio that Robert McNamara's analysts calculated for the advantage of offensive missile investments over antiballistic missile systems—an advantage that many then and since have thought warranted accepting a situation of mutual vulnerability to assured destruction.[27]

The less prepared we are to undertake appropriate programs and the more false starts and confusions that are likely, the worse the cost-exchange ratio will be in the short term. The public health system, law enforcement organizations, and state and local bureaucrats are still feeling their way on what, how, and in which sequence to boost efforts. The U.S. military will also have to overcome the natural and powerful effects of inertia and attachments to old self-conceptions and preferred programs and modes of operation. Impulses to repackage old priorities in the rhetoric of new needs will further dilute effectiveness of countermeasures.

Nevertheless, given low confidence that deterrence can prevent terrorist attacks, major improvements in defenses make sense.[28] This is especially true because the resource base from which the United States can draw is vastly larger than that available to transnational terrorists. Al Qaeda may be rich, but it does not have the treasury of a great power. Primacy has a soft underbelly, but it is

[27] Estimates in the 1960s indicated that even combining ABM systems with counterforce strikes and fallout shelters, the United States would have to counter each Soviet dollar spent on ICBMs with three U.S. dollars to protect 70 percent of the industry, assuming highly effective ABMs (.8 kill probability). To protect up to 80 percent of the population, far higher ratios would be necessary. Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 321–324.

[28] For an appropriate list of recommendations see *Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism*, Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, Pursuant to Public Law 277, 105th Congress (Washington, DC, June 2000). This report holds up very well in light of September 11.

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far better to have primacy than to face it. Even at an unfavorable cost exchange ratio, a number of defensive measures are a sensible investment, but only because our overwhelming advantage in resources means that we are not constrained to focus solely on the most efficient countermeasures.

At the same time, as long as terrorist groups remain potent and active, a serious war plan must exploit efficient strategies as well. Given the offense-dominant nature of terrorist operations, this means emphasis on counter-offensive operations. When terrorists or their support structures can be found and fixed, preemptive and preventive attacks will accomplish more against them, dollar for dollar, than the investment in passive defenses. Which is the more efficient use of resources: to kill or capture a cell of terrorists who might otherwise choose at any time to strike whichever set of targets on our side is unguarded, or to try to guard all potential targets? Here the dangers are that counteroffensive operations could prove counterproductive. This could easily happen if they degenerate into brutalities and breaches of laws of war that make counterterrorism begin to appear morally equivalent to its target, sapping political support and driving the uncommitted to the other side in the process of polarization that war makes inevitable. Whether counteroffensive operations gain more in eliminating perpetrators than they lose in alienating and mobilizing "swing voters" in the world of Muslim opinion depends on how successful the operations are in neutralizing significant numbers of the organizers of terrorist groups, as opposed to foot soldiers, and in doing so with minimal collateral damage.

Primacy and Policy

September 11 reminded those Americans with a rosy view that not all the world sees U.S. primacy as benign, that primacy does not guarantee security, and that security may now entail some retreats from the economic globalization that some had identified with American leadership. Primacy has two edges—dominance and provocation. Americans can enjoy the dominance but must recognize the risks it evokes. For terrorists who want to bring the United States down, U.S. strategic primacy is a formidable challenge, but one that can be overcome. On balance, Americans have overestimated the benefits of primacy, and terrorists have underestimated them.

For those who see a connection between American interventionism, cultural expansiveness, and support of Israel on one hand, and the rage of groups that turn to terrorism on the other, primacy may seem more trouble than it's worth, and the need to revise policies may seem more pressing. But most Americans have so far preferred the complacent and gluttonous form of primacy to the ascetic, blithely accepting steadily growing dependence on Persian Gulf oil that could be limited by compromises in lifestyle and unconventional energy policies. There have been no groundswells to get rid of SUVs, support

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the Palestinians, or refrain from promoting Western standards of democracy and human rights in societies where some elements see them as aggression.

There is little evidence that any appreciable number of Americans, elite or mass, see our primacy as provoking terrorism. Rather, most see it as a condition we can choose at will to exploit or not. So U.S. foreign policy has exercised primacy in a muscular way in byways of the post-cold war world when intervention seemed cheap, but not when doing good deeds threatened to be costly. Power has allowed Washington to play simultaneously the roles of mediator and partisan supporter in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For a dozen years nothing, with the near exception of the Kosovo War, suggested that primacy could not get us out of whatever problems it generated.

How far the United States goes to adapt to the second edge of primacy probably depends on whether stunning damage is inflicted by terrorists again, or September 11 gradually fades into history. If al Qaeda and its ilk are crippled, and some years pass without more catastrophic attacks on U.S. home territory, scar tissue will harden on the soft underbelly, and the positive view of primacy will be reinforced. If the war against terrorism falters, however, and the exercise of power fails to prevent more big incidents, the consensus will crack. Then more extreme policy options will get more attention. Retrenchment and retreat will look more appealing to some, who may believe the words of Sheik Salman al-Awdah, a dissident Saudi religious scholar, who said, "If America just let well enough alone, and got out of their obligations overseas . . . no one would bother them."[29]

More likely, however, would be a more violent reaction. There is no reason to assume that terrorist enemies would let America off the hook if it retreated and would not remain as implacable as ever. Facing inability to suppress the threat through normal combat, covert action, and diplomatic pressure, many Americans would consider escalation to more ferocious strategies. In recent decades, the march of liberal legalism has delegitimized tactics and brutalities that once were accepted, but this delegitimation has occurred only in the context of fundamental security and dominance of the Western powers, not in a situation where they felt under supreme threat. In a situation of that sort, it is foolhardy to assume that American strategy would never turn to tactics like those used against Japanese and German civilians, or by the civilized French in the *sale guerre* in Algeria, or by the Russians in Chechnya in hopes of effectively eradicating terrorists despite astronomical damage to the civilian societies within which they lurk.

This possibility would highlight how terrorists have underestimated American primacy. There is much evidence that even in the age of unipolarity, opponents have mistakenly seen the United States as a paper tiger. For some reason—perhaps wishfully selective perception—they tend to see retreats from

[29] Quoted in Douglas Jehl, "After Prison, a Saudi Sheik Tempers His Words," *New York Times*, 27 December 2001.

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Vietnam, Beirut, and Somalia as typical weakness of American will, instead of considering decisive exercises of power in Panama, Kuwait, Kosovo, and now, Afghanistan.[30] As Osama bin Laden said in 1997, the United States left Somalia "after claiming that they were the largest power on earth. They left after some resistance from powerless, poor, unarmed people whose only weapon is the belief in Allah. . . . The Americans ran away."[31]

This apparently common view among those with an interest in pinning America's ears back ignores the difference between elective uses of force and desperate ones. The United States retreated where it ran into trouble helping others, not where it was saving itself. Unlike interventions of the 1990s in Africa, the Balkans, or Haiti, counterterrorism is not charity. With vital material interests involved, primacy unleashed may prove fearsomely potent.

Most likely America will see neither absolute victory nor abject failure in the war against terror. Then how long will a campaign of attrition last and stay popular? If the United States wants a strategy to cut the roots of terrorism, rather than just the branches, will American power be used effectively against the roots? Perhaps, but probably not. This depends of course on which of many possible root causes are at issue. Ironically, one problem is that American primacy itself is one of those roots.

A common assertion is that Third World poverty generates terrorism. While this must certainly be a contributing cause in many cases, there is little evidence that it is either a necessary or sufficient condition. Fundamentalist madrassas might not be full to overflowing if young Muslims had ample opportunities to make money, but the fifteen Saudis who hijacked the flights on September 11 were from one of the most affluent of Muslim countries. No U.S. policy could ever hope to make most incubators of terrorism less poor than Saudi Arabia. Iran, the biggest state sponsor of anti-American terrorism, is also better off than most Muslim countries. Poverty is endemic in the Third World, but terrorism is not.

Even if endemic poverty were the cause, the solution would not be obvious. Globalization generates stratification, creating winners and losers, as efficient societies with capitalist cultures move ahead and others fall behind, or as elite enclaves in some societies prosper while the masses stagnate. Moreover, even vastly increased U.S. development assistance would be spread thin if all poor countries are assumed to be incubators of terrorism. And what are the odds that U.S. intervention with economic aid would significantly reduce poverty? Successes in prompting dramatic economic development by outside assistance in the Third World have occurred, but they are the exception more than the rule.

The most virulent anti-American terrorist threats, however, do not emerge randomly in poor societies. They grow out of a few regions and are concen-

[30] See data in the study by Barry M. Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, "Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 114 (Spring 1999).

[31] Quoted in Simon and Benjamin, "America and the New Terrorism," 69.

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trated overwhelmingly in a few religiously motivated groups. These reflect political causes—ideological, nationalist, or transnational cultural impulses to militant mobilization—more than economic causes. Economic development in an area where the political and religious impulses remain unresolved could serve to improve the resource base for terrorism rather than undercut it.

A strategy of terrorism is most likely to flow from the coincidence of two conditions: intense political grievance and gross imbalance of power. Either one without the other is likely to produce either peace or conventional war. Peace is probable if power is imbalanced but grievance is modest; the weaker party is likely to live with the grievance. In that situation, conventional use of force appears to offer no hope of victory, while the righteous indignation is not great enough to overcome normal inhibitions against murderous tactics. Conventional war is probable if grievance is intense but power is more evenly balanced, since successful use of respectable forms of force appears possible.[32] Under American primacy, candidates for terrorism suffer from grossly inferior power by definition. This should focus attention on the political causes of their grievance.

How are political root causes addressed? At other times in history we have succeeded in fostering congenial revolutions—especially in the end of the cold war, as the collapse of the Second World heralded an End of History of sorts.[33] The problem now, however, is the rebellion of anti-Western zealots against the secularist end of history. Remaking the world in the Western image is what Americans assume to be just, natural, and desirable, indeed only a matter of time. But that presumption is precisely what energizes many terrorists' hatred. Secular Western liberalism is not their salvation, but their scourge. Primacy could, paradoxically, remain both the solution and the problem for a long time.*

[32] On why power imbalance is conducive to peace and parity to war, see Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War*, 3rd. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988), chap. 8.

[33] Francis Fukuyama's thesis was widely misunderstood and caricatured. He noted that the Third World remained mired in history and that some developments could lead to restarting history. For the First World, the defeated Second World, and even some parts of the Third World, however, the triumph of Western liberalism could reasonably be seen by those who believe in its worth (as should Americans) as the final stage of evolution through fundamentally different forms of political and economic organization of societies. See Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *National Interest* no. 16 (Summer 1989); and Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

* The author thanks Robert Jervis for comments on the first draft.

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An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not?

ROBERT JERVIS

I do not think any of us has a definitive understanding of the causes and consequences of the terrorist attacks of September 11; I know that I do not. These events are so recent that we lack information as well as time for thought and discussion. Emotions also remain raw, and we have little general knowledge to draw on because our grasp of terrorism is even less secure than it is of other important social phenomena such as poverty, ethnic conflict, and wars. Terrorism grounded in religion poses special problems for modern social science, which has paid little attention to religion, perhaps because most social scientists find this subject uninteresting if not embarrassing. These obstacles help explain if not excuse why most of my arguments will be negative ones. It is easier to dispute some commonly held views than to say what is right. I will argue that the threat of terrorism is not as new as is often claimed, that terrorism reinforces state power more than it undermines it or exemplifies the decreasing importance of states, that the claims for reducing terrorism by getting at its root causes are largely tendentious, that viewing the struggle against terrorism as a war is problematic, and that the attacks of September 11 are not likely to greatly change world politics.

What Is New?

When we are confronted with something as unsettling as the terrorist attacks, our first reaction is to see them as unprecedented, and indeed the world had never seen a terrorist attack that killed so many people. But terrorism itself is not new. A precise definition may be impossible, but some stab at one is unavoidable: the use of violence for political or social purposes that is not publicly

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authorized by leaders of recognized political units, including acts that are sponsored and supported by states, but not publicly avowed.

It is not surprising that terrorism is ancient, because individuals have never been fully bound to established states and terror is needed by the weak who lack other instruments. Terrorism, although not easy to mount, is much easier than fielding a full-scale military apparatus; a great deal of disruption is possible with relatively little force. Whether the goal is revenge, the hope to inflict enough pain to get the adversary to change its behavior, or the desire to call attention to one's cause, terror may be the only tool that might prove effective.

This is not to claim that September 11 represented nothing new, however. The form and scale of the attack obviously were enabled by modern technology. Airplanes could not be turned into weapons until recently; since people now live and work packed together, many can be killed in one blow; since modern societies are highly interconnected, they can be disrupted by limited destruction. The advantages that medical science has given the world are matched by the speed with which infectious diseases can be spread through air travel.

Modern societies may also be uniquely psychologically vulnerable. The density of personal networks multiplies the number of people who lost a relative or close friend or who know someone who did. Everyone I know in New York fits into the latter category if not the former. The rapid flow of information means that everyone immediately learns about any terrorist attack and follows it as it unfolds. Furthermore, because everyone gets this information, it dominates not only the thoughts of separated individuals but social conversation and so is incorporated into popular consciousness and culture. This effect is magnified by the availability of videos, which by their vividness make a deep and lasting impression.

Not only do terrorist attacks resonate more deeply through society than was the case in the past, but they are more shocking because we are no longer accustomed to war, violent domestic disturbances, and raging epidemics. People in the advanced democracies now see themselves, their relatives, and their friends live long and relatively tranquil lives. Terrorism was less shocking when it was only one of many forms of violent death that could be expected. Now it stands out, which helps explain why people so overreact. The fear of anthrax is much greater than concern about influenza, although the latter will kill thousands of times more Americans than the former and the chance of a massive anthrax attack is slight; people cancel flights to drive, at a greatly increased chance of dying.

Similar processes explain the economic impact of September 11. The attacks came at a time when the U.S. economy was slipping, and the direct effect through damage to the airline and tourist industries was significant. But this cannot explain most of the subsequent economic downturn. Consumer confidence is crucial and is susceptible to significant psychological magnification. Not only is confidence inherently subjective, being an estimate of how well the economy is likely to do in the future, but it is highly interdependent in the sense

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that each person's confidence is in part based on her or his estimate of how confident others are. Positive feedbacks and bandwagon effects then are likely. These should not be dismissed as irrational: since the fate of the economy depends on how much people will buy, and this in turn is strongly influenced by their predictions of their future economic fortunes, I should be less confident if I think others are. So when shocks like terrorism are very widely felt and the level of consumer confidence is known to the general public, the economic health of the society is highly vulnerable. The chief economist of the International Monetary Fund noted that after September 11, most of the world economies suffered badly, not only because they reflected the downturn in the United States; but "One reason we have become more synchronized is because we're all watching CNN."[1]

The obvious irony is that American society is now more vulnerable than the military. Although the military action in Afghanistan may have significantly reduced the threat of terrorism against the United States, at least in the short run, it cannot perform the standard function of defense. In the classical model, the armed forces literally stand between the population and the enemy. The development of air power and, even more, nuclear weapons reduced if not destroyed this conception, erecting in its place the edifice of deterrence. Fulfilling this mission required retaliatory forces to be as invulnerable as possible, buried deep beneath the soil or the oceans, and standard conceptions of the stability of a mutually deterrent relationship called for the civilian population to be unprotected so that neither side would be tempted to attack. No theories mandate civilian vulnerability to terrorism, but civilian targets are easier to destroy than are military ones, and civilian life is easier to disrupt than is the military. This might not be problematic if deterrence held, but terrorists have little to lose.

We should remember, however, that short of an attack by a lethal and infectious disease such as smallpox, no terrorist can inflict nearly as much damage as warfare.[2] Even a mere decade after the end of the cold war, it is easy to forget that we used to live with the possibility of unimaginable devastation. Interestingly enough, in the earlier years of the cold war, American leaders doubted that the country could live with such a prospect over a prolonged period of time.[3] In fact, the country did adjust without sacrificing many of its deepest values, and this gives some hope for our ability to cope with the psychological burdens imposed by the new threats.

[1] Quoted in Joseph Kahn, "The World's Economies Slide Together Into Recession," *New York Times*, 25 November 2001.

[2] Of course, terrorists might employ a nuclear device, but these are likely to be very small in number and relatively small in lethality. They hardly compare to the destruction that either superpower could have brought on the other.

[3] Gregory Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).

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The Decline of States?

At first glance, terrorism in general and September 11 in particular would seem to epitomize the declining relevance of states. Putting aside state-sponsored terrorism, these attacks are violence by private actors who are seeking public ends, which is just what states are supposed to stamp out. They represent the failure of states to protect their own citizens, which is their primary purpose. A world characterized by extensive terrorism is one in which states are not the most important actors.

September 11 also represents the declining importance of states in two other ways. First, terrorist groups are transnational, united not by their national citizenship or even the desire to form a state, but by religious and ideological beliefs. Although most of the hijackers were Saudis, letters found in al Qaeda headquarters in Kabul indicate that its members came from at least twenty countries.[4] Were this a peaceful enterprise, we would celebrate it as showing the ability of people from different countries, social classes, and experiences to work together. Second, the attack demonstrates the importance of globalization. Not only did the hijackers come from many countries, but they traveled throughout the world and depended on the efficient movement of information and money. Their motives and goals also epitomize globalization. They are seeking not the expansion or retraction of national power, let alone territory, but the stanching of the global flow of corrupting ideas and the protection if not expansion of the realm in which proper forms of Islam dominate.

There is something to these arguments, but in other ways September 11 and its sequels show the crucial role of states. To start with, al Qaeda gained much of its capabilities through its close ties to, if not its capture of, the Afghan government. It could not have operated as it did without the acquiescence and the sponsorship of the state government. Extensive training of terrorists would have been impossible; semipermanent headquarters could not have been established; the maintenance of a far-flung network would have been extremely difficult. In a way, the United States has ratified and reinforced the links between terrorists and states by making it clear that it will now hold the latter accountable for any acts of terror emanating from their territory.[5]

The targets of September 11 also included major elements of state power. The Pentagon was attacked, and the White House probably was the target of the plane that crashed in Pennsylvania. The response further showed the continued centrality of states. Most strikingly, American public opinion and even traditionally antistate conservatives immediately looked to the organs of the

[4] David Rhoad, "On Paper Scraps, Talk of Judgment Day and Words To Friends At Home," *New York Times*, 24 November 2001.

[5] It can be argued that this stance, and the attack against Afghanistan, will weaken states by ignoring their sovereignty and perhaps opening the door to other modifications of this cornerstone of the state system. But sovereignty always has been complex, flexible, and pragmatic. See Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

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government for order and protection. The national guard was sent to New York City and airports; federal moneys poured into affected locales; airport security personnel was federalized; the federal government was granted greatly increased powers of investigation and prosecution, despite the doubts of the relatively isolated group of civil libertarians. In a time of crisis, Americans turned not to their churches, multinational corporations, or the UN, but to the national government. For better or for worse, one of the long-run consequences of September 11 is almost certain to be a larger and more powerful state apparatus.

Internationally as well, states were the dominant actors in the response. The United States put together a coalition of states, and when dealing with countries like Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, did so in a way that increased the power of those states over their own societies by providing resources and expertise. Although the coalition is not an ordinary alliance, being more ad hoc and flexible, an alliance of states it nevertheless is. It also uses traditional diplomatic, economic, and military instruments. The technology is modern, and the intelligence network represents a form of globalization, but there is little in the fundamental nature of the activities that would surprise an observer of the past centuries.

We Must Get at the Root Causes of Terrorism: We Must Understand Why We Are Hated

It has become a truism, especially among liberals, that while attacking al Qaeda is necessary, it is not sufficient. Even if the campaign is successful, terrorism will recur unless the United States and its allies deal with the conditions that produced it. Central among these are grinding poverty in the Third World, great and increasing inequality within and among nations, corrupt and unresponsive governments, and American policies that too often range it along side of the forces of injustice and oppression. In some ways, this argument is deeply attractive. We all want to make this a better world, and few would disagree with the proposition that poverty and oppression cause enormous misery around the world.

This perspective is misleading as an explanation for terrorism or a prescription for dealing with it, however. It is difficult to say exactly what the root causes of terrorism are. Poverty and lack of liberties do not appear on the list of grievances articulated by terrorist leaders, and neither the al Qaeda leadership nor the hijackers were poor. Of course, leaders of almost all political causes are drawn from the upper and middle classes of society; perhaps they would not have chosen their cause had their societies been richer and more egalitarian. But rich societies produce their own terrorists and many poor societies do not, and it is hard to argue that poverty is either a necessary or a sufficient cause of terrorism. There is one specific thing that the United States could do that in all probability will have a good effect, however: it could provide funds for educa-

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tion and press Muslim governments to do likewise; as it stands now, parents often send their children to madrassas because no other education is available.

To see the absence of liberal arrangements as the root cause of terrorism is even more perverse. Tolerance for diversity, respect for human rights as the West defines them, free and diverse mass media, vigorous political competition, and equality for women is not the vision of the good society held by the terrorists and their supporters. The very notion of elevating the rights of individuals and the ability to choose one's way of life is anathema to them. Traditions, real or imagined, community values as they interpret them, and life regulated by Muslim clerics who read the Koran the way Taliban leaders did are their avowed objectives. Perhaps if their countries were remodeled along Western lines, terrorism would eventually subside. But resistance, including terrorism, would almost certainly increase during the transition, which could last for generations.[6]

Even if poverty, inequality, and oppression were the root causes of terrorism, there is little reason to think that we could deal with them effectively. Many of us believe that the United States should provide higher levels of economic assistance to the Third World and lower tariff barriers to their goods, but we cannot point to solid evidence to support the argument that doing so would make much difference. For all our studies, we are far from a complete understanding of what produces democracy, a well-functioning civil society, and respect for human rights. It is even less clear that the relevant variables can be much affected by outside interventions. It can be argued that one of the main barriers to democracy in Islamic countries is the lack of a separation between church and state and an acceptance of the idea that even in a religiously homogeneous society the direct political influence of theological leaders should be limited. It is hard to see what outsiders could do to effect such a separation, however.

Somewhat parallel to the call for attacking the root causes of terrorism is the plea to understand why the perpetrators undertook such dreadful acts. There are many barriers to understanding, starting with the fact that the terrorists come from different cultural and religious backgrounds than we do. Even if we can trust the translations of their statements, they metaphorically as well as literally speak a different language. Furthermore, there are political and psychological inhibitions to understanding why one is hated, since this may lead to asking whether there is some validity to the grievances. This is why a few hotheads initially attacked such pleas, seeing them as excusing the terrorists. I do not think this is fair. Understanding and even empathy is not inconsistent with the strongest possible condemnation.

[6] This is why Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), far from proclaiming the superiority of the West and calling for the westernization of the world, asks for toleration of different cultures and decries Western attempts to force its values and way of life on others. To interfere in other cultures is a recipe for greatly increasing conflict to no good end.

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Once we put aside these superficial objections, the need for understanding is almost self-evident. Intellectuals seek understanding for its own sake; policy makers need understanding to establish an appropriate policy. But it is worth noting that the second proposition is not without its problems. Sometimes understanding a problem can push solutions beyond reach. One important historical case is British policy following the fall of France in May 1940. Almost alone among top British decision makers, Winston Churchill adamantly opposed opening peace talks with Germany, but he reached (or at least justified) his conclusion on the basis of wildly incorrect information and misleading analysis.[7] More generally, Albert Hirschman has shown that many important human endeavors are made possible only by what he calls the "hiding hand."[8] We start many ventures because we greatly underestimate the hindrances and are fortunate to fully understand them only when we have invested so much time and effort that it seems better to push on rather than try something else. Had we understood the magnitude of the task at the start, we never would have undertaken it, as many advanced graduate students come to appreciate. Collective action problems may also be harder to solve if they are understood. Many voluntary associations and related efforts succeed because few members understand that each individual's contribution is too small to make a noticeable difference. Thus it is not surprising that when I ask my students to play a form of a collective action game in class, the level of successful cooperation falls from the introductory class to the advanced undergraduate class to the graduate classes. Sometimes a lot of learning is even more dangerous than a little.

Putting aside this possibility, the worthy cause of understanding why the United States is hated may lead in directions unanticipated by those who call loudest for the effort. Bin Laden appears to hate the United States both for what it is and what it has done. The United States exemplifies consumerism, individual choice, and a relatively high degree of sexual permissiveness and equality. By being so powerful around the world, it cannot but be a threat to cultures that are built on very different values. The terrorists and others who share these concerns are not being paranoid to fear that fundamentalist Islam will be under great pressure from corrosive Western values as long as the latter have global reach.

Of course, the United States has not been passive, and the terrorists see a number of horrific policies. Foremost among them is the stationing of troops in Saudi Arabia and the support for a corrupt Saudi regime. Thus it is no accident that most of the hijackers were Saudis. The grievance that is second in

[7] P. M. H. Bell, *A Certain Eventuality: Britain and the Fall of France* (Farnborough, UK: Saxon House, 1974); David Reynolds, "Churchill and the British 'Decision' to Fight on in 1940: Right Policy, Wrong Reasons" in Richard Langhorne, ed., *Diplomacy and Intelligence During the Second World War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 147–67. A recent, more popular treatment is John Lukacs, *Five Days in London: May 1940* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

[8] Albert Hirschman, *Development Projects Observed* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1967), 9–34.

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prominence is the American attacks on Iraq. But it is not clear whether this position is much more than an attempt to cater to the beliefs of the followers; Saddam Hussein's regime, although repressive, has not propagated fundamentalist Islam. Bin Laden also berates the United States for its support of Israel, although this position received stress only after September 11 and also may be designed to garner support from the widest possible Arab audience. Furthermore, bin Laden's opposition is to the existence of Israel and the American support for the Jewish state, not to the settlements or Israeli sovereignty over parts of Jerusalem.

What this means is that there are no conceivable changes in the United States and American policy that could reduce al Qaeda's hatred. Powerful states are always hated, even if they exercise their power relatively benignly.[9] Perhaps the United States might reduce the terrorists' hatred by withdrawing its troops from Saudi Arabia. Whether this would do any good at this point is far from clear, however, and probably would increase the chance of another Iraqi attack on Kuwait.

The much larger group throughout the Islamic world that has some sympathy for the September 11 attacks and that sees bin Laden as at least in part a hero and is glad to see the United States humbled by the attacks, is of course harder to analyze, being much more disparate. Much of the rage is attributable to their own governments, which are unable to provide a decent life for their people while sponsoring mass media that blame most of their ills on the United States. Democracy, reform, and more diverse media might have good effect here, especially if they were coupled with economic growth that led to improved lives for society's lower strata. But whether such an outcome could be produced by a different United States policy is questionable.

Turning to foreign policy, following a more "moderate" policy toward Iraq and lifting the embargo would meet one of the grievances. But doing so might not reduce suffering within Iraq, because the oil-for-food program already provides sufficient funds to provide food and medicine for the people of Iraq, and it is unclear that a change in American policy would lead to a change in Saddam's priorities. If the United States were to withdraw its protective umbrella over the northern areas, the regime would reestablish control, with the resulting repression and flow of refugees. If the terrorists were motivated by compassion for the Kurds, this could increase terrorism.

United States support for Israel is perhaps highest on the list of grievances in the Muslim world. Over the long run, the Arab-Israeli dispute and the American role in it may play a large role in cultivating the next generation of terrorists, even if it has not generated the current one. But in the short run, it is hard to tell what difference United States policy would make, and the United States was not without enemies when it was actively promoting a settlement that would

[9] See Richard Betts, "The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy," *Political Science Quarterly* 117 (Spring 2002).

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have given the PLO a state, most of the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. It is also interesting that those who believe that the United States could diminish Arab hatred toward it by pressing for an Israeli withdrawal also believe that this policy is moral and would bring peace between Israel and its neighbors. Here, as with policy toward Iraq, those who call for a tougher stance toward Israel (or toward the PLO) held these views on 10 September. It would be more impressive if those advocating a different American policy in the Middle East argued that while the old policy had been appropriate previously and was morally well-grounded, the new circumstances require a courting of important groups in the Middle East even at Israel's expense. I think that if the shoe had been on the other foot and circumstances had arisen that could lead people to call for greater American support for an unyielding Israeli policy, calls to do so would be rejected by liberals on the grounds that it would be wrong to make people in the Middle East pay for a policy that served American interests elsewhere.

More reasonable is the argument that the roots of much terrorism lie in the intolerance and hatred preached in many mosques and taught in madrases, often supported by Saudi money. While those who reject social constructivism should be slow to give too much credit to the power of socialization and should ask why these messages find a receptive audience, al Qaeda surely would have had fewer recruits had these voices been quieter or were alternative views expressed clearly by other religious and political leaders. But for many countries, tolerating or sponsoring religious extremism is more attractive than domestic reform, and it is far from clear how much the United States can do to change this landscape.

The call to understand why people hate us, while intellectually sound, is largely motivated by political agendas unrelated to September 11. There are many reasons to object to the Bush administration's policy in the Middle East—I myself think it has been badly misguided—but it is disingenuous to claim that such a conclusion follows from an understanding of the motives of the terrorists or why the United States is hated in the Islamic world. Almost any course of action can be rationalized on the grounds that it will reduce terrorism. Thus a member of the Kuwaiti parliament urged that his country adopt Sharia on the grounds that if this were done, "there would be no terrorism."[10]

It's A War

In his speech to a joint session of Congress after the attack, President George W. Bush declared that the United States was waging a war against terrorism, and it used military force to overthrow the government of Afghanistan. But this

[10] Quoted in Douglas Jehl, "Democracy's Uneasy Steps in Islamic World," *New York Times*, 23 November 2001. Also see Serge Schmemann, "U.N. Gets a Litany of Antiterror Plans," ibid., 12 January 2002; and Neil MacFarquhar, "Syria Repackages Its Repression of Muslim Militants as Antiterror Lesson," ibid., 14 January 2002.

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was not a "normal" war, and the very label is contentious and questionable.[11] To start with, the overthrow of the Afghan government was not the ultimate goal of the effort but only a means to combat terrorism. The point was not to change Afghan external policy or reduce the power of that regime or country, as it would have been in most wars. Rather, Afghanistan was attacked in order to install a new government that would eliminate the terrorists; had it been possible to attack the terrorists directly, this would have been done and the Afghan authorities, even though repellant to many American values, would have been left in place.

If this is a war, the obvious question is what its objectives are. The normal answer would be to get the adversary to withdraw from disputed territory, to make it impossible for that country to follow obnoxious policies, or to replace a government that was deemed a menace by its very existence. But these conceptions of victory seem inappropriate here, and there are no clear replacements. So it is not surprising that the administration has never issued a definitive statement of its war aims. Secretaries Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld have said that the war will be won when Americans feel secure again, an objective that sounds more like psychotherapy than international politics. This is not to say that it is an inappropriate formulation when dealing with terrorism, however. By its nature, terror seeks to utilize political and psychological leverage in order to produce political effects that are disproportionate to the military force deployed. To the extent that it is more than mere revenge (a motive not to be underestimated, as I will discuss later), it seeks change through inducing fear, and generally fear that is a magnified rather than a true reflection of what else could follow. So reducing fear and making Americans feel secure should be a crucial focus of American policy. But it is an unusual reason to wage a war.

Making Americans feel secure is presumably related to destroying al Qaeda and the Taliban regime that was linked to it. But as Bush has said on numerous occasions, Afghanistan and the terrorists located there are only the first target of the American efforts. With whom exactly are we at war? Who else is to be attacked? What constitutes terrorism? How do we distinguish terrorism from insurgency, let alone fighters for freedom? Will we keep fighting until terrorism disappears or will we be content with the lesser objective of reducing terrorism to manageable levels? What constitutes harboring terrorism, which Bush has equated with terrorism itself? Questions like these can never be answered with complete clarity, and fortunately a coherent response is not necessary for a sensible policy. Indeed, under most circumstances the questions are not even asked, because satisfactory answers will not be forthcoming. But if one calls for a war, it becomes harder to avoid them, and the messy pragmatism, ambiguity, and inconsistency that are normal facts of policy life become more troublesome.

The most obvious question, which may be answered by the time this article appears in print, is whether the United State should attack Iraq. A significant

[11] See Michael Howard, "What's in a Name? How to Fight Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs* 81 (January-February 2002): 8–13.

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group has long felt that the first Bush administration made a mistake by not finishing off Saddam Hussein after the Gulf War, although the difficulties in doing so are rarely examined. These people have been quick to see ambiguous evidence as indicating close links between Iraq and al Qaeda, just as opponents of this policy have been quick to provide other interpretations of the evidence. They have argued that Saddam is rapidly developing weapons of mass destruction.[12] Even if these points are granted, the obvious question is whether Saddam can be deterred from using these weapons. Saying that we are at war, however, distracts us from asking this or implies that deterrence has broken down and that the use rather than the threat of force is necessary.

The main alternative target to Iraq is the al Qaeda cells in other countries, especially Somalia, Yemen, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Whether these countries are "harboring" terrorists by Bush's definition is unclear, as is it whether the governments would cooperate with any American efforts. I suspect that what will drive American policy, however, is less an analysis of these threats and the impact of antiterrorism on local stability than the debate over whether to attack Iraq. That is, those who favor doing so will downplay the significance of these cells; those who oppose it will argue that the rest of al Qaeda is the most urgent target in the knowledge that the United States cannot take on both this far-flung effort and a war against Iraq.[13]

The label "war" implies the primary use of military force. Other instruments like diplomacy and intelligence may be used, but they are in service of the deployment of armed force. I believe this conceptual frame is unfortunate when it comes to dealing with terrorism. Here diplomacy, the international criminal justice system, and especially intelligence are primary. With good information, almost everything can be done to reduce terrorism; without it, very little is possible. Force and the threat of force play a vital role both in helping to generate information and in the final elimination of terrorist targets, but intelligence and international information-sharing is central. If they are sacrificed in order to gain military advantage, the policy will suffer. Thinking of this as war then gets us thinking in the wrong terms.

Others have seen the advantages of taking the United States at its word and justifying their behavior in terms of fighting terrorism. In addition to the Russian

[12] In his press conference of 26 November, Bush equated the seeking of weapons of mass destruction to "terrorize nations" with terrorism. In this context, it is worth asking why there has been no call to target Iran, a country that has sponsored more terrorism than Iraq, is closer to gaining nuclear weapons, and is more anti-Israeli and almost as anti-American. The obvious reply is that there is a greater chance of peaceful change in that country than in Iraq, but I suspect that at least as important is the strength of the anti-Saddam faction within the U.S. elite, which realizes that military action against Iran would undercut the possibility of moving against Iraq.

[13] The leaks that form the basis of news stories about al Qaeda outside of Afghanistan should be read in this light: see, for example, Bob Drogin and Paul Watson, "Battlefield Clues Key to Bush's Next Step," *Los Angeles Times*, 9 December 2001; David Cloud, "U.S. Believes Al Qaeda Bases in Somalia Could be Ousted Through Limited Force," *Wall Street Journal*, 12 December 2001; Gerald Seib, "U.S. Must Prevent Another 'Afghanistan' Where Terrorists Can Find Safe Harbor," ibid.

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rhetoric in its conflict in Chechnya, a leader of Hamas said that no one expected the United States to refrain from violence in response to the September 11 attack, "so why do you expect me to react peacefully to occupation?"[14] In parallel, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon argues: "You in America are in a war against terror. We in Israel are in a war against terror. It's the same war."[15] One of his advisers explained that "the Palestinian Authority has an obligation to no longer harbor or give shelter to international terrorist organizations" like Hamas.[16] The Indians have equated 13 December (the date of the attack on their parliament) with September 11, an interpretation the United States has largely endorsed. All sorts of domestic oppression are also being claimed as counter-terrorism. Thus the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe claimed that critical reporters "are assisting terrorists. . . . We would like them to know that we agree with President Bush that anyone who in any way finances, harbors or defends terrorists is himself a terrorist. We, too, will not make any difference between terrorists and their friends or supporters."[17]

The United States has responded that this war is not against terrorism in general, however, but only against "terrorism with a global reach," as Bush put it in his speech of 20 September. This modifier nicely gets the United States out of one dilemma, but opens the door to several others. If the war were to be against all terrorism, defeat would be inevitable and the collateral damage would be enormous. Even on the unreasonable assumption that such an effort would receive widespread support abroad, it would engender enormous opposition as well. In December, bloody suicide attacks against Israel and the Indian parliament led the United States to broaden its definition, pushing Arafat and Musharraf to eliminate the groups responsible. But the focus and consistency of the American effort remains to be seen.

To say that we are at war only with a subset of terrorists raises the question of in whose interest the war is being waged. The United States seeks worldwide support on the grounds that al Qaeda and related groups are seeking weapons of mass destruction, which "would be a threat to every nation and, eventually, to civilization itself."[18] But terrorists, even with nuclear weapons, do not target the entire globe. Instead, they attack sites in and representatives of particular states. As a Russian diplomat said to me shortly after Bush's speech, "Ah, a global reach—that means terrorists who can attack the US." Terrorists in Sri Lanka, for

[14] Quoted in James Bennett, "Israeli Soldier Killed in Gaza, Nablus Mourns a Hamas Leader," *New York Times*, 25 November 2001.

[15] Quoted in William Safire, "Israel or Arafat," ibid., 3 December 2001; also see the remarks quoted in James Bennet, "Israelis Storm Village in the West Bank," ibid., 25 October 2001; Bennet, "15 Israelis Die in Bus Attack," ibid., 3 December 2001.

[16] Quoted in Bennet, "New Clashes in Gaza; Hamas to Limit Suicide Attacks," ibid., 22 December 2001.

[17] Rachel L. Swarns, "West's Envoys Unhappy, Find Zimbabwe Unhelpful," *New York Times*, 24 November 2001; also see Tony Hawkins, "Harare to Hold Talks Today on Sanctions Threat," *Financial Times*, 17 December 2001.

[18] Quoted in "President's Words: 'Lift This Dark Threat,'" *New York Times*, 7 November 2001.

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example, do not seem to qualify. Neither, I suspect, would the IRA if it were to resume violence in Northern Ireland. (This is fortunate, because an attack on areas supporting these terrorists would require military action in New York's Lower East Side and Boston's South End.) Would renewed Algerian terrorism in France be "global"? I suspect the answer would turn on the extent of French support for American efforts. Politically and rhetorically convenient in the short run, Bush's answer to the question of what terrorists we are at war with may prove more troublesome over the long run, at minimum in highlighting American hypocrisy. It might have been more straightforward and honorable to declare that it was only terrorists who could menace American assets and allies that were our target.[19]

Framing the conflict as war also implies that we must be prepared to sacrifice many values in order to prevail. In a normal war, this would mean that men would be called to the colors and those at home would expect to endure economic privation and even enemy bombardment. But none of this is required here. Logic might suggest that our leaders would tell people that they must accept further acts of terrorism in order to win the struggle, but instead we are being urged to fly and shop.[20]

Greater sacrifices are being required in the area of civil liberties. The claim that we must accept intrusions and restrictions that were previously intolerable is justified not by detailed claims that the value of the information produced will outweigh the cost to our privacy and liberty but rather by blanket assertions that war requires measures that were previously unacceptable. Similarly, careful arguments for bringing terrorists before military tribunals are short-circuited by statements that this is what is done during wartime. As Bush declared: "The United States is under attack. And at war, the president needs to have the capacity to protect the national security interests and the safety of the American people."[21]

[19] See David Sanger, "As the Battlefield Changes, So Does the War Itself," *New York Times*, 23 December 2001; Serge Schmemann, "Caution: This Weapon May Backfire," ibid., 30 December 2001. Perhaps because of the apparent success of the operation in Afghanistan, in early 2002 American rhetoric and some of its actions expanded to encompass terrorism in general. This is consistent with indications that Bush will seek to exploit and reinforce American hegemony. As he said in his press conference in response to criticisms of U.S. unilateralism levied by the French foreign minister: people around the world "understand . . . that history has given us a unique opportunity to defend freedom. And we're going to seize the moment, and do it." See "President Bush, Prime Minister Koizumi Hold Press Conference," White House press release, 18 February 2002. The clearest rationale for such a stance was the draft Defence Policy Guidance for Fiscal Years 1994–1999 that was written by Paul Wolfowitz when he was in Bush senior's Pentagon. The document was toned down after it was leaked to the press: *New York Times*, 8 March 1992 and 24 May 1992.

[20] For a good statement of the sacrifices that Bush might ask of Americans, see Thomas Friedman, "Ask Not What. . . ," *New York Times*, 9 December 2001.

[21] Quoted in Elisabeth Bumiller and Katharine Q. Seelye, "Bush Defends Wartime Call for Tribunals," *New York Times*, 15 December 2001. More recently, "President Bush has issued an executive order barring union representation at United States attorneys' offices and at four other agencies in the Justice Department. . . . out of concern that union contracts could restrict the ability of workers in the Justice Department to protect Americans and national security." Steven Greenhouse, "Bush, Citing Security, Bans Some Unions at Justice Dept." ibid., 16 January 2002.

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The Terrorism is Senseless

The attacks of September 11 seem not only inhumane but senseless. It is hard to see what objective bin Laden thought he could reach. I doubt that he really expected to change American support for Saudi Arabia and Israel or its opposition to Iraq. His actions also seem self-defeating, because they endangered his life, al Qaeda, and the Taliban regime.

But actions that are horrible are not necessarily irrational. Bin Laden and his colleagues may have been motivated first of all by the desire for revenge and what they saw as justice. The United States had committed great crimes and had to be punished. Even if the attacks could not set the world aright, they would at least make the United States pay a price for its awful deeds. We—or at least academics—often underestimate the importance of revenge. Emotional, primitive, unamenable to analysis, it does not seem to belong in a civilized country. But it does. In everyday life we often try to inflict small punishments on others who have harmed us, not because we think it will change them, but because we think this is appropriate. The centerpiece of U.S. strategic policy during the cold war was the threat to massively retaliate against a Soviet attack on the United States. Putting aside arcane war-fighting scenarios of interest to a few theorists, the attack to which the United States was seen as responding would have been one that utterly destroyed it. Retaliation could have reached no meaningful goal and would have been motivated entirely by revenge. No one doubted the credibility of this threat, however.

Bin Laden may also have had an instrumental purpose. His focus may have been less on the United States and the short run than on the Islamic world over a longer period. He could have reasoned that a dramatic action would put his movement and ideology at the center of attention. He could expect to multiply the strength of his cause even if he was to die in the effort. As E. E. Schattschneider showed, the outcome of a conflict is often determined by the number and kind of people who are mobilized to join in it.[22] Bin Laden may also have expected the attack to serve as a provocation that would lead the United States to strike out in a way that would rally support for him. Although September 11 cannot be seen as a "clash of civilizations," he may have hoped to generate one.

The United States Must Not Walk Away From Afghanistan Again

It is often argued that the Taliban and bin Laden are a product of previous American actions in supporting the resistance to Soviet rule and then ignoring the country when the cold war ended. The first claim is largely correct, although the implied counterfactual may not be. That is, it can be argued that even without American aid the mujahedeen eventually would have forced the Soviet Union to withdraw.

[22] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960).

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However this may be, it is certainly true that the United States lost interest in Afghanistan after the end of the cold war. The lesson is obvious: the United States and others now must stay fully engaged. The implicit counterfactural here is that if the United States had remained involved, a more benign Afghan regime could have developed. While I share this view, we cannot be sure and should not overestimate what outsiders can do. Coalition building is extremely difficult for outsiders; nation building may be impossible. Both our knowledge and the relevant resources are sharply limited. In the short run, violence can be suppressed and some laws reestablished. Outside organizations are not without instruments they can deploy, especially money and technical assistance; but these instruments are not magic bullets and many of the consequences are unintended. A host of questions arise. Should we try to work through local leaders who can control their own areas and then cooperate with counterparts from different groups? Should we seek central power-sharing arrangements that aim at stability, the limitation of power of the local warlords, and reduced political competition? Should we instead push for new political groupings that cross-cut older rivalries? It is neither clear whether outsiders could implement such arrangements or whether they would produce the desired effects. Even food aid can backfire in several ways, for example by providing a resource that fuels violence, bolstering only those factions that are able to work with the aid groups, and discouraging farmers from returning to their fields.

None of this is to say that the United States and its allies should abandon Afghanistan, but we should not conclude that the previous abandonment created today's misery or have high expectations for what we can achieve. As one observer said about the dreary results of a variety of international efforts in Somalia: "Total benign neglect is problematic, but total engagement and obsession is problematic as well."[23]

A New World?

It is often said that "everything has changed after September 11," "this is the end of the post-cold war era," and "the world will never be the same." Although the truth is yet to be revealed, I am skeptical.[24] I think it unlikely that the world will unite against terrorism or that American foreign policy will take on a basically new orientation.

One claim is that terrorism is such a scourge that the nations of the world will unite against it, just as most countries pull together if they are attacked.

[23] Quoted in Mark Turner, "Somalia Provides Lesson in Non-Interference," *Financial Times*, 19 November 2001.

[24] This is not to deny the importance of other drastic changes in world politics that are recent but pre-date September 11, most importantly the fact that war among the leading powers is now unthinkable: John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Robert Jervis, "Theories of War in an Era of Leading Power Peace," *American Political Science Review* 96 (March 2002).

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The Bush administration argues that this is what should happen, seeing the conflict as one of civilization against evil which must trump all differences. So the United States tells India and Pakistan to stand down and join the common coalition and urges Israel and the PLO to subordinate their dispute to the common cause. The expectation that the world will fall into line is not entirely unreasonable. In the past, nations put aside old conflicts when faced by an even more pressing common enemy, as Britain and the USSR finally did in their struggle against Nazi Germany. But I doubt that most countries see terrorism as posing a threat of this magnitude, although a serious biological or nuclear attack might change this. At this point, however, it is hard to argue that India has more reason to fear al Qaeda than Pakistan, nor are most other countries in the world more concerned about this network than they are by neighbors or local threats.[25]

Even if few countries support al Qaeda, many use forms of terror to advance their own goals. If the struggle were against terrorism rather than anti-American terrorism, these countries would have to forego many of their most valued objectives. And if the enemy is anti-American terror, there is even less reason for countries to unite against it, although the United States does have powerful incentives to deploy.

This is not to say that many countries have not taken advantage of the new opportunities offered by September 11. Sudan has accepted the American "get out of jail free" card by offering intelligence cooperation in return for being removed from the list of countries that sponsor terrorism. Pakistan was transformed from a nuclear-powered troublemaker and an enemy of the new American potential ally in the region (India) to a pillar of stability meriting extensive aid and a forgiveness of past sins. Uzbekistan's lack of democracy and violations of human rights were put aside to gain necessary bases.

Most importantly, Russia has given the United States great support and facilitated its gaining bases in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in return for tacit Western approval of its attacks on "Islamic terrorists" in Chechnya and their supporters in Georgia. More far-reaching cooperation seems in train on strategic arms and relations with NATO. President Vladimir Putin has attributed much of this dramatic shift to September 11: "We would like to see our joint struggle against terrorism to lead to positive results, that terrorism not only in Afghanistan but the entire world be destroyed, uprooted, liquidated. . . . It is quite obvious to any objective observer that we can find an effective response to these challenges only if we pull our efforts together." To do this, both the United States and Russia must shed "the fears of the past" and understand that they

[25] The conflict between India and Pakistan over the alignment of the new Afghan regime influenced the struggle over the regime's composition and the American efforts to build a broad-based coalition. For India's moves on the diplomatic front, see Edward Luce, "India Moves Quickly to Build Kabul Links," *Financial Times*, 13 December 2001.

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share a commitment to democratic values and market economics. Those who think otherwise "simply do not understand the way the world has changed."[26]

The change here does seem real, although many difficult issues are still being postponed, and it is hard to say what Russian-American relations would have been like had the attack not occurred. Perhaps typifying the new but mixed relationship is what happened with the ABM treaty: on the one hand the two countries could not agree, but on the other hand Putin accepted the U.S. withdrawal. In general, Putin has taken September 11 as an opportunity to retreat from positions that Russian weakness made untenable and to try to maximize gains in terms of American support. Furthermore, frictions remain over issues like the extension of NATO and Russia's ties to that organization, America's increased role in central Asia,[27] and the Russian attempt to maintain its influence over the Northern Alliance. It is then premature to proclaim a new era of Russian-American relations.

At least as dramatic but probably more temporary is the change in U.S.–China relations. Before September 11, the Bush administration said that China was the greatest menace to world peace. This discussion has ceased and for its part the Peoples Republic of China has been quick to point out that it staunchly opposes terrorism throughout the world, and especially in the Muslim province of Xinjiang. But I doubt that this common interest will prove sufficient to override the conflict over Taiwan and other issues.

If terrorism does not represent a truly common threat, let alone one of sufficient magnitude to override all other disputes, then perhaps it will at least induce the Bush administration to modify its previous unilateralism. Not only does the United States need the cooperation of many other countries to attack al Qaeda, but the success of the joint efforts may teach the United States that multilateralism is a generally effective stance.[28] Here, too, we are in the realm of prediction rather than explanation, but again I am skeptical. Bush has welcomed foreign support and been willing to make trades to gain it, but unchanged is the deep-seated belief that both the world and the United States are best served if the latter refuses to be restrained by others' views. International organizations can help reach American goals at minimum cost, but the United States should not be guided by international consensus. It has not budged from its unilateral rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, the ABM Treaty, and the proposed arrangements for ensuring that states do not develop biological weapons. The basic logic that it is often advantageous for great powers to bind themselves to quasi-constitutional rules in order to reassure others

[26] Quoted in Michael Wines, "Putin Urges A 'New Level' of the Trust With America,' *New York Times*, 11 November 2001; also see Wines, "NATO Plan Offers Russian Equal Voice on Some Issues," ibid., 23 November 2001.

[27] See, for example, Fred Weir, "Russia Wary of Postwar Goals," *Christian Science Monitor*, 10 December 2001.

[28] See, for example, G. John Ikenberry, "After September 11: American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror," *Survival* 43 (Winter 2001–2002): 19–34.

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and so elicit their cooperation is appealing to academics and some liberal policy makers,[29] but not to the Bush administration and major segments of American opinion. To take just one example, John Bolton, the undersecretary of state for arms control and international security affairs, said that the Bush administration would not wait for "slow moving multilateral mechanisms that are happening in the real world."[30] In response to actions that embody such views, foreign diplomats can only say: "Big partners should consult with smaller partners."[31] The operative word is "should."

For many of us, not a day will pass in which we will not think of September 11. Nevertheless, it may not change the world as much as it now appears. It is striking how much the diverse "lessons" of this event reinforce what the learner already believed. With the significant exceptions of many of the calls for increased domestic security and sacrifices of civil liberties, the measures that various groups advocate, from building missile defense, to shunning missile defense, to greater support of Sharon's policies, to greater opposition to them, to greater multilateralism, to increased economic assistance to the poor, to freer world trade, to shielding weak groups from the foreign competition, to tax cuts at home all correspond to what the advocates had wanted earlier.[32] It is yet possible that the shock we have all felt will be translated into greater agreement and effective measures to deal with the world's ills, but I suspect that differences in diagnosis, values, and interests will continue to characterize how we understand terrorism and conduct world politics.*

[29] G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding Order After Major War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

[30] Quoted in David E. Sanger, "After the Taliban, Who? Don't Forget North Korea," *New York Times*, 25 November 2001.

[31] Quoted in Steven Erlanger, "Bush's Move on ABM Pact Gives Pause to Europeans," ibid., 13 December 2001; also see Suzanne Daley, "Many in Europe Voice Worry that U.S. Will Not Consult Them," ibid., 31 January 2002.

[32] The most plausible argument that September 11 has strengthened the case for missile defense has not been widely made: it would increase the credibility of the threat to attack states that both possess weapons of mass destruction and harbor terrorists.

* I am grateful for comments by Robert Art, Richard Betts, and Demetrios James Caraley.

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Managing the Racial Breach: Clinton, Black-White Polarization, and the Race Initiative

CLAIRE JEAN KIM

From 1992 to 2000, both Democrats and Republicans frequently charged President Bill Clinton with being "an unprincipled opportunist quick to shed ideas, commitments, and associates when they become inconvenient."[1] Clinton's actions on race-related issues, in particular, fueled accusations that he cared more about his public approval ratings than his stated principles. When the Lani Guinier nomination for assistant attorney general for civil rights provoked heated controversy in 1993, Clinton decided to withdraw the nomination. His subsequent decisions to continue federal affirmative action programs and to sign Republican-sponsored welfare reform legislation drew fire from the right and left for being inconsistent, unprincipled, and opportunistic. The President, his critics averred, blithely moved back and forth between liberal and conservative positions on racial issues, swaying in the political winds of the moment.

In light of these charges, Clinton's announcement of a new race initiative, entitled "One America in the 21st Century: The President's Initiative on Race," in June 1997 posed something of a puzzle to observers of the presidency. Consider the following two facts. First, public opinion polls have shown a significant and enduring black-white breach on racial issues for decades. Black-white polarization concerning the extent of, nature of, and solutions to the race problem

[1] Bert Rockman, "Cutting *With* the Grain: Is There a Clinton Leadership Legacy?" in Colin Campbell and Bert Rockman, eds., *The Clinton Legacy* (New York: Chatham, 2000), 274–94, 294.

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has become a settled feature of the American political landscape.[2] Second, presidential scholars concur that the Clinton administration has indeed been the most poll-driven in U.S. history. Howard Kurtz refers to Clinton's "market-tested approach to governing," and Bert Rockman characterizes his leadership style as "cutting *with* the grain."[3] Graham Wilson writes, "It was not only that Clinton spent far more time, money, and energy on tracking opinion polls than previous presidents, but that specialists in public opinion and campaigning such as [Dick] Morris were much more involved in policymaking in the past, and policy initiatives were more thoroughly pretested on the public."[4]

The puzzle, therefore, is why Clinton, the permanent campaigner, voluntarily took on the race issue when black-white polarization made this appear to be a no-win, zero-sum scenario in which he was likely to alienate either blacks or whites or both. If approval ratings were his paramount concern, why did he jump into the racial breach instead of steering clear of it? Michael Lipsky and David Olson argue that executives placed on the hot seat by racial crises create race commissions in order to give the appearance of decisive action while they wait for the crises to pass.[5] Clinton, however, was not on the hot seat, and the question is why he chose to put himself there through the proactive effort of launching a race initiative.

There are several possible answers to this question. One is that Clinton cared so deeply about the race issue on a personal level that he chose to use his presidential bully pulpit to address race relations despite the obvious risk to his approval ratings. Another explanation is that Clinton was freed from reelection concerns during his second term and thus able to pursue bold action on race in the interest of securing his historical legacy. Both of these explanations suggest that Clinton's creation of the race initiative represented a transcendence of immediate strategic calculations in the name of a higher goal.

I make a different argument in this article. I argue that the Clinton administration did in fact launch the race initiative with the aim of boosting the president's public approval ratings. Keenly aware of the racial breach in public opinion, Clinton dared to tackle it because he was confident that he could find a way to please blacks and whites at once. In making this argument, I am not simply reprising the charge that Clinton was opportunistic on racial matters. Clinton did act to enhance his popularity, but he did not sway in the political winds of the moment, making ad hoc accommodations to black and white pres-

[2] See Howard Schuman et al., *Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders, *Divided By Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

[3] Howard Kurtz, *Spin Cycle: How the White House and the Media Manipulate the News*, rev. ed. (New York: Touchstone, 1998), 203; Rockman, "Cutting *With* the Grain," 294.

[4] Graham Wilson, "Clinton in Comparative Perspective" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., *The Clinton Legacy*, 254–73, 261.

[5] Michael Lipsky and David Olson, *Commission Politics: The Processing of Racial Crisis in America* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1977).

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sure groups as circumstances demanded. Rather, as I will show, he developed and pursued systematic strategies for managing the racial breach and maximizing white and black support from his 1992 presidential candidacy until he left office. The launching of the race initiative was the culmination of breach management strategies that Clinton had practiced for years. Observers who have judged Clinton's behavior on race to be inconsistent and opportunistic have failed to recognize these strategies and have thus had difficulty explaining the creation of the race initiative.

Briefly, Clinton's breach management strategies consisted of, first, an initial electoral strategy of courting white support, in part through the symbolic rejection of blacks; and second, an adjusted governing/reelection strategy of pleasing whites with substantive action on racial policy issues and placating blacks with largely symbolic gestures of support. Paul Frymer observes that blacks, to their collective detriment, have been "captured" by the Democratic party in recent times: faced with the Republican party's indifference or outright hostility, blacks feel that they have no choice but to support the Democrats, who inevitably take that support for granted.[6] This dilemma for blacks became especially apparent as Clinton and the New Democrats set out to bring "Reagan Democrats" back into the Democratic fold. The genius of Clinton's breach management strategies was that they appeased black public opinion, thus obscuring the stark reality of black electoral capture and stabilizing it. This is not to say that none of Clinton's actions as president helped black people—some clearly did, as I will indicate below. But my concern in this article is not with assessing the impact of his presidential actions upon black well-being or material conditions but rather with analyzing the way in which he strategically conquered the racial breach in public opinion and made it work for him. As Bert Rockman wrote of Clinton: "He has been the president of a rational choice theorist's dreams."[7]

The first section of this article briefly sketches the black-white breach in public opinion on race matters. The second section discusses the breach management strategies Clinton developed from 1992 through the launching of the race initiative in 1997. The third section analyzes the race initiative as an extension and culmination of these strategies. The conclusion considers some of the implications of these strategies for blacks in American politics.

The Black-White Breach in Public Opinion

The black-white divide on racial matters is one of the most profound and enduring in American society. For decades, public opinion polls have shown that blacks and whites differ fundamentally as to what constitutes the race problem, how severe it is, and what to do about it. Thus Lee Sigelman and Susan Welch

[6] Paul Frymer, *Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

[7] Rockman, "Cutting *With* the Grain," 288.

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write: "It is hardly an overstatement to say that blacks and whites inhabit two different perceptual worlds."[8] And David Bositis, summarizing the findings of the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies 1997 National Opinion Poll, goes so far as to speak of a "white reality" versus a "black reality."[9] Of course, blacks and whites are not diametrically opposed on all race-related issues, and each community of opinion is far from internally monolithic. Still, the breach is significant enough to pose a serious challenge to vote-maximizing politicians.[10]

Blacks and whites disagree about whether or not blacks currently enjoy equality of opportunity or equal treatment with whites in local communities. A 1997 Gallup Poll question asked: "Do blacks in your community have as good a chance as whites to get any kind of job? to get an education? to get housing?" Seventy-nine percent of whites said yes to the first part of the question, 93 percent said yes to the second part, and 86 percent said yes to the third part. For blacks, the figures were 46 percent, 71 percent, and 58 percent, respectively.[11] Hence whites are much more likely than blacks to think that blacks enjoy equality of opportunity in every one of these areas of life. Figure 1 shows that the black-white opinion gap about how blacks are treated has remained significant for several decades, although it has constricted and expanded over time. The smallest gap was 20 points in 1987, and the gap grew during the 1990s.[12] For nearly forty years, a large majority of whites has believed that blacks receive equal treatment with whites in their local communities, while a large majority of blacks has disagreed.

Relatedly, blacks and whites disagree about whether or not racial discrimination persists, to what extent, and to what effect. According to the 1997 Joint Center poll, a large majority of whites (76 percent) and blacks (92 percent) said they believed that discrimination against blacks remains common today. However, this agreement broke down somewhat regarding the extent of current discrimination, with 49 percent of blacks and 21 percent of whites saying they thought there was "a lot" of discrimination, and 50 percent of blacks and 76 percent of whites saying they thought there was only "some" discrimination.[13]

[8] Lee Sigelman and Susan Welch, *Black Americans' Views of Racial Inequality: The Dream Deferred* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 65.

[9] David Bositis, "Summary of Findings," Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies 1997 National Opinion Poll—Race Relations (http://www.jointctr.org/selpaper/poll_ra.htm), May 2000.

[10] It is beyond my scope to offer an explanation for the racial breach. For current debates about why whites express the racial attitudes they do, see David Sears, Jim Sidanius, and Lawrence Bobo, eds., *Racialized Politics: The Debate About Racism in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

[11] "Black/White Relations in the U.S.," Gallup News Service, Social Audit (http://www.gallup.com/poll/socialaudits/sa970610.asp, 10 June 1997), May 2000.

[12] Jack Ludwig, "Perceptions of Black and White Americans Continue to Diverge Widely on Issues of Race Relations in the U.S.," Gallup News Service, Poll Releases (http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr000228.asp, 28 February 2000), May 2000.

[13] I have rounded these figures off. A *Washington Post*/ABC News poll taken the same year showed similar results: 44 percent of blacks and 17 percent of whites said they believed that blacks face "a lot" of discrimination in American society. See Michael Fletcher and Dan Balz, "Race Relations Initiative May Post Risks for Clinton," *Washington Post*, 12 June 1997.

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FIGURE 1
Treatment of Blacks Perceived to be Equal to Treatment of Whites, 1963–1999



Adapted from Jack Ludwig, "Perceptions of Black and White Americans Continued to Diverge Widely on Issues of Race Relations in the U.S.," Gallup News Service, Poll Releases, 28 February 2000 (http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr000228.asp), May 2000.

It makes sense that blacks who deny that they have equality of opportunity with whites also perceive a high level of discrimination. How do we explain the fact that whites appear to believe both that discrimination is common and that blacks enjoy equality of opportunity? It may be that whites believe that discrimination persists but do not think that it significantly constrains the life prospects of blacks.

This is borne out by the fact that whites are much less likely than blacks to see discrimination as the reason for racial inequality. Over the past few decades, the number of whites who agreed that inequality was due to discrimination dropped slowly but steadily, from 41 percent in 1977 to 34 percent in 1996. Indeed, in 1996, 52 percent of whites agreed that inequality was due to blacks' lack of motivation; this was, among whites, the single most frequently cited explanation for inequality. Blacks, on the other hand, are much more likely to see discrimination as the reason for inequality. From 1985 to 1996, the percentages of blacks agreeing that inequality was due to discrimination ranged from the 70s to the low 80s, with a low of 66 in 1996. Among blacks, discrimination was the single most frequently cited explanation for inequality.[14] Further, while whites tend to emphasize past rather than present discrimination as an explanation for black disadvantage, blacks do the reverse.[15]

[14] Schuman et al., *Racial Attitudes*, 155–57, 163, 258–59.
[15] Ibid., 275–76.

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Since most whites perceive less past and present discrimination than blacks, think that blacks enjoy equal opportunity and treatment, and blame black disadvantage on blacks themselves, it is not surprising that they are considerably less supportive than blacks of government efforts to help blacks. A 1997 Gallup Poll question asked how much effort the government should make to improve the conditions of blacks and other minorities. Fifty-nine percent of blacks and 34 percent of whites said the government should make every effort, while 30 percent of blacks and 59 percent of whites said the government should not make any special effort.[16] When asked about government spending on blacks in 1996, 84 percent of blacks said there was too little spending, 15 percent said the amount was about right, and only 1 percent said there was too much spending. For whites, the figures were 26 percent, 48 percent, and 26 percent, respectively.[17] Thus a strong majority of blacks favors more government spending to help blacks, while a strong majority of whites does not favor such an increase. Overall, the racial breach in American public opinion is sufficiently large and enduring to constitute a settled feature of the political landscape with which politicians must contend.

Clinton's Strategies

During the contemporary era, Republicans have dealt with the racial breach by clearly taking sides: they consistently cater to white positions on race-related issues such as affirmative action, welfare, and crime. Their strategy has been not only to favor white over black demands but also symbolically to repudiate blacks as a way of enhancing their support among whites disaffected with civil rights reforms. Both Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan effectively used race as a wedge issue to draw whites away from the Democratic party. In response, Democrats have had to try to recapture Reagan Democrats at the risk of alienating blacks, one of their core constituencies. Clinton watched both Walter Mondale's and Michael Dukakis' candidacies founder in the racial breach and resolved to chart a different course.

With the support of the Democratic Leadership Council, which was founded in the mid-1980s, Clinton developed a 1992 campaign strategy that involved actively courting white votes, in part through a symbolic distancing from and rejection of black interests and leaders. Where previous Democratic presidential nominees tried to walk a tightrope between white and black demands, Clinton mimicked the Republican electoral strategy instead. This feat depended upon and highlighted the fact that blacks are, in Frymer's words, "captured" by the Democratic party, or unable to make a viable threat of defection and thus unable to exercise influence over the party's policies. Once in office, Clin-

[16] "Black/White Relations in the U.S.," Gallup News Service, Social Audit (http://www.gallup.com/poll/socialaudits/sa970610.asp, 10 June 1997), May 2000.

[17] Schuman et al., *Racial Attitudes*, 266–67, 172–73.

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ton implemented an adjusted breach management strategy designed to placate restive black leaders with symbolic gestures while maintaining white support through substantive policy action on racial issues. While Republicans wrote off the black vote entirely, Clinton sought as much as possible to maximize both white and black support.

Campaign Strategy, 1992

Galvanized by Walter Mondale's overwhelming loss to Ronald Reagan in 1984, a group of mostly southern and conservative Democrats came together to form an out-party organization called the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC). The explicit aims of the DLC, of which Clinton was an early and prominent member, were to neutralize the Republicans' race strategy, woo white voters back into the Democratic fold, and recapture the White House. Toward these ends, the DLC launched the New Democrat movement, which calls for the party to reject conventional "left-liberalism," distance itself from "special interests" (especially blacks), move to the political center, and reconnect with the sentiments of middle-class whites. In short, the New Democrats exhort the Democratic party to counter the Republicans' race strategy by forcefully disidentifying itself with black interests and concerns and aggressively courting white votes.[18]

The New Democrats insist that their pragmatically flexible "Third Way" philosophy transcends politics as usual.[19] The Third Way, they argue, represents a bold new course between the outdated poles of liberalism and conservatism, one that "look[s] beyond the conventional left-right debate for solutions to the new challenges of the Information Age."[20] The New Democrat mantra—"Opportunity, Responsibility, Community"—is meant to symbolize this dialectical transcendence: the first term is associated with liberalism, the second with conservatism, and the third with a normative ideal shared by both.[21] New Democrats present themselves as a compassionate but sensible alternative to liberals, who give handouts to disadvantaged people, and conservatives, who ignore them altogether. Despite their rhetoric about innovation and navigation, the New Democrats have simply adopted Republican positions on many race-related issues such as crime, welfare, and affirmative action in a considered effort to distance themselves from blacks and court white votes.

[18] See Adolph Reed, Jr., ed., *Without Justice For All: The New Liberalism and Our Retreat From Racial Equality* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999).

[19] As Jonathan Chait observes, the New Democrats did not clearly distinguish between organizational philosophy and electoral strategy. See "The Slippery Center: The Self-Contradictions of the Third Way," *New Republic*, 16 November 1998, 19–21.

[20] From an editorial entitled "The Myth of the Resurgent Left," *New Democrat* 10 (January/February 1998): 4–5.

[21] See the DLC's website at http://www.dlcppi.org/ndmovement/ndprinciples.html, May 2000.

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Significantly, the New Democrats argue that the Democratic party should reverse its longstanding commitment to affirmative action. The DLC's magazine, the *New Democrat*, and its think tank, the Progressive Policy Institute, routinely criticize affirmative action and suggest alternatives to it. Their argument is that the American dilemma no longer consists of white racism, which is steadily declining, but rather of *racialism*, or the wrongheaded tendency of blacks to cry racism and emphasize racial difference and identity as a way of getting ahead. Joel Kotkin writes in the *New Democrat*: "[T]he greatest threat comes not from white bigots bent on segregation but from 'racialists' pursuing positive discrimination in favor of selected minority groups."[22] Affirmative action, New Democrats contend, is a symptom of racialism, an outgrowth of the "cult of victimization" that blacks have developed to leverage white guilt. It is not only no longer necessary to achieve racial fairness, it is actually racially divisive and unfair to whites. It should be eliminated in order to make public policy truly colorblind. One would be hard pressed to distinguish these arguments from those made by prominent conservatives such as Dinesh D'Souza and Charles Murray.

Having served as DLC national chairman from 1990 to 1991, Clinton enjoyed a close, even symbiotic relationship with the New Democrats in 1992.[23] During the campaign, he contributed to the elaboration of the Third Way philosophy, served as a national spokesman, and offered the New Democrats a chance to have one of their own in the White House. In return, he received a leadership platform, political networks, and a package of well-developed policy ideas—all vital resources for a presidential candidate. Clinton's breach management strategy during the 1992 campaign consisted in large part of following the New Democrat line on race.[24] Clinton's vow to "end welfare as we know it" and his call for welfare recipients to take personal responsibility over their own lives signaled his impatience with black demands and his sympathy with white attitudes on this highly racialized issue. The Clinton/Gore campaign manifesto, *Putting People First*, did not mention race at all except in the context of denouncing "racial quotas." The chapter on civil rights focused on sexual preference and physical disabilities more than it did on race.[25] The Democratic party

[22] Joel Kotkin, "The New Racialism," *New Democrat* 6 (August/September 1994): 7–8.

[23] See Philip Klinkner, "Bill Clinton and the Politics of the New Liberalism" in Adolph Reed Jr., ed., *Without Justice For All: The New Liberalism and Our Retreat From Racial Equality* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999), 11–28; Jon Hale, "The Making of the New Democrats," *Political Science Quarterly* 110 (Summer 1995): 207–32.

[24] Clinton did seek to cement his support among moderate black elected officials such as John Lewis (D–GA), Mike Espy (D–MS), and William Jefferson (D–LA), but he did this kind of networking behind the scenes rather than in front of the television cameras. See Virginia Sapiro and David Canon, "Race, Gender, and the Clinton Presidency" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., *The Clinton Legacy*, 169–99.

[25] Kenneth O'Reilly, *Nixon's Piano: Presidents and Racial Politics From Washington to Clinton* (New York: Free Press, 1995).

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platform of 1992, which borrowed heavily from DLC position papers, was the first in almost thirty years to make no mention of redressing racial injustice.[26]

Per the New Democrat line, Clinton aggressively courted whites and distanced himself from blacks during the 1992 campaign. Consider the racialized issue of crime. In 1988, Republican consultant Lee Atwater had devastated Michael Dukakis's presidential candidacy with his television commercial about Willie Horton, a black convict who raped a white woman while on furlough from a Massachusetts prison. Convinced that Democrats had to shed the image of being soft on crime, the Clinton campaign made two highly publicized moves with regard to this issue. First, in his capacity as governor of Arkansas, Clinton refused to grant executive clemency to Rickey Ray Rector, a brain-damaged black man who had been convicted of killing a police officer many years earlier. Rector was killed by lethal injection in January 1992. Political analyst David Garth commented: "[Clinton] had someone put to death who had only part of a brain. You can't find them any tougher than that." Then, on 2 March 1992, the day before the Georgia, Maryland, and Colorado primaries, Clinton had his picture taken with Senator Sam Nunn, a hawkish Democrat, at the Stone Mountain Correctional Facility in Georgia; a group of mostly black convicts was visible in the background. Former California Governor Jerry Brown, who was also vying for the Democratic nomination, quipped: "Two white men and forty black prisoners, what's he saying? He's saying we got 'em under control, folks, don't worry."[27] Clearly, Clinton was determined not to be Willie Hortonized.

The Los Angeles riots of April 1992 presented the Clinton campaign with a challenge and an unexpected opportunity. Generally, riots tend to have a polarizing effect on public discussion, prompting conservatives to emphasize law and order proposals and liberals to emphasize social programs. Clinton's challenge was to steer a Third Way course between these poles. He had to disavow the expected liberal laments about white racism and calls for more spending in the inner city while still appearing more compassionate and responsive than his Republican opponent, George Bush. While Jerry Brown talked about economic polarization, urban decay, and the failure of both parties to help the poor and minorities, Clinton talked about the culture of dependency and poverty within the "urban underclass" and the need to strengthen families and values in inner city areas.[28] "Throwing money at a system that is profoundly broken," he insisted, "is not the answer."[29] All of Clinton's comments in the aftermath of the riots resonated with whites' opinion that blacks are responsible for their own disadvantage and poverty. At the same time, to distinguish himself from Bush, whom he charged with neglecting urban problems, Clinton emphasized the need for racial healing, dialogue, and reconciliation and called for programs

[26] Frymer, *Uneasy Alliances*, 5.

[27] O'Reilly, *Nixon's Piano*, 411–412, 410.

[28] See E. J. Dionne Jr. and Maralee Schwartz, "Clinton Issues Plea for Racial Harmony," *Washington Post*, 3 May 1992.

[29] Maralee Schwartz, "Clinton Calls For National Day of Reflection," *Washington Post*, 2 May 1992.

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that would "help people to help themselves." In the end, the riots gave Clinton an opportunity to highlight the fact that the New Democrats were nothing like the old Democrats on race.

After the riots, in what was "perhaps the defining moment of his campaign," Clinton took his breach management strategy to its logical conclusion.[30] Having distanced himself from blacks and shown that he was not beholden to them, he rejected Reverend Jesse Jackson in a highly public manner—as if to emphasize to whites that he was unequivocally on their side on racial issues. In early June, trailing behind Bush and Perot in the polls, Clinton delivered a speech at the summit conference of Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition. He surprised Jackson, who was sitting on the platform with him, by chastising the organization for having hosted rap artist Sister Souljah the day before, denouncing comments that she made after the riots as antiwhite. The speech provoked extensive media commentary and gave Clinton's campaign a much-needed boost. Mary Matalin, Bush's campaign director, noted: "We thought it [the Souljah event] was a stroke of genius. . . . We wondered from the beginning how they were going to deal with the Jesse Jackson factor, and they did it all in one fell swoop. Not only did they not kowtow to him, they publicly humiliated him."[31] In the end, Clinton's strategy of courting whites and distancing himself from/rejecting blacks was successful: he received 39 percent of the white vote (Bush received 41 percent, Perot 20 percent) and 82 percent of the black vote in the general election, becoming the first Democrat to be elected to the White House since Jimmy Carter in 1976.

Governing/Reelection Strategy

Clinton adjusted his strategy for managing the racial breach once he took office. Optimally, a politician will try to maximize both white and black support to the extent possible. During the 1992 campaign, Clinton risked alienating blacks because he calculated, first, that he needed to take dramatic action to convince whites to vote for a Democratic presidential candidate, and second, that blacks would remain loyal to the Democrats because of their electoral capture. Once in office, however, several factors allowed or encouraged him to switch gears and try to maximize both white and black support, in that order.

As chief executive, Clinton had more to offer whites: he could push through race-related policies that satisfied whites' preferences, thus freeing himself from the imperative to please whites through the rhetorical rejection of blacks. This gave him more latitude to make symbolic gestures to blacks, placating them for their relative lack of policy influence. The fact that Ronald Reagan and George Bush had largely ignored blacks during their administrations helped Clinton by making his mostly symbolic gestures appear noteworthy. Also, elec-

[30] Frymer, *Uneasy Alliances*, 5.
[31] O'Reilly, *Nixon's Piano*, 415.

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toral capture notwithstanding, Clinton's latitude for alienating blacks was ultimately limited: it was always possible, after all, that disaffected blacks would stay home on the next election day. Clinton's incentive to placate blacks for the insults of the campaign season was heightened by the new ascendancy of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). Following redistricting, the 1992 congressional elections had produced the single largest increase in black representatives in U.S. history, taking the number of CBC members to an historic high of thirty-eight. CBC Chair Kweisi Mfume made it clear that he expected the Clinton White House to treat the newly invigorated caucus as a serious partner.

Clinton's adjusted strategy involved pleasing whites with policy decisions on key racial issues while placating blacks for their relative lack of policy influence with largely symbolic gestures. Soon after taking office, Clinton nominated longtime family friend Lani Guinier, a law professor at the University of Pennsylvania, to be assistant attorney general for civil rights. In her work, Guinier argued that the American political system did not adequately represent the interests of blacks and advocated the exploration of procedures such as cumulative voting and proportional representation to rectify the situation. Although her ideas were not particularly radical, her liberal credentials and focus on racial redress prompted both Republicans and conservative Democrats to attack her.[32] The *Wall Street Journal*'s label for Guinier—"quota queen"—exemplified the tone of this attack. The media set up the drama: Would Clinton stand by his candidate and her black and liberal supporters or would he repudiate her to please whites? Clinton left Guinier hanging for months and then withdrew her nomination before it reached the Senate, saying to the press that he had realized belatedly that she advocated "anti-democratic ideas" that were "difficult to defend." Under fire, Clinton moved to reassure whites that he would side with them on racially polarized issues. Still smarting from the insults of the campaign season, leading black figures such as Charles Rangel (D–NY) and Jesse Jackson expressed outrage over the Guinier episode.[33] The Congressional Black Caucus rebuffed Clinton's request for a meeting, deliberately denying him the opportunity to make a compensatory symbolic gesture to blacks.[34]

Passing a crime bill was one of Clinton's top priorities in his first term. Crime regularly tops the Gallup Poll's "most important problem" list, and, as we have seen, Clinton was determined to change the public perception that Democrats were soft on crime. Clinton's crime bill contained concessions to both liberals and blacks, and also conservatives and whites. It proposed a ban on assault weapons, addressed domestic violence against women, and provided funding for crime prevention measures such as midnight sports programs for inner city

[32] See David Plotke, "Racial Politics and the Clinton–Guinier Episode," *Dissent* 42 (Spring 1995): 221–35.

[33] J. Zamgba Browne, "Black Leaders Are Outraged By Treatment of Prof. Lani Guinier," *New York Amsterdam News*, 12 June 1993.

[34] Kitty Cunningham, "Caucus Rebuffs Clinton," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 12 June 1993, 1452.

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youth. At the same time, it expanded the list of federal crimes to draw the death penalty, created harsher sentencing guidelines, established mandatory sentencing for repeat offenders ("three strikes and you're out"), and provided funds to hire and train 100,000 more police officers.[35]

The Congressional Black Caucus opposed the administration's bill, arguing among other things that its provisions on the death penalty were excessively harsh. Mfume and the CBC tried to persuade the administration to adopt a "racial justice" amendment that would address racial inequities in the death penalty, in part by permitting black death row inmates to base appeals on statistics showing that the death penalty falls disproportionately upon racial minorities.[36] Clinton promised to issue an executive order calling for "racial fairness" in the application of the federal death penalty, but the CBC's proposed amendment was deleted in the House-Senate conference committee and not included in the final version of the bill. On 11 August 1994, a procedural resolution to bring the crime bill to the House floor was defeated by a group of Republicans, conservative Democrats, and ten CBC members.[37] At that point, "faced with either making the bill more liberal to gain the votes of the ten Caucus members or making the bill more conservative to gain the votes of southern Democrats and moderate Republicans, Clinton and the Democratic leadership in Congress opted for the latter."[38] Thus the Clinton administration, guided by its numerous public opinion polls on the issue, made some of the punitive provisions of the bill harsher and cut more than three billion dollars in crime prevention spending to secure the votes needed to pass the bill, which became the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. Compelled to choose sides, Clinton opted to reassure whites that he was tough on crime at the risk of alienating black leaders. The Democrats' approval ratings on crime rose from 50 percent in 1994 to 70 percent in 1997.[39]

Clinton also acted to please whites on welfare reform. Starting with his 1992 campaign promise to "end welfare as we know it," Clinton had signaled to whites that he would not coddle welfare recipients, who are mostly black, according to popular stereotype; rather he would compel them to take personal responsibility for their lives.[40] In the end, Clinton signed a welfare bill that even he thought was too harsh. During the two-year period (1993–1994) when the Democrats controlled Congress, the Clinton administration had focused on health

[35] Robert Singh, *The Congressional Black Caucus: Racial Politics in the U.S. Congress* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998).

[36] Bob Cohn, "Buying Off the Black Caucus," *Newsweek*, 1 August 1994, 24.

[37] The other twenty-eight CBC members reluctantly voted with the administration in the belief that the bill was the best they could get under the circumstances.

[38] Frymer, *Uneasy Alliances*, 175.

[39] Mark Peterson, "Clinton and Organized Interests: Splitting Friends, Unifying Enemies" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., *The Clinton Legacy*, 140–68, 163.

[40] For discussion of the racialization of the welfare issue, see Martin Gilens, *Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Anti-Poverty Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

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care reform and had failed to produce a welfare bill. Following the 1994 midterm elections—in which the Democrats lost both houses of Congress for the first time in forty years—congressional Republicans were able to draft and pass their own welfare bills over Democratic opposition. Clinton vetoed two Republican-sponsored welfare bills. But his advisers warned that polls showed that his reelection would be in jeopardy if the public perceived him to be obstructing welfare reform, so he signed a third bill in July of 1996, conceding that it had "serious flaws" and that parts of it were "wrong."[41] The legislation replaced the federal guarantee of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with lump sum payments to each state and required states to move welfare recipients into jobs within two years and to enforce a lifetime maximum of five years' benefits.[42] Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York, who has himself been accused of taking draconian positions on welfare and other race-related issues, called the legislation "the most brutal act of social policy since Reconstruction."[43] Congressional Black Caucus and liberal leaders expressed dismay at Clinton's actions, unmoved by his claim that he had done his best to hold the line against the Republican onslaught.

Even as he angered black leaders with his positions on crime and welfare, Clinton made symbolic gestures to placate them and reassure them that he cared. When the racial breach seemed implacable—that is, when blacks and whites had strongly polarized policy preferences, as they did during the Guinier episode and on crime and welfare issues—Clinton chose to satisfy whites' preferences. His symbolic gestures to blacks, on the other hand, were carefully crafted to reduce the appearance of a zero-sum situation and the likelihood that whites would be offended. For example, Clinton chose to take a highly public stand on the arson burnings of more than 100 southern black churches in the mid-1990s. He convened a White House meeting of southern governors to discuss the problem, promised that the Department of Justice would take vigorous action, and expressed his personal outrage in several speeches.[44] He also made an emergency transfer of six million dollars to communities in twelve southern states to allow them to hire new police officers and institute other safety measures; he signed into law the Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996 facilitating the prosecution of suspects.[45] Clinton could safely calculate that going after bigoted arsonists would please blacks without alienating whites.

The most visible of Clinton's symbolic gestures was his appointment of an historically unprecedented number of blacks (and other minorities and women) to the Cabinet, judiciary, and subcabinet administrative positions. During the

[41] Paul Quirk and William Cunion, "Clinton's Domestic Policy: The Lessons of a 'New Democrat'" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., *The Clinton Legacy*, 200–25.

[42] States were allowed to set shorter time limits on benefits if they so chose.

[43] Quirk and Cunion, "Clinton's Domestic Policy," 220.

[44] Sapiro and Canon, "Race, Gender, and the Clinton Presidency," 181.

[45] "Remarks Announcing Emergency Action to Prevent Church Burnings," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 32 (8 July 1996): 1165–66.

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first year of his presidency, 14 percent of his appointees were black and 6 percent were Latino; at the time, blacks constituted 12 percent of the population and Latinos 9.5 percent of the population. His appointments of Asian Americans and Native Americans also correlated with these groups' representation in the population. Clinton also took his 1992 campaign promise to appoint "a Cabinet that looks like America" seriously. By the middle of his second term, Clinton had nominated an unprecedentedly large number (ten) of racial minorities to Cabinet positions.[46] These appointments enabled Clinton to appear responsive to blacks even as he refused to heed many of their leading policy preferences. Nor did these actions alienate whites, who do not oppose representational diversity as long as they do not perceive it to have a negative impact on their own opportunities and prospects.

What about Clinton's 1995 decision to continue federal affirmative action programs? At first glance, it might appear as though Clinton boldly defied white and DLC opinion on this issue and defended black interests out of personal conviction—that he put principles before popularity. However, closer examination reveals that Clinton's actions here, too, were perfectly consistent with strategic calculations about maximizing white and black support. As Randall Kennedy observed: "A shrewd, cautious, hard-boiled politician, Clinton recognized that he would have risked much more by abandoning affirmative action than by continuing his measured support of it."[47]

Clinton understood that abandoning federal affirmative action programs would have cost him dearly in black support. It is well known that black policy preferences on this issue are particularly intense: affirmative action is probably the single most important political litmus test to which blacks subject politicians. In 1995, having promised to "end welfare as we know it," humiliated Jesse Jackson, abandoned Lani Guinier, and passed crime legislation perceived by many blacks as too harsh, Clinton did not have much latitude left with black voters. He could not withdraw his support for federal affirmative action without alienating large numbers of black supporters, including the members of the Congressional Black Caucus. Low black turnout had hurt the Democrats in the 1994 midterm elections and threatened to hurt Clinton's reelection prospects in 1996. As he pondered what to do about affirmative action, Clinton took this opportunity to consult and mend fences with Jesse Jackson, who was becoming increasingly critical of the administration and was openly considering another run for the Democratic presidential nomination.[48] The fact that Clinton was also intent on courting women's votes for his reelection run in 1996 undoubtedly influenced his calculus on affirmative action as well.[49]

[46] Ibid., 189, 192.

[47] "Is He a Soul Man? On Black Support for Clinton," *American Prospect* 43 (March/April 1999), (http://www.prospect.org/cgi-bin/printable.cgi), May 2000.

[48] For discussion of how Clinton persuaded Jackson not to run against him in 1996, see Roger Simon, "Primary Care: How Bill Sandbagged Jesse." *New Republic*, 11 February 1997.

[49] Sapiro and Canon, "Race, Gender, and the Clinton Presidency."

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Crucially, Clinton was not forced to side with blacks against whites on this issue, or depart from his breach management strategy of favoring white policy positions, because black-white opinion on affirmative action is not as strictly polarized as one might think. A skillful politician, Clinton found a way to couch his decision to continue federal affirmative action programs in language that pleased whites as well as blacks. Polls clearly show that while whites are less supportive of affirmative action than blacks, the size of the gap varies considerably, depending upon the wording of the survey question.[50] If surveys do not use the words "quotas" or "preferences," both white and black support for affirmative action increases. This suggests that both groups reject the notion of rigid rules that give unfair advantage to less qualified people, but endorse the notion of flexible programs that give qualified people a fair chance.

For example, a 1997 Gallup Poll that did not use the terms "quotas" or "preferences" showed that 53 percent of blacks thought that affirmative action programs should be increased, 29 percent thought that they should be kept the same, and 12 percent thought that they should be decreased; the figures for whites were 22 percent, 29 percent, and 37 percent, respectively.[51] Thus a strong majority of blacks opposed decreasing affirmative action programs, while a slim majority of whites favored increasing them or keeping them the same. Similarly, a July 1995 CNN/*USA Today* poll showed that 61 percent of all Americans agreed that affirmative action was "good in principle but needs to be reformed," 22 percent agreed that it was "fundamentally flawed and needs to be eliminated," and 8 percent thought it was "basically fine the way it is." Again, an overall majority of blacks and whites indicated that they thought that affirmative action, if reformed, was worth keeping.[52] Thus Clinton reasonably expected that he could cement his support among blacks and not alienate—indeed, even please—whites if he did two things: depict affirmative action as a flexible program designed to provide equality of opportunity to qualified people rather than as a system of quotas/preferences, and acknowledge existing problems with the programs.

Clinton's July 1995 speech defending federal affirmative action programs was clearly written with these two imperatives in mind.[53] Clinton began the speech by emphasizing that affirmative action was originally designed in the 1960s to promote equality of opportunity and that it had helped the nation to

[50] Kinder and Sanders, *Divided by Color*; James Kluegel and Eliot Smith, *Beliefs About Inequality: Americans' Views of What Is and What Ought To Be* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1986); Lawrence Bobo, "Race and Beliefs About Affirmative Action" in David Sears, Jim Sidanius, and Lawrence Bobo, eds., *Racialized Politics: The Debate About Racism in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 137-64: Sigelman and Welch, *Black Americans' Views*, 127–28.

[51] "Black/White Relations in the U.S.," Gallup News Service, Social Audit (http://www.gallup.com/poll/socialaudits/sa970610.asp, 10 June 1997), May 2000.

[52] This poll was taken shortly after Clinton's "mend it, don't end it" speech, so it is conceivable that the speech made respondents more open to the idea of reforming and retaining affirmative action.

[53] http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1995/7/19, May 2000.

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move closer to realizing that goal since that time. He then declared that he had concluded from his official review of affirmative action that it remained a "useful tool for widening economic and educational opportunity" and giving a fair chance to qualified people because bigotry persisted in employment, hiring and promotions, education, home loans, and other areas. Still, Clinton conceded, affirmative action needed to be reformed in various ways. He promised to crack down on fraud and tighten requirements in set-aside programs and to vigorously prosecute reverse discrimination cases. He also proposed four "standards of fairness" as guidelines for all affirmative action programs: no quotas, no reverse discrimination, no preferential treatment for unqualified applicants, and programs should be ended as soon as they reach their goals. Toward the end of his speech, Clinton quoted business leaders who said that diversity made the economy stronger and served the interests of all. He summed up his message with the slogan, "mend it, don't end it." In the end, Clinton turned a potentially difficult political situation into an opportunity to maximize his popularity among blacks and whites alike.

From 1992 to 1996, Clinton managed the racial breach quite effectively. His initial electoral strategy of distancing from/rejecting blacks helped him to get elected, and his governing/reelection strategy of satisfying white policy preferences on racial issues and placating blacks with largely symbolic gestures helped him to maintain high popularity ratings among blacks and whites alike. He won reelection handily in 1996, with 46 percent of the white vote (Dole won 45 percent, Perot 9 percent) and 84 percent of the black vote.

Again, this is not to say that none of Clinton's actions helped blacks. For example, acceding to lobbying from the Congressional Black Caucus and other liberals, Clinton included various provisions in his 1993 budget that helped low-income families and individuals (who are disproportionately black), including an expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit, funding for urban enterprise zones, an expansion in food stamp eligibility, and mandatory immunizations for poor and uninsured children.[54] A document issued by the White House Office of Communications in September 1998, entitled "President Clinton and Vice President Gore Working on Behalf of African Americans," lists numerous indices showing how blacks benefited economically during the Clinton years, including figures on unemployment, median household income, poverty rates, access to credit, homeownership rates, etc. There is no doubt that some of Clinton's universalistic policies and, most importantly, a thriving economy helped many blacks, as well as whites. But Clinton did not initiate high-profile, race-targeted programs to help blacks specifically, since such a move would have alienated many whites. Instead, he managed the racial breach in public opinion and sought to enhance his overall approval ratings by siding with whites on ra-

[54] Kitty Cunningham with Jeffrey Katz, "A Test of Strength," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 7 August 1993, 2126. 1993 was the zenith of the CBC's strength, since the losses in the 1994 midterm election severely weakened the group.

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cialized policy issues and placating blacks with mostly symbolic gestures for their failure to prevail on these issues. This brought whites back into the Democratic fold while stabilizing black electoral capture. Whether on balance Clinton's actions advanced black interests or set them back is open to debate.

The President's Initiative on Race

Clinton opened his second term with a number of symbolic gestures designed to placate blacks without offending whites. At a White House ceremony on 16 May 1997, Clinton formally apologized for the Tuskegee experiments—in which government researchers had withheld a cure from syphilitic black men for decades in order to study the progression of the disease—and announced the creation of new grants and fellowships to promote ethics in health research and care.[55] By focusing on an example of egregious discrimination that was safely in the past and taking only limited steps to redress it, Clinton minimized the risk of alienating whites. Clinton also made an unprecedented head-of-state visit to several African nations in the spring of 1998. In Uganda, he issued what amounted to an apology for slavery in the American South. In the spring of 1997, Clinton announced the creation of "One America in the 21st Century: The President's Initiative on Race."

Virginia Sapiro and David Canon argue that Clinton's second-term gestures showed that he really cared about blacks, since he had no election-related motive for making them.[56] This seems to me to miss the point, which is that even in the absence of direct reelection pressures, Clinton made mostly symbolic gestures to blacks and declined to do anything that was clearly politically risky on their behalf. Nor is it accurate to conclude that Clinton no longer cared about his approval ratings in his second term, since he tended, in the absence of close ties with Democratic congressional leaders, to rely upon his general popularity as a source of his authority. Moreover, he still had to consider his party's fortunes in the 1998 midterm elections and 2000 presidential contest. In my view, Clinton's second-term actions on race—including the race initiative—are best explained not by reference to his personal commitment to fighting racism but rather by reference to his ongoing strategic calculations about how to manage the racial breach so as to maximize white and black support. For instance, in 1997 Clinton seriously considered endorsing a House bill that formally apologized for slavery but then demurred when polls indicated strong white opposition to the bill. Even symbolic gestures for blacks had to pass the test of not alienating whites.[57]

[55] "In Tuskegee Experiment's Wake: Apology, Fellowship and Grants Offered," *Black Issues in Higher Education*, 12 June 1997, 8.

[56] Sapiro and Canon, "Race, Gender, and the Clinton Presidency."

[57] A June 1997 Gallup Poll showed that whites opposed legislation apologizing for slavery by a significant margin—67 percent to 26 percent. Blacks favored such legislation 65 percent to 28 percent. Frank Newport, "Whites Oppose Formal Apology For Slavery," Gallup News Service, Poll Releases (http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr970725a.asp, 25 July 1997), May 2000.

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TABLE 1

Clinton's Approval Ratings on Handling Race Relations

		Approve	*Disapprove*	*Don't Know*
1993	Apr 22–24	65	21	14
	Jun 5–6	44	36	20
	Aug 8–10	60	28	12
	Nov 2–4	60	25	15
1994	Jan 15–17	60	24	16
	Apr 22–24	55	30	15
	Jul 15–17	52	32	16
1995	Jul 20–23	57	27	16
	Oct 19–22	52	34	14
1997	Feb 24–26	54	26	20
1998	Jun 5–7	67	19	14
1999		76	15	9

Adapted from "Approval Ratings on Issues," Gallup News Service, Poll Trends (http:/www.gallup.com/poll/trends/ptissues.asp), May 2000.

While there was no urgent need for Clinton to take action on the race issue in the spring of 1997, public opinion data gave him some reason to consider doing so. Clinton entered his second term with public approval of his overall job performance at an all-time high, public concern over many of the nation's problems down, and public satisfaction with the general direction of the country strong.[58] However, as of February 1997, Clinton's approval ratings for handling race relations were at an all-time low, having dropped over ten points from 65 to 54 since 1993. (See Table 1.)[59] A *Washington Post*/ABC News poll taken in early 1997 showed that a majority of Americans viewed race as "a serious problem," even if very few identified it as the most important problem facing the nation.[60] Moreover, a clear majority of both whites and nonwhites (not just blacks, but Latinos and Asian Americans, too) thought that race relations were less than good. (See Table 2.) Both Wade Henderson, executive director of Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and Jesse Jackson had been pressuring Clinton to take action on race for some time, and Representatives John Lewis and Charles Rangel had suggested setting up an executive commission on race. It is no coincidence that Henderson's suggestion about a National Conference on Hate Crimes and Jackson's proposal for more funding for civil rights law enforcement eventually made their way into the race initiative.[61]

[58] Lydia Saad, "Clinton Riding High As Second Term Begins," Gallup News Service, Poll Releases (http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr970118.asp, 18 January 1997), May 2000.

[59] The June 1993 rating was even lower, but it appears to have been a fluke.

[60] Only 3 percent of Americans cited race/civil rights issues as the most serious problem facing the country. Fletcher and Balz, "Race Relations Initiative May Pose Risks."

[61] James Bennet, "Clinton Plans Moves Aimed to Improve Nation's Race Relations," *New York Times*, 5 June 1997; Dewayne Wickham, "Blacks Should Seize Lead in Clinton Race Initiative," *USA Today*, 17 June 1997.

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TABLE 2

Assessments of Race Relations, 17–19 April 1998

	Whites (%)	*Nonwhites (%)*
Very Good	5	3
Somewhat Good	34	24
Neither Good nor Bad	22	19
Somewhat Bad	30	35
Very Bad	7	17
No Opinion	2	2

Adapted from David Moore,"Public Divided on Need for New Racial Initiatives," Gallup News Service, Poll Releases, 29 May 1998 (http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr980529.asp), May 2000.

White House pollster Mark Penn played a key role in creating the race initiative. He liked to conduct extremely detailed polls (he especially favored shopping mall surveys), which asked respondents, among other things, to compare presidential proposals with Republican ones and to rank different iterations of a proposed policy. He also tracked media coverage of the President's activities, and he reported all of his findings during weekly Wednesday night strategy sessions at the White House attended by Clinton, Gore, and senior aides.[62] Having pretested parts of the second Inaugural Address and 1997 State of the Union speech on the public, Penn was pleased (if not exactly surprised) to find that Americans said that they were moved by those parts of the two speeches that dealt with race. In the inaugural speech, Clinton exhorted Americans to live up to their true creed and redeem the promise of America: "Will we be one nation, one people, with one common destiny, or not?" Similarly, in the State of the Union address, Clinton argued that diversity was America's greatest strength, encouraged people to build "One America," and quoted Isaiah 58:12, saying that all Americans must be "repairers of the breach."

Reading the post-speech polls, Penn recommended that Clinton set up some kind of race commission. Clinton assembled staff to brainstorm about the idea and announced "One America in the 21st Century" a few months later.[63] As we shall see, the race initiative borrowed its rhetoric and ideas directly from the Inaugural Address and State of the Union speech. The initiative was intended to convey the impression of bold leadership. The Advisory Board's final report noted: "The initiative represents an example of leadership that seeks to move America toward its highest aspirations. No other President in the history of this Nation has had the courage to raise the issue of race and racism in American society in such a dramatic way."[64] Yet the initiative was in fact an example

[62] Kurtz, *Spin Cycle*.

[63] James Carney, "Why Talk Is Not Cheap," *Time*, 22 December 1997, 32; Kenneth Walsh, "Handholding as Policy," *U.S. News & World Report*, 23 June 1997, 20–24.

[64] *One America in the 21st Century: Forging a New Future* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), 9.

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of how Clinton led by following public opinion. Interestingly, according to one report, Clinton told aides that his goal in launching the initiative was to promote diversity as a means to enhance America's economic strength and moral standing in the eyes of the world.[65] Clearly, Clinton calculated that the race initiative would produce both domestic and international payoffs.

The fact that Clinton announced a new race initiative in 1997 rather than several years earlier in the aftermath of the Los Angeles riots supports the argument that the initiative emerged out of strategic calculations about maximizing white and black support. Because the Los Angeles riots of 1992 dramatized racial inequalities and polarization in American society, any commission appointed in its aftermath would have had to contend with the specific facts of a concrete conflict, inflamed popular demands, and deeply entrenched and polarized opinions about what was to be done. It would have risked alienating whites or blacks or both with its findings. By choosing a relatively nonpolarized moment, Clinton ensured that he had the latitude to frame the race issue as he desired—that is, in a way that would maximize white and black support. Renee Smith argues that the absence of a precipitating crisis like the riots diminished Clinton's ability to use his bully pulpit in the service of racial reform.[66] In my view, it was precisely the absence of such a crisis that made the race initiative appear to be a sound strategic move.

Clinton and his staff kept a tight rein on the race initiative from start to finish, assessing and seeking to control its impact on public opinion. Roger Simon writes: "This was going to be a really big show by a really big showman and the entire White House was mobilized for it."[67] Together, Executive Order 13050 (which created the Advisory Board), the president's announcement speech at the University of California, San Diego, and the initiative's website—all direct products of the White House—laid down strict parameters for the Advisory Board's work, fixing its approach, language, and priorities in advance. The Advisory Board's work constituted the initiative's public face, but Clinton's staff monitored and censored the board members' actions and statements from behind the scenes. Board member Thomas Kean, for example, claimed that the White House staff tried to control what he and his colleagues said about the initiative out of concern that their comments would somehow embarrass the president or vice-president. In the end, it was White House staff rather than Advisory Board members who designed, researched, and wrote the final report. Christopher Edley, who had served as Clinton's main adviser on affirmative action two years earlier, played an important role in shaping the initiative and the report; pollster Mark Penn conducted regular surveys to gauge the public's potential response.

[65] Roger Simon, *Show Time: The American Political Circus and the Race for the White House* (New York: Random House, 1998), 315–16.

[66] "The Public Presidency Hits the Wall: Clinton's Presidential Initiative on Race," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 28 (Fall 1998): 780–85.

[67] Simon, *Show Time*, 317.

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The race initiative was the logical culmination of Clinton's strategy of maximizing white and black support. It represented his effort to conquer the racial breach by pleasing both groups at once. The initiative took the racial breach as its explicit subject; its stated aim was to bridge the racial "divide" or "fault line" and bring about racial reconciliation. As one Democratic pollster commented at the time: "The challenge for Clinton is to be able to reframe the debate. We've got a debate now that's inherently polarizing. I think the drama here is whether Clinton can pose a different set of questions around the issue of race that's more likely to produce a sense of consensus in the country."[68]

Clinton's initiative met this challenge by characterizing the American race problem as the threat posed to social coherence and national unity by proliferating racial/cultural differences. In his commencement speech at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD), Clinton expressed his concern about maintaining unity: "Can we be one America respecting, even celebrating, our differences, but embracing even more what we have in common? Can we define what it means to be an American, not just in terms of the hyphen showing our ethnic origins but in terms of our primary allegiance to the values America stands for and values we really live by?"[69] The Advisory Board's final report struck a more ominous note, warning that racial divisions could "undermine our future as the world's most internally strong and globally competitive society."[70] This characterization of the race problem as the straining of *pluribus* against *unum* represented a significant (though largely unnoticed) departure from the emphasis on white racism seen in Gunnar Myrdal's *America Dilemma* and the 1968 Kerner Commission report on urban riots of the 1960s—the two major American race studies of the twentieth century.[71] What made it effective for Clinton's purposes was that it was ambiguous and multivalent enough to appeal to both blacks and whites at once. Blacks heard what they wanted to hear: recognition of an ongoing race problem and a call for white Americans to practice their creedal values. Whites heard what they wanted to hear: recognition of the racial tensions produced by immigration and race-conscious programs and a call for participation in a shared civic culture.

Given the reluctance of both Republicans and Democrats to talk about race at all in recent times, the initiative's very existence and its spotlighting of race as an issue constituted a major gesture to blacks. To some degree, too, the final report addressed blacks' concerns about discrimination and black-white inequality. Chapter two, "Struggling With the Legacy of Race and Color," reviewed past

[68] Geoffrey Garin, cited in Fletcher and Balz, "Race Relations Initiative May Pose Risks."

[69] "Initiative Announcement," (http://www.whitehouse.gov/Initiatives/One America/speech.html), May 2000.

[70] *One America in the 21st Century*, 34.

[71] See Claire Jean Kim, "Clinton's Race Initiative: Recasting the American Dilemma," *Polity* 33 (Winter 2000): 175–97; Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, 20th anniversary ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1962); *Report of the National Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York: Bantam Books, 1968).

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discriminatory practices, and chapter four, "Bridging the Gap," documented ongoing black-white "disparities." The initiative also incorporated a multiculturalist sensibility aimed at pleasing other nonwhites. Thus Clinton appointed one Latina and one Asian American as well as three whites and two blacks to the Advisory Board. Chapter two of the final report paid careful attention to the histories of each of the major racial/ethnic minority groups (blacks, Latinos, Asian Americans, and Native Americans). Chapter three, "The Changing Face of America," documented the racial/ethnic diversification of the nation's population and called for improved data collection on "America's less visible racial groups."[72] This emphasis on the multicultural, multiracial character of American society once again distinguished the race initiative from earlier race commissions, which had focused exclusively on black-white dynamics.

The initiative staff took various steps to ensure that whites, too, felt that they were getting something out of the event. In the UCSD speech, Clinton reassured whites that the initiative would not brand them all as racists and denounced the "disturbing tendency to wrongly attribute to entire groups, including the white majority, the objectionable conduct of a few members." He also promised that "white Americans have just as much to gain as anybody else from being part of this endeavor." Once the initiative was underway, the initiative staff arranged for a public forum on race and sports to be broadcast on ESPN, billing it as an outreach effort to white men.

Most importantly, the initiative played to white sensibilities by downplaying discrimination, deemphasizing white responsibility for black disadvantage, and denying the need for major government programs. Even as it testified to persistent discrimination, the final report downplayed its significance through various narrative and semantic techniques. One technique consisted of implying that discrimination was mostly a thing of the past. For example, Chapter two, "Struggling With the Legacy of Race and Color," focused primarily on discriminatory practices that took place before the twentieth century and subsumed these in a narrative about the nation's teleological "path toward racial progress."[73] The report's repeated references to the "legacy" of past discrimination suggested that current discrimination was more a vestige of ancient habits than a vibrant contemporary practice. Another technique involved trivializing the effects of discrimination. The report commented on "White privilege," for instance, but confined its discussion to whites' ability to purchase cars at lower prices than blacks, their tendency not to get surveilled in stores, and their receipt of prompt service in restaurants. Significantly, the report said nothing about how racial privilege functions with regard to more vital issues such as income, employment, and housing.

Another semantic technique involved shifting attention away from whites' responsibility for black disadvantage. When discussing racial inequalities, the

[72] The report uses the following terms: African Americans, Latinos, Asian Pacific Americans, and Native Americans/Alaskan Natives.

[73] *One America in the 21st Century*, 36.

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report relied heavily upon terms such as "gap" and "disparity"—that is, upon bland, technical words that obscured the agency of discriminatory whites by focusing on comparative group outcomes rather than on the historical and political processes by which they came about. More often than not, the report depicted discrimination as an impersonal force "out there" that did not emanate from particular individuals or institutions. Consider this language: "Discrimination . . . is active and the source of harmful consequences. . . . [It] contributes to alienation and further impedes our ability to live, work, and grow together as one America."[74] Note how discrimination is depicted as an externally imposed burden that afflicts all Americans rather than as something that one group does to another. Through these kinds of semantic maneuvers, the report managed to acknowledge discrimination while at the same time letting whites off of the hook.

Finally, the initiative called for dialogue rather than government programs as a means of bridging the racial divide. Exhorting Americans to engage in a "great and unprecedented conversation about race," the initiative staff sponsored campus week dialogues, statewide dialogue days, town hall meetings, and other kinds of public discussions across the country. They also offered for sale via the initiative website the *One America Dialogue Guide*, a practical manual that instructs people on how to start their own local dialogues. This notion of dialogue as an activity of private citizens, which reduced the race problem to a problem of intergroup communications, fitted nicely with the New Democrats' vision of "reinvented" or streamlined government and with whites' clear opposition to new government programs designed to redress racial inequality. The role of government, Clinton insisted in his UCSD speech, was only to facilitate dialogue; it was up to ordinary Americans to open their hearts and minds to one another and thereby achieve racial reconciliation. Given the initiative's pronounced focus on dialogue, the report's modest and unoriginal recommendations on civil rights enforcement, housing, education, health, the economy, and criminal justice appeared almost as afterthoughts. Overall, the initiative succeeded in effecting a semantic closing of the racial breach, but only by downplaying the role of white racism in sustaining racial inequalities and retreating from a governmental commitment to improve things.

Conclusion

When the Advisory Board issued its final report in September 1998, most observers judged the race initiative to be a failure. Those on the left denounced it for failing to suggest any new policy efforts to alleviate black disadvantage. Those on the right denounced it as a symptom of the racialist liberalism that was ruining the country.[75] Some credited Clinton with good intentions but ar-

[74] Ibid., 59.

[75] Peter Dreier, "There's No Racial Justice Without Economic Justice: Shortcomings of Clinton's Race Initiative Report," *Social Policy 29* (Winter 1998): 41–48; Evan Gahr, "Bulworthless: Clinton's Miserable 'Race Initiative' Flop," *American Enterprise 9* (November/December 1998): 62–65.

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gued that the Monica Lewinsky sex scandal had derailed his efforts to use his bully pulpit to improve race relations.[76] In making these judgments, observers held the initiative up to their respective standards and declared that it had fallen short.

By the Clinton administration's own assessment, however, the initiative was a success: it made blacks and whites alike feel better about the president's handling of race relations. Jesse Jackson participated in the White House ceremony announcing the final report's release, and NAACP president and former CBC chair Kweisi Mfume and CBC chair Maxine Waters praised the report in a press conference.[77] Between February 1997 and June 1998, moreover, Clinton's approval rating on race relations made a significant jump from 54 to 67.[78] (See Table 1.) To assume that the initiative aimed at great things and failed is to buy into Clinton's rhetoric about repairing the racial breach and "redeem[ing] the promise of America."[79] In my view, the initiative was designed to achieve a less exalted goal, and it did just that.

What Clinton could not have anticipated when he launched the race initiative was how much he would need the public support it helped to generate, especially among blacks. As the Lewinsky scandal unfolded, blacks proved to be his most ardent and outspoken supporters. A CNN poll conducted in the fall of 1998 showed that 90 percent of blacks approved of Clinton's job performance as president, compared with 59 percent of whites.[80] Author Ishmael Reed declared Clinton to be "a white soul brother," and Nobel prize-winning novelist Toni Morrison added, "[W]hite skin notwithstanding, this is our first Black president."[81] As the storm of scandal gathered force, Clinton took refuge in the black community. He asked Jesse Jackson for spiritual advice, sought solace in black churches, and basked in the public displays of support undertaken by various black leaders and luminaries.[82] There is no doubt that black support—in particular that of the CBC—helped Clinton to weather the impeachment process. Blacks also helped to deliver historic results for the Democrats in the 1998 midterm elections. For only the second time since the Civil War, the president's party gained ground in the House (five seats) and held even in the Senate, prompting the *New York Times* to run the headline: "Dem-

[76] Derrick Jackson, "When the President is Crippled, the People Suffer," *Boston Globe*, 25 September 1998; Louis Freedberg, "Scandal Drowns Out Conversation on Race," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 20 September 1998.

[77] "NAACP Commends Clinton's Race Report But Urges More" (http://www/naacp.org/president/releases/archieves/1998/race_report.htm), May 2000.

[78] Gallup does not break down these numbers by race.

[79] "Initiative Announcement."

[80] Bill Johnson, "Black Support for Bill Clinton Understandable, But Incorrect," *Detroit News*, 23 October 1998.

[81] Ceci Connolly and Robert Pierre, "African American Voters Standing by Clinton," *Washington Post*, 17 September 1998; "The Talk of the Town," *New Yorker*, 5 October 1998, 31–32.

[82] Robert Sherill, "Preachers to Power," *Nation*, 13 July 1998, 11.

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ocrats in Political Debt for Black Turnout in South."[83] In the end, the race initiative and the larger breach management strategies of which it was part paid dividends for the Clinton administration.

Clinton's skillful management of the racial breach in public opinion raises difficult questions for those concerned with black electoral capture in the American political system. In testing the limits of black loyalty to the Democrats, Clinton has shown that Democratic presidential candidates and presidents have a good deal of latitude with black leaders and voters. It seems that blacks will tolerate substantive policy concessions to whites on racialized issues as long as symbolic gestures are made in compensation. Clinton's particular genius has been to provide the Democrats with a formula for stabilizing the situation of black electoral capture from which the party benefits. Some black leaders seeking to alter their "captured" situation and gain real influence over national policy have tried over the years to persuade black voters that they must be willing to abandon the Democrats in favor of the Republicans or an independent black political party in order to be taken seriously by the Democratic leadership. Clinton's model of breach management politics has made their task of persuasion more difficult than ever.

[83] Sapiro and Canon, "Race, Gender, and the Clinton Presidency," 183–84.

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United States Senators as Presidential Candidates

BARRY C. BURDEN

Robert Dole was apparently more comfortable and successful as a senator than as a candidate for president of the United States. There was real concern within the Dole campaign in 1996 that his bid for the presidency was hindered by his position as a senator. The potential liability of his office became so great that Dole chose to abandon his seat and position as majority leader of the U.S. Senate. This was done to redefine himself as a citizen and presidential candidate rather than as a member of the Senate and to create more time for campaigning. It is not clear that this strategy worked, however, as the Dole-Jack Kemp ticket was soundly defeated with only 41 percent of the popular vote and less than a third of the electoral vote. Though his senatorial experience surely did not cause his defeat, this story raises the question of whether candidates generally find Senate service a liability in their quests for White House.

Contrary to Dole's view, the conventional wisdom holds that senators are prime presidential material. The Senate is thought to be "the major launching pad for presidential contenders."[1] It has been called the "Mother of Presidents," "presidential incubator," "the presidential nursery," and "presidential pre-school."[2] Nearly every senator has been considered a potential candidate for president at one time or another simply because of the office he or she occu-

[1] Stephen Hess, *The Ultimate Insiders* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1986), 70.

[2] Helen Dewar, "Senate's Club of Failed Ambitions," *Washington Post*, 10 March 1980; Robert L. Peabody, Norman J. Ornstein, and David W. Rohde, "The United States Senate as a Presidential Incubator: Many are Called but Few Are Chosen," *Political Science Quarterly* 91 (Summer 1976): 237–258; Neil MacNeil, "The Presidential Nursery," *Harper's Magazine*, January 1972, 48–50.

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pies.[3] Some elections have even seen hordes of senators running for president simultaneously. For example, the 1976 contest brought out Senators Henry "Scoop" Jackson, Frank Church, Birch Bayh, Lloyd Bentsen, and Fred Harris, while the 1988 election featured Senators Joseph Biden, Bob Dole, Al Gore, Gary Hart, Ernest "Fritz" Hollings, and Paul Simon. This strong presence would not surprise most scholars and journalists, since they assume that senators are natural candidates for the White House. Among other assets, they have demonstrated campaign experience, are able to raise large sums of money, enjoy wide name recognition, and have already managed to represent large and often diverse state constituencies. In short, senators ought to have a head start over other kinds of candidates when the presidential race begins.

Despite these clear expectations, senators have not often been successful presidential candidates, particularly in the modern nominating era. The failure of senators to meet expectations cannot be explained by a series of unconnected anecdotes; statistical evidence shows that the poor performance of senators is more than coincidence. Before turning to empirical analysis or suggesting explanations, I begin by reanalyzing the historical record to reject the basic contention that senators are ideal presidential candidates. The second section reviews relevant political science theory and considers two specific historical events that might have affected senators' success rates. The next section develops the notion of candidate investment found in ambition theory and suggests four explanations flowing from it that might explain why governors in particular perform better than senators. Finally, I collect data on all major presidential contenders over the last forty years to determine how career backgrounds in the Senate affect campaign success.

The Surprising Historical Record

It is almost unheard of for presidents to come directly from the Senate. Of the forty-three presidents of the United States, only two—Warren Harding in 1920 and John Kennedy in 1960—moved straight from the Senate to the White House. Of the fifty-four presidential elections held since 1789, only fifteen saw current or even former senators win. Limiting the time frame to contemporary elections, some of the worst defeats were suffered by senators who had earned their parties' nominations. Among others, Senators Barry Goldwater (1964), George McGovern (1972), Walter Mondale (1984), and Bob Dole (1996) lost by embarrassing margins. Of the last seven presidents, only Nixon had senatorial experience, and he had but a partial term as senator.

While this brief history does not prove that senators make poor candidates, it seems clear that senators are not the strong candidates that many expect them to be. There are two nuances to this conclusion that require further exploration,

[3] Hess, *The Ultimate Insiders*; Jonathan S. Krasno, *Challengers, Competition, and Reelection: Comparing Senate and House Elections* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

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TABLE 1

Last Offices Held by Presidential Contenders and Nominees (1868–1972)

	Major Party Nominees (%)		*Contenders (%)*	*Nomination Success Rate (Nominees/Contenders)*
Last Office Held	*Lubalin*	*POR*	*POR*	*Computed by author*
Vice President	5.5	5.4	2.0	1.00
Other or None	13.9	24.4	15.7	.56
Governor	33.2	37.9	28.4	.48
Federal Appointee	16.7	13.5	13.7	.36
Senator	13.8	13.5	30.4	.16
Representative	5.5	5.4	9.8	.02
President	11.1	—	—	—
N	36	37	102	.36

Note: Peabody, Ornstein, and Rohde (POR) do not include current or former presidents in their calculations.

however. First, there are probably differences between former and sitting senators. Indeed, many successful presidential candidates—from Martin Van Buren to Harry Truman—are former senators who worked their way to the presidency through the vice-presidency. Thus, the safest path from the Senate to the White House might be indirect. Roughly 142 major-party nominees have run for president, but just forty-four of these were ever in the Senate, most of them earlier in their political careers. Former senators not only make up the lion's share of this group but also won more often. There is either a liability associated with those who are currently senators or a benefit associated with having left the Senate in the past, perhaps attributable to passing through the vice-presidency first, a sort of back door strategy.

The second refinement to the conclusion is to point out that governors are senators' main competition. Thus, the story is as much about governors' successful presidential campaigns as it is about senators' unsuccessful ones. Over the last thirty years, senators accounted for the largest group of declared presidential candidates but governors were not far behind.[4] Nearly two-thirds of contemporary presidential candidates are drawn either from the Senate or governors' offices. Longer-range data support this contention too. Table 1 presents data on presidential nominees and the larger pool of presidential "contenders" assembled by Eve Lubalin and separately by Robert L. Peabody, Norman J. Ornstein, and David W. Rohde (hereafter POR) for the period covering 1868 to 1972.[5] Data from both studies are presented to show that results are similar despite their use of slightly different coding procedures. The POR data are further manipulated to compute success rates.

[4] Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, *Change and Continuity in the 1998 Elections* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1998).

[5] Eve Lubalin, "Presidential Ambition and Senatorial Behavior: The Impact of Ambition on the Behavior of Incumbent Politicians" (Ph.D. dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 1981); Peabody, Ornstein, and Rohde, "The United States Senate as a Presidential Incubator."

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The first column in Table 1 lists the last office held by presidential candidates. This is nearly the same as Joseph Schlesinger's definition of a "manifest office."[6] While not an ideal way to characterize candidates' office-holding histories, it is reasonable shorthand at this point for suggesting from where party candidates are drawn. The Lubalin and POR data roughly agree that governors provide the largest number of major party nominees. Senators and other federal appointees such as cabinet secretaries each comprise about 14 percent of the nominees, while other types of candidates—probably those with military and business backgrounds—are a slightly larger proportion of the pool. For now, note that this low number of senators as nominees is surprising given that senators far outnumber governors and visible executive branch appointees combined.

The fourth column of the table considers all presidential contenders, a larger set of candidates that includes the eventual nominees. Contenders outnumber nominees almost three to one using the POR definition. Among contenders the position of senators changes dramatically. Senators are one of the smallest groups of nominees despite being the largest groups of contenders. Governors, in contrast, tend to be contenders just as often as senators but are much more likely to win nomination.

More interesting for our purposes is the rate at which contenders become nominees. The final column of Table 1 presents the nomination success rate (NSR), computed as the number of nominees divided by the number of contenders. The mean NSR for all contenders is .36, indicating that about one of every three contenders wins nomination. If senators, governors, and other office-holders had equal success rates, all of the entries in the final column would be nearly equal and close to this value. They clearly are not. Aside from House members, who are few in number, the lowest value is for senators. Only three out of every twenty senators who run for the presidency will be nominated. In contrast, nearly half of governors who run for president win their parties' nominations. Governors' nomination rate is nearly three times that of senators.

The simple evidence presented so far demonstrates that senators have fared less well than conventional wisdom would suggest. Their failures have opened the door for governors. Despite this clear statistical pattern, it is tempting to explain some recent failures of senators using stories specific to particular elections. For example, one might argue that ex-Senator Dole lost the 1996 presidential election because he was perceived as too old for the job or because his opponent benefited from presiding over a booming economy. Several other senators lost in November because they were thought to be too ideologically extreme (Barry Goldwater in 1964, George McGovern in 1972, and Walter Mondale in 1984). One might argue that former Senator Hubert Humphrey lost in 1968 because of a fluke third-party candidacy, a lack of unity within the

[6] Joseph Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

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Democratic party, or blame for Lyndon Johnson's handling of the Vietnam War. One could add stories about numerous other candidacies.

While these explanations all have some truth to them, they do not allow one to connect cases to one another in a systematic fashion. Many more complicated stories would have to be told to explain the dozens of senators including tough cases such as Estes Kefauver (1960), Scoop Jackson (1972), Birch Bayh (1976), and John McCain (2000) who failed to earn even their parties' nominations. While it might be feasible to construct idiosyncratic explanations for each case of senatorial failure over the past 200 years, coincidence is not this powerful. There is something more general about the Senate that connects many of these cases; from a political science perspective it is more useful to understand the rule than the exceptions. To do so, our study should be linked to the rich literature on presidential selection.

Senators and the Theory of Presidential Selection

Since the rise of the direct primary as the chief mechanism for choosing presidential candidates, an emerging literature has sought to explain the dynamics of presidential selection. Some excellent studies, beginning with John Aldrich's early treatment, focus on the sequence of prenomination events.[7] Because primaries and caucuses occur one after another in time, early results affect candidates and voters in later contests. This creates a dynamic process in which momentum and expectations are crucial.[8] With the growing use of direct primaries for selecting convention delegates and the institution of party reforms in the late 1960s and early 1970s, fundraising and early primary wins have become even more important to candidate success. Thus, in contrast to the many studies of general elections, presidential primaries feature more candidates, unpredictability, and strategy on the parts of voters and candidates.[9] The result is a quick winnowing of the field from as many as ten viable contenders to just one nominee per party over the course of just a few months.

Presidential selection is a natural setting in which to apply theories of political ambition. Ambition theory flows from Schlesinger's classic treatment of the subject, which has shaped all subsequent analyses. The basic idea is that most politicians wish to advance their careers by moving up the hierarchy of political offices. Though some office holders choose to hold a single office their entire careers (static ambition) or remain in office only a few years (discrete ambition), most politicians have progressive ambition: "the politician aspires to at-

[7] John H. Aldrich, *Before the Convention: Strategies and Choices in Presidential Nomination Campaigns* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

[8] Larry M. Bartels, *Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

[9] For examples, see Aldrich, *Before the Convention*; Bartels, *Presidential Primaries*; Samuel L. Popkin, *The Reasoning Voter*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

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tain an office more important than the one he now seeks or is holding."[10] Of course, calculating politicians do not blindly seek higher office at every opportunity. Ambition is progressive in the sense that politicians would accept higher office were it offered to them without risk.[11] It is the "political opportunity structure" along with an individual's risk profile that partly governs moves up the political ladder.

The Senate appears to be a natural stepping-stone in Schlesinger's view. It is commonly assumed, for example, that nearly all senators have progressive ambition for the presidency and place a uniformly high value on holding the office.[12] Unfortunately, there are real risks associated with running for president, especially losing one's current office in the pursuit and ending up out of government entirely. The political opportunity structure interacts with ambition in this way. Senators are better able to take advantage of the structure than are other office holders because of their six-year terms. Schlesinger also shows that senators' careers are the most "orderly" in terms of flowing from office to office up the hierarchy. And the Senate is seen as higher on the ladder of offices than are governorships.[13] In short, ambition theory suggests that the Senate is the ideal "manifest office" for seeking the presidency. Before exploring why this might not always be true, two caveats are in order.

Historical Milestones

There are two events that might have changed the success rates of senators seeking the presidency. The first was the 17th Amendment to the Constitution, which in 1913 provided for the direct election of U.S. senators. Direct election changed the Senate, making senators more responsive to and more representative of their constituencies.[14] One might expect that senators became more successful seeking the presidency after the amendment, because they developed through generational replacement into a more electorally oriented breed.[15] There is some empirical support for this hypothesis. After the 1916 election, senators' share of the contender pool rose from 26 percent to 35 percent, and their presence among nominees grew from 6 percent to 21 percent. Before the 17th Amendment, senators were less likely to pursue presidential bids and less

[10] Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics*, 10.

[11] David W. Rohde, "Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of Members of the United States House of Representatives," *American Journal of Political Science* 23 (February 1979): 1–26.

[12] Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, "Progressive Ambition among United States Senators, 1972–1988," *Journal of Politics* 49 (February 1986): 3–35.

[13] Schlesinger's finding comes from his analysis of careers in the first half of the twentieth century. I verified this result for a recent year (1999) in which 13 percent of U.S. senators had been governors while only one governor (2 percent) had been a senator.

[14] See Sara Brandes Crook and John R. Hibbing, "A Not-so-distant Mirror: The 17th Amendment and Constitutional Change," *American Political Science Review* 91 (December 1997): 845–853.

[15] Lubalin, "Presidential Ambition and Senatorial Behavior"; Peabody, Ornstein, and Rohde, "The United States Senator as a Presidential Incubator."

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likely to achieve them if they did run. This had a multiplicative effect that doubly hurt their chances.

The second change occurred when the nomination process was altered in the 1960s and 1970s. Most notably, the direct primary replaced conventions and caucuses as the method for choosing nominees. Delegate selection methods, particularly for Democrats, assured that delegates would be more representative of the citizenry than before. These reforms could have affected senators' success rates if senators were uniquely able to take advantage of primaries or were somehow hindered by the new rules. These reforms culminated in the McGovern-Fraser Commission recommendations, which encouraged more democratic selection of delegates to national party conventions. Using the 1972 election as the first in which these reforms defined the nomination process, there is no evidence that the process affected recruitment from the Senate. In the era of direct election, the 1972 reforms did not affect the rate at which senators won their parties' nominations.

While these historical changes in the presidential selection structure, particularly direct election, had some effect on senators' success rates, they are not responsible for the persistent gap between theoretical expectations and actual performance. Anecdotes also fail to generate complete accounts for what seems to be a systematic pattern; they are better explaining deviations from it. A fuller explanation of candidate performance is required to augment the rich histories of individual campaigns and candidates.

The Role of Investment in Ambition Theory

I seek to augment the traditional approach to studying presidential selection by emphasizing the notion of candidate investment implied by ambition theory. This emphasis might be able to explain better the anomalous cases, particularly those of senators, and might also lead us to rethink the role of risk in progressive ambition. I define investment as the degree to which a candidate commits to her or his presidential campaign. Note that it is an amount (that is, how invested one is) rather than a dichotomy (that is, invested or not). Investment matters because presidential campaigns are taxing affairs. They require extraordinary time commitments, extensive organizational resources, daunting fundraising demands, and thick skins. In short, a presidential campaign requires huge personal and professional sacrifices with only a modest chance of success.

Intuitively, the idea of investment fits with journalistic accounts suggesting that particular politicians are "exploring the possibility of a presidential bid" or "testing the waters" (low investment) or "aggressively seeking the nomination" (high investment). One can easily imagine a senator toying with a presidential bid to get attention from the media and gain other kinds of influence.[16] That is

[16] Hess, *The Ultimate Insiders*; Lubalin, "Presidential Ambition and Senatorial Behavior."

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the lowest form of investment. In contrast, Dole's bridge-burning resignation from the Senate in 1996 represents total investment in the presidential campaign.

Senators might fare poorly because they invest less than other candidates, even though their desire for the presidency is just as great. And they might invest less because something inherent in the office depresses their subjective estimates of their chances for success or lowers the costs of a initiating a presidential bid. Such behavior is of course consistent with ambition theory. The theory recognizes that the motivations to invest in a presidential campaign also vary among senators depending on such complex factors as risk profiles and simple things like when their terms end. Compare two senators who face reelection in different years. For one, the presidential election occurs midterm; for the other it coincides with the end of the current term. The midterm senator might casually consider a presidential campaign and then retreat to the safety of his office should it not seem fruitful in the early months. The other senator, however, faces a more consequential choice. She or he might decide to abandon the Senate to campaign for the presidency full-time or conclude that the bid would not be successful and resolve to rerun for the Senate instead with a better chance of success.[17]

I hypothesize that senators and governors differ in their successes because they invest at different levels. Because their constituencies are the same, many factors are held constant, allowing us to identify Senate-specific variables more confidently. Since senators and governors together account for most of the serious presidential contenders, explaining their relative success rates goes a long way toward explaining presidential nominations in general. I now offer four potential explanations for why senators are not performing as theory would expect, each of which is congruent with the investment idea and the larger theory of ambition. None is sufficient, unfortunately, but each is at least plausible. They deal with authority and the issues, expectations, office structure, and the candidate pool.

Authority and the Issues

Though elected within the same constituencies, a fundamental difference between a senator and a governor is that one is a legislator and the other is an executive. This difference might affect their chances for success and thus their investment levels. Senators make policy and take positions by introducing bills, offering amendments in committee, making speeches, bargaining with their colleagues, and eventually voting on roll calls on the Senate floor. Many of these actions, particularly roll call voting, are concrete, durable, and traceable. Most senators have some issues on which they would prefer not to take clear public stands, perhaps because it would divide their reelection constituencies and pro-

[17] Lyndon Johnson (1960) and Orrin Hatch (2000) were permitted by state law to run for senator and president simultaneously.

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vide potential opponents with material to use against them in a campaign.[18] Nonetheless, the relentless flow of votes, usually hundreds each year, requires senators to do so. The agenda is often forced upon them. The skills that aid senators in assembling coalitions and negotiating with colleagues might not serve them well when campaigning for an executive office that demands leadership and decisiveness. A poignant indicator of this problem came after Senator Bob Dole flopped in his first national presidential debate. "If only the debate worked like the Senate, he lamented: 'If you could go back and edit remarks, like we do in the Senate, I would have changed the wording.'"[19]

Governors, on the other hand, often get to define their own agendas and might choose to remain ambiguous on sensitive issues. They can find niche issues such as education, campaign reform, taxes, and welfare reform on which they may to ride into office and govern. Sometimes objective state conditions will require them to tackle particular issues, of course, but they will never be forced to go on record on as wide an array of matters as legislators must. Though governors do negotiate with their state legislatures, as executives they have much more control than do senators over policy outcomes. Legislators must negotiate to reach their own goals but also take positions on the compromises that others are negotiating. Senators face a double-edged policy sword. They must equivocate to succeed but rarely are given credit for Congress's accomplishments. Governors, on the other hand, may often take clearer credit for what has been done.

Expectations

Citizens have different expectations of senators and governors. These are of several types. Governors must steer the executive branch bureaucracies on a daily basis while senators address the issues on the national agenda, including such remote affairs as the annual budget process, treaties, and executive branch appointments about which voters know little. Governors might be advantaged because they are expected to act as executives, perhaps the ideal role to play before becoming the nation's chief executive. Though senators such as Al Gore (2000) sometimes have an advantage in the traditional presidential realm of foreign policy, the conventional view is that "being a governor is like being a president in miniature."[20] Senators are required to compromise and negotiate

[18] R. Douglas Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

[19] David Maraniss, "A 20-Year Journey's Lessons, Impressions," *Washington Post*, 11 August 1996.

[20] Louis Harris, "Why the Odds Are against a Governor's Becoming President," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 23 (Fall 1959): 361–370. Former presidential candidate Ross Perot explained just before the 2000 presidential election that George W. Bush benefited from this. Perot explained that ". . . when you're a senator, you just pass laws; when you're a governor, you have to make things work. When you're president, you have to make things work. George Bush has had the practical experience and demonstrated his ability in being an effective governor and getting results and making things work. Gore has no experience" (NBC's "Meet the Press," 5 November 2000).

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to be successful legislators, skills that do not necessary make good presidential candidates.

Governors are also perceived as outsiders compared to senators, many of whom have been in Washington long enough to acquire reputations as Beltway fixtures. Maybe as a result of these differences, survey data show that governors are better known than senators within their home states.[21] Unfortunately, this degree of familiarity seems to breed contempt: constituents also view governors less favorably than senators. Further, governors are also less known around the country than are senators.[22] Except on federal issues such as welfare reform and the recent tobacco industry settlement, governors are seen as less authoritative on national matters. The Sunday morning talk shows, after all, rely heavily on the Senate for their supply of guest experts.[23]

Finally, governors are disadvantaged to the degree that constituents see senators linked more to national affairs. This happens in part because the media create these links, even if implicitly, in their coverage of statewide elected officials.[24] Though a senator probably has less responsibility for government in general, he nonetheless spends more time in Washington than does a governor and is associated with issues beyond state borders. Research has found that voters perceive these differences and that they vote more on the basis of national issues in Senate elections and more on the basis of state issues in gubernatorial elections.[25]

Office Structure

The formal office structures of senators and governors differ in two ways. First, senators have longer terms. Currently governors' terms are four years in all but two states (where they are even shorter) while senators serve for six years at a stretch. Further, the switch to four-year terms for governors is relatively new; in 1960 sixteen states still had two-year terms. Many governors also face term limitations that senators do not. By state law thirty of the fifty governors must

[21] Barbara Hinckley, Richard Hofstetter, and John Kessel, "Information and the Vote: A Comparative Election Study," *American Politics Quarterly* 2 (April 1974): 131–158; Peverill Squire and Christina Fastnow, "Comparing Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections," *Political Research Quarterly* 47 (December 1994): 703–720.

[22] Harris, "Why the Odds are against a Governor's Becoming President."

[23] Hess, *The Ultimate Insiders*; Krasno, *Challengers, Competition, and Reelection.*

[24] Charles M. Tidmarch, Lisa J. Hyman, and Jill E. Sorkin, "Press Issue Agendas in the 1982 Congressional and Gubernatorial Election Campaigns," *Journal of Politics* 46 (November 1984): 1226–1242.

[25] This point is not in contention, though the relative importance of state and national issues is controversial. See Lonna Rae Atkeson and Randall W. Partin, "Economic and Referendum Voting: A Comparison of Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections," *American Political Science Review* 39 (March 1995): 99–107; Lonna Rae Atkeson and Randall W. Partin, "Economic and Referendum Voting and the Problem of Data Choice: A Reply," *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (July 1998): 1003–1007; Thomas M. Carsey and Gerald C. Wright, Jr., "State and National Factors in Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (July 1998): 994–1002.

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now limit themselves to just one or two terms. So when a quadrennial presidential election rolls around, many governors' terms are either ending simultaneously or they know that they are lame ducks who must leave office before the next presidential election.

Only one-third of senators' terms end when any given president's does, and there are no legal limits on how long they may serve. As a result, senators whose terms are not up may casually pursue a presidential bid without jeopardizing their status as elected officials. If the campaign does not succeed in the early prenomination period, one may simply abandon it and return to life in Washington. The experience might even be helpful in testing the presidential waters again in the future. Many governors do not have this low-investment luxury.[26] When their terms end, most have to pursue another office or return to private life. They must be serious about their presidential campaigns because it is generally all-or-nothing. The degree of investment should be deeper and more uniform for governors than senators, because they have less to lose.

A side effect of serving six-year terms without limit is that senators are probably in office longer than are governors. Winning three senatorial elections puts a politician in Washington for eighteen years, though few governors will remain in office more than four or eight years total by law. So senators should be older than governors, have been in office longer, and, most importantly, have a different view of what makes a successful campaign because of their longevity. The issues and strategies that worked in the first campaign years ago might not appeal to today's voters as well. Though senators probably invoke similar themes each time they run, mere name recognition, incumbency perquisites, challenger deterrence, and constituent loyalty are what really contribute to reelection. This works in one's own state, but could fail miserably on the road when campaigning nationwide for convention delegates. One of the benefits of the primary system for parties is that it identifies those candidates who can sell themselves outside of their home states. Governors, who generally have spent less time in government, are "closer" to the voters. Perhaps they are a bit younger too; the themes and tactics they employed to win a few years ago are probably still potent today. This might explain in part why young governors like Jimmy Carter (1976), Bill Clinton (1992), and George W. Bush (2000) succeeded while older Senators Lloyd Bentsen (1988), Scoop Jackson (1980), and Ernest "Fritz" Hollings (1988) did not.

A final point on office structure concerns the organization of staff. Senators have a wealth of staff working for them. They have staff to deal with constituents and interest groups, draft legislation, communicate with other members,

[26] As of the early 1990s, thirty-four states held gubernatorial elections at the presidential midterm. Of these, thirty-one have four-year terms so that governors' terms do not usually line up with presidents' terms. A few other states hold gubernatorial elections in odd-numbered years. So term limits and lengths matter more for governors than when their terms begin and end. Many senators, but not many governors, will be midterm during a presidential election and have been in office for at least one full term.

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manage committee business, and write speeches. This decentralized staff system works well for legislators but is too fragmented to convert easily into a presidential campaign team. Many of the staff are centered around committees, caucuses, or policies rather than members. Governors are fortunate to have more pyramidal staff structures that serve them directly. Many of these aides were campaign staff who made the transition to governing staff after the initial election. Loyal and centralized, they can easily be converted back into a personal campaign machine that suits a presidential bid. Many governors have lieutenant governors who may tend to daily administrative tasks while they are on the presidential campaign trail. In contrast, sitting senators such as Scoop Jackson (1972) are simply blamed for missing roll call votes in Washington when they campaign nationwide.

The Candidate Pool

Finally, the pool of potential presidential contenders is quite different in both size and quality for senators and governors. If one limits the pool to just those who are in office, it seems that there are twice as many senators as governors available to run. If senators ran and succeeded at the same rate as governors, then there should be twice as many running and twice as many winning. This logic expects that two presidents will have come from the Senate for every one that came from a governorship, making senators' low success rates even more striking.

But this conclusion neglects two important facts. First, many of the candidates who run for president are former governors or senators. Because sitting senators are especially likely to be chosen as vice-presidential running mates, they often make their way to the presidency indirectly.[27] Consequently, one must consider the larger pool of current and former office-holders. Though collecting data on all living ex-governors and ex-senators would be a daunting task, it is safe to assume that the ratio of former senators to former governors is almost certainly less than the 2:1 ratio for current incumbents. One reason is that governors have shorter terms and many face term limits, so they rotate in and out of office more frequently by law. Governors are also more likely than senators to be defeated. From 1960 to 1992, senators won 84 percent of the time compared to governors' 74 percent.[28] So turnover among governors is much higher, resulting in a large pool of ex-governors who may seek the presidency. If senators' and governors' terms were the same length and retirements occurred at the same rate, so that electoral turnover were all that mattered, it

[27] Alan I. Abramowitz and Jeffrey A. Segal, *Senate Elections* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992).

[28] Jim Seroka, "Incumbency and Reelection: Governors vs. U.S. Senators," *State Government* 52 (April 1980): 161–165; Squire and Fastnow, "Comparing Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections."

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is clear that ex-governors would outnumber ex-senators quickly. Their shorter terms and term limits accelerate the differing reelection rates.[29]

Because states differ greatly in their size, industrialization, population, wealth, and culture, the governors elected to represent them also differ. Governorships, like state legislatures, vary in their professionalism.[30] Governors from states such as California and New York are professional, nationally known politicians who are almost immediately considered presidential contenders. Governors from Wyoming and Louisiana are more amateur and parochial, making their presidential bids more challenging. As of 1990, governors' salaries ranged widely from $35,000 in Arkansas to $130,000 in New York. Resources ranged from a staff of 173 and an airplane and helicopter for travel in Illinois to a staff of seventeen and no state air transportation in Nevada.

In contrast, senators are a less diverse lot despite their constituencies' differences. Senators from California and Wyoming often have the same amount of influence in Washington and are equally apt to seek the presidency. They all have the same salary and similar resources. In short, the Senate is professionally egalitarian. All else constant, a senator such as Joseph Biden is expected to outperform a governor such as Pierre "Pete" DuPont because they are from the same amateur state (Delaware). In contrast, a senator and governor from a state with a professional government start with more similar resources. Thus, one would expect contenders from the Senate to be from smaller states than contenders who are governors. The small state bias is likely to disadvantage senators in the Electoral College.

Because of greater turnover among governors than senators and differences among the people who serve as governors than senators, the heterogeneity of governors is greater. Part of this comes from the fact that the path to the governor's mansion is less orderly than the path to the Senate.[31] The natural variance in governors' capabilities as politicians means that many of them at the low end of the "quality" distribution are unfit for a presidential campaign but that those at the high end of the distribution are well suited to the task. The distribution of senators' fitnesses is tighter, resulting in fewer who are complete failures and fewer who are natural presidential nominees.

Finally, there are de facto rules about presidential nominations that effectively restrict who may run. For example, incumbent presidents seeking a second term and vice-presidents trying to run for the presidency for the first time rarely face strong intraparty challenges for their parties' nominations. In the modern era, no sitting president has been denied the nomination when he

[29] A simple simulation shows how quickly exgovernors accumulate. Assume a limit of one four-year term for thirty governors and a .75 probability of reelection for the other twenty. Senators have an assumed .85 reelection rate. There are no retirements or deaths. After just six years forty-two of the fifty governors have left office, while only fifteen of the 100 senators have.

[30] Peverill Squire, "Career Opportunities and Membership Stability in Legislatures," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 13 (February 1988): 65–82.

[31] Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics*.

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sought it. This thwarts the aspirations of those in the president's party who would like to make a run for higher office. For example, as a strong candidate for reelection in 1984, President Ronald Reagan faced no real opposition for the Republican nomination. This had the effect of removing all Republican senators, governors, and other notables from running that year. So the Senate's 100 members were not given an equal opportunity to run. Any of fifty-four Republicans in the majority who wished to run probably deferred because of Reagan's presence. Thus, the operative pool of current senators who could credibly run for president in 1984 was at most forty-six, the number of Democrats at the time. As a result, nine Democrats became contenders, six of them with senatorial experience. In general, the greater the number of offices held by the president's party, the smaller the pool of candidates available to run for the opposing party's nomination. From 1960 to 1996, the size of the outparty pool—those senators and governors not from the president's party—averages around seventy-seven individuals. This pool could be reduced further by eliminating those who do not meet the legal requirements (age 35, natural born citizen, and fourteen-year resident) or common demographic requirements such as being male, white, and Christian.[32]

Presidential Contender Data

Before considering these hypotheses empirically, one must decide upon a particular stage of the selection process to study. I have chosen to observe candidates who seriously pursued a presidential bid. Following others, I label these candidates presidential "contenders." They are people who chose to move beyond just being considered potential candidates by actually initiating their candidacies. My operational definition of a contender is any presidential candidate who officially declares her or his candidacy and runs in at least one primary outside of his home state (to avoid the idiosyncratic "favorite son" phenomenon).[33] These criteria are a reasonable compromise between analyzing the thousands of possible candidates and studying only party nominees.

The choice is not without consequences, but it seems to capture an important point at which candidacies become failures or successes during the prenomination phase. I have further limited the focus to the modern nomination era for sake of comparability. The rise of television as a campaign medium and the direct primary fundamentally changed the structure of the nomination process. Consequently, the data set includes those presidential contenders who sought their parties' nomination in the ten presidential elections from 1960 to 1996. This results in a total of 139 contenders from both parties, twenty of whom won major party nomination.

[32] For example, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, "Progressive Ambition among United States Senators, 1972–1988."

[33] The data set also excludes second tier candidates who earned no more than 1 percent of the vote in a primary outside of their home states.

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TABLE 2

Backgrounds of Presidential Candidates (1960–1996)

Last Office Held	*Contenders (%)*	*Nominees (%)*	*Winners (%)*	*NSR*[a]	*VSR*[b]
President	5.0	28.6	40.0	.86	.57
Vice-President	6.5	28.6	30.0	.67	.33
Governor	23.0	19.1	20.0	.13	.06
Senator	36.7	23.8	10.0	.10	.02
Representative	10.8	0	0	0	0
Activist/Celebrity	9.4	0	0	0	0
Federal Appointee	6.5	0	0	0	0
Business Person	1.4	0	0	0	0
Mayor	.7	0	0	0	0
Sitting Senators	33.8	23.8	10.0	.11	.02
Former Senators	10.8	23.8	30.0	.42	.25
Never in Senate	57.6	52.4	60.0	.14	.08

[a] Nomination Success Rate = Nominees/Contenders
[b] Victory Success Rate = Election Winners/Contenders

I have recorded the most recent office or other position held by each of the presidential contenders as was done in Table 1 by Lubalin and Peabody, Ornstein, and Rohde. I repeat their analysis in Table 2 using a slightly different coding of offices held. I include categories for business people such as Steve Forbes (1996) and activists/celebrities such as Jesse Jackson (1988) and Pat Buchanan (1992 and 1996). As one might expect, senators make up the largest grouping at more than one-third of all contenders. Governors are not far behind at 23 percent. Aside from House members, no other office comprises more than a tenth of the total pool.

In addition to the many contenders whose most recent position was in the Senate, eight other candidates had been in the Senate at some point in their past; all eight were later chosen president or vice president. To account for all possible paths from the Senate to the White House, I coded whether they had ever been in the Senate and, for current senators, whether the ends of their terms coincided with the presidential election or not.

I rely on two rough measures of success. The nomination success rate (NSR) is computed as before. The final column also shows the victory success rate (VSR), which is the ratio of general election winners to contenders. Aside from those candidates with backgrounds in the House, bureaucracy, or private sector who were never nominated by their parties, senators have the lowest success rates, which most importantly are below those of governors. Governors do 30 percent better at winning nomination (.13/.10) and three times as well at winning the general election.

The lower half of the table considers the candidates in terms of Senate experience alone to examine how current and former senators differ. This part of the table shows how senatorial experience anywhere in one's background affects success. The percentage of senators in the pool now grows to 43 percent,

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since any contender who ever served in the Senate is counted. Remarkable here is that only about one in ten candidates was a former senator when running for president, yet these few contenders performed best, winning nomination almost half of the time and election a quarter of the time. In contrast, current senators and those without Senate experience do poorly. One would suppose that current senators invest less in their campaigns than do former senators, as the theory offered here expects. This finding is especially striking because those without much relevant experience—representatives, celebrities, and bureaucrats—win the general election four times as often as current senators do.

These data clarify the role of the Senate for us. It is only those candidates with current Senate attachments who underperform as presidential contenders. Former senators do as theory would expect, but their success is often due to running from the vice-presidency rather than any direct advantage provided by their time in the Senate.

This discussion recalls the basic causal argument underlying studies of presidential selection: background experiences shape candidate success. Though a full account of the factors that affect candidate performance is beyond the scope of this article, it is useful to consider briefly whether senators differ from other contenders on some relevant dimensions. Success, of course, may be measured in many ways. Above I measured it using the NSR and VSR. Here I expand the operational definition of success to several continuous measures as well—percentage of primary votes for a candidate, percentage of the party convention vote for a candidate, and number of convention delegates won.

I begin with simple demographic data for the 139 contenders in my sample: their ages and whether they meet the traditional presidential pattern of being white, male, and Christian. Jews, blacks, and women are thought to be disadvantaged in the process, as are older candidates.[34] Because candidates must win a majority in the Electoral College to be elected, geographic considerations are important too. I determined whether candidates were from the South or not and how many electoral votes their home states were allotted. At least in the post-civil rights era, being from the South is an advantage, evidenced by the fact that five of the seven presidents elected after JFK were southerners. Being the favorite son from a state that carries a lot of electoral clout is beneficial too; all but three of the twenty-two major party presidential nominees since 1960 have won their home states. Finally, two variables capture the visibility or viability of candidates. The first is whether a contender ran before or not, assuming that an initial failure may lead to success later as it did for Reagan, Nixon, and the senior George Bush. Second is a measure of the candidates' ideological positions. One might expect that those associated with extreme policy proposals are disadvantaged in the general election, though they may be favored during the nomination when they seek approval from party activists. I use the absolute value of NOMINATE scores to assess ideological extremity, which exists for most of

[34] See Aldrich, *Before the Convention*.

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TABLE 3

Characteristics of Presidential Candidates (1960–1996)

Background	Electoral Votes	Age	From South (%)	Ideology Extremity	Minority (%)	Previously Ran (%)
Last Office Held						
Senator	13.1	56.0	23.5	.359	7.8	43.1
Governor	23.3	54.1	34.4	.361	18.8	40.6
Other	21.5	55.1	33.9	.324	17.9	46.4
Senate Background						
Sitting Senator	13.6	56.1	25.5	.350	8.5	42.6
Former Senator	16.8	57.1	16.7	.403	0	66.7
Sitting & Former	14.3	56.3	23.7	.361	6.8	47.5
Never a Senator	22.2	54.3	35.0	.328	20.0	41.3

Note: Ideology measures only exist for former presidents and members of Congress (71 percent of contenders).

the contenders. (See Appendix.) This variable gives one a rough sense of the ideological appeal of the candidate to primary and general election voters. Details about the operations of all of the variables may be found in the Appendix.

None of the variables is ideal, nor are they an exhaustive accounting of the factors that determine presidential candidate performance. While not tapping directly the peculiarities of being in the Senate, each gets at investment differences among candidates indirectly by assessing their chances for success in much the same way that donors, activists, voters, or candidates themselves might.

Analysis of Contenders

Table 3 presents mean values for six of the variables by last office held and Senate background of the 139 presidential contenders. The first data column reports the mean number of electoral votes for the states from which candidates run. There are two notable findings here. First, as one would expect, contenders are disproportionately from large-population states. The average state has 10.8 electoral votes but the typical contender brings 18.8 votes to the campaign ($p < .001$). More importantly, senators have the lowest number of electoral votes of the seven types of contenders in the data set. On average they bring to the election ten fewer electoral votes than governors, even though they share the same constituencies. Though there are counterexamples, senators running for president such as Bob Dole, George McGovern, and Ed Muskie are often from small states while governors like Jerry Brown, George W. Bush, Ronald Reagan, and Nelson Rockefeller hail from larger states. This finding is consistent with the candidate pool explanation provided above. Because governors are a heterogeneous bunch, only the best will make serious runs for the presidency, and they tend to be from the largest states with the most professional governments. Senators are more homogeneous, so state size matters less in their political calcula-

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tions. Since electoral votes and general election victories are correlated (r = .22), the lack of diversity hurts senators as a group.

Senators are also older than governors by a couple of years. While not universal, there are plenty of young governors such as Clinton and George Wallace and older senators such as Alan Cranston and Dole who have run. This modest difference is at least consistent with the office structure argument offered above. Senators have been in office longer because of their six-year terms and because senators tend to hold more lower offices than governors on their way up the political ladder.[35] The data are also surprising in terms of overrepresentation of the South. Southern states comprise only 22 percent of the Union and thus of current senators and governors. Even in terms of the Electoral College, southern states were just 24 percent of the total in 1960 and rose to only 27 percent in 1996. However, the South's influence grows the further one moves along the path from candidacy (30 percent) to nomination (33 percent) to victory (50 percent). The fact that the South plays a disproportionately large role in national politics is not surprising.[36] A new implication is that senators' low success rates as contenders stem in part from their nonsouthern bases. If the U.S. electoral system and voters' preferences favor candidates like Johnson, Carter, and Clinton from below the Mason-Dixon line, then the many senators who choose to run for president despite being from somewhere else have a clear liability.

These findings should not imply that senators are always disadvantaged by their backgrounds. They do not appear more ideologically extreme than other contenders, for example. In terms of race, religion, and gender, senators are actually advantaged because they are more likely to fit the traditional pattern than are other candidates. Only 8 percent are not white, male, or Christian, while nearly one-fifth of governors and other contenders do not conform with these historical precedents. Finally, senators are no more reluctant than governors to give a presidential campaign another shot following a failure.

In summary, this simple analysis has shown at least four ways in which contenders from the Senate differ from governors and other contenders. Senators are often hindered because they are older, hail from states with fewer electoral votes, and are less likely to be from the South than are other candidates. To their advantage, they are more likely to fit the traditional white, male, and Christian description of American presidents, though the frequency of these characteristics varies widely across contender types.

To be certain that these inferences are correct, we need to consider more carefully what it means to be a candidate from the Senate. A contender could be a current senator, former senator, or without Senate experience when she or he pursues the presidency. Table 2 showed that former senators performed

[35] Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics*.

[36] For a depiction of the South's role in presidential politics, see Earle Black and Merle Black, *The Vital South: How Presidents Are Elected* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).

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TABLE 4

Success Rates and Senate Experience (1960–1996)

Senate Status	*N*	*Primary Vote*	*Final Convention Vote*	*Nominated*	*Elected*
Sitting Senators: Term Up	15	4.1	8.6	6.7	0
Sitting Senators: Term Not Up	32	9.9	10.1	12.5	3.1
Former Senators	12	20.5	35.2	41.7	25.0
Never in Senate	80	14.4	13.8	13.8	7.5
All	139	12.8	14.2	15.1	7.2

better than expected, while current members and those who never served in the Senate seldom won nomination and were even less likely to win the election. The bottom half of Table 3 shows mean values of each of the six variables by Senate background to explore whether differences in success are attributable to other candidate characteristics.

We now find that the differences between senators and other contenders are really due to differences between sitting senators and others. Former senators do not face as large an Electoral College shortfall, nor, surprisingly, are they as old as current senators. They benefit from having the right demographic profiles and experience from previous presidential campaigns. Their only liabilities appear to be having less connection to the South and more ideological diversity than sitting senators.

Senate Backgrounds and Candidate Success

These findings, largely but not completely, conform with theoretical expectations. Senators are favored and hindered in different ways depending on whether they are current or former members and how their terms line up with presidential elections. Most of the differences are limited to sitting senators, since former senators look like other non-Senate contenders. Though I have theoretical reasons for how the six variables relate to success, I do not yet know how much weight each of them is given during the nomination and general campaigns. For example, being from the South may be helpful and being older might be harmful, but which effect is greater?

I attempt to address these kinds of questions in Table 4. For each of four Senate statuses, the table presents four sequential measures of candidate success. Two are continuous and occur early in the process (percentage of all primary votes and percentage of party convention votes) while the other two are dichotomous and operationalize later outcomes (nomination and election). Further, success is considered in light of where a current senator's term stands. Taking advantage of the staggered cycle of Senate elections gives one leverage on the investment component of ambition theory by further differentiating cur-

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rent senators according to how much they must commit to a presidential campaign. Senators whose terms end in the presidential election year must often choose to focus on either the presidential or senatorial campaign, while midterm senators are free to pursue presidential nominations without jeopardizing their seats.

Clearly the most successful contenders are former senators. Since eight of twelve were actually running for the vice presidency or presidency when observed, this is not as surprising as it might seem at first. Sitting senators are much less successful than former senators according to all four criteria. More importantly, sitting senators also appear to be less successful than those who were never in the Senate. This implies that the key variable is not Senate experience per se, but being in the Senate while running for president. It does not seem that legislators necessarily have a more difficult time than other contenders because of the positions they take on roll calls, the negotiating and compromising they do with other members, or the lack of credit they can take for government accomplishments. This result challenges the "authority and the issues" and to a lesser degree the "expectations" explanations offered above. Sitting members of the Senate, only two of whom ever were elected president, do the most poorly. Despite his eventual defeat, in retrospect it seems wise of Bob Dole to have resigned his Senate seat in the summer of 1996 to pursue of campaign full time.

A final point should be made about current senators. Contrary to what the investment idea implies, senators whose terms are up do a bit worse than those who are in the middle of their terms. I expected that these candidates would commit more seriously to the campaign than those who are entertaining the ideal without real risk. But there is another explanation that still fits with the ideas of investment and progressive ambition. Senators whose terms expire in the year in which they want to run for president must decide early in the election which office they will devote themselves to full-time. Senator Phil Gramm (1996) was one of many presidential candidates whose term happened to expire in the year he was running. He quickly realized that his presidential campaign was failing and withdrew before the New Hampshire primary occurred so that he could focus on winning reelection to the Senate. Today he remains a senator with the opportunity to run for president again. Senators Dole (1980), Hollings (1984), and Bentsen (1988) made similar moves by choosing not to invest heavily in presidential bids at the time their Senate seats could have been taken away. In contrast, senators who are midterm when the presidential election rolls around may campaign aggressively without fear of losing their place in Congress. Though not all candidacies fit the pattern, John Kennedy (1960), Robert Kennedy (1968), and George McGovern (1972) are just three of the many senators who had the luxury of heavy investment without much risk—an ideal situation.

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Conclusion

Contrary to the conventional wisdom found in newspaper stories and academic journals, senators have been poorer presidential candidates than one might expect. Many of them have run for president, but surprisingly few have earned their parties' nominations and even fewer have won the general election. Former senators do well, though much of their success is attributed to being selected as vice-presidential running mates. The group of presidential candidates most analogous to senators—governors—make up the second largest share of the contender pool and perform better than senators when they run. Though senators are probably at least as likely as governors to harbor progressive ambition for the presidency, I argue that their differing success rates are due in part to deeper campaign investment by the typical governor. Governors also benefit from more careful self-selection, with those from larger states, especially in the South, more likely to run. It seems evident that senators, especially sitting senators, have not done as well at the nomination and general election stages as they should have, given what we know. The Senate has seldom been the presidential incubator or nursery it ought to be given the ambition, visibility, resources, and records of both current and former members of the institution.

Of the four general explanations offered for the gap between expectations and performance, some have received more support than others. The "authority and the issues" and "expectations" arguments seem the least potent. There are at least two reasons to be skeptical of these. First, all members of Congress do not perform equally well. Representatives and senators do have similar success rates in the long run, but members of the House differ significantly from senators on several predictors of success. Cabinet officials, business people, activists, and mayors have done about as well too, so there does not appear to be a liability unique to legislators. Representatives should be less successful than senators, since their constituencies are smaller. They serve in a chamber of 435 rather than 100 and have generally spent less time climbing the hierarchy of offices to get where they are. Second, current senators are less successful than former senators. If there is a congressional aura that hurts legislators when they run for president, it does not extend to members who have left Capitol Hill.

I am more optimistic about the "office structure" and "candidate pool" arguments. They have clear connections to the investment and ambition theory and garner tentative support in the rudimentary analysis done here. They explain why the pools of senators and governors are not quite the sizes that we assumed if former office-holders are included. Both arguments also rely on notions of supply and demand and strategic decision making by elites, two crucial elements of any study of presidential selection. Mysteries about ascension of particular candidates to the White House remain of course, but revealing new facts and proposing explanations for them that are tied to theory have proved useful.*

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1999 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. Thanks go to Cecil Eubanks, DuBose Kapeluck, and especially Phil

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APPENDIX

Operational Definitions of Variables:

Electoral Votes: Number of electoral votes for state from which the candidate hails.
Age: Age on general election day of the year in which candidate runs.
South: Candidate from one of the eleven states in the Confederacy.
Ideological Extremity: Absolute value of NOMINATE scores computed by Keith Poole.[37]
Minority: Candidate was non-Christian (that is, Jewish), noncaucasian, or female.
Previously Ran: Met the definition of a contender at least once in the past, even if before 1960.
Percent of Primary Vote: Percentage all presidential primary votes earned by the candidate.
Percent of Convention Vote: Percentage of nomination votes on final party convention ballot.

Data Sources:

Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, *Almanac of American Politics* (Washington, DC: National Journal, various years); *Book of the States* (Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments, various years); *CQ's Guide to U.S. Elections*, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1994); Congressional Biographical Directory, "Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774–Present" (http://bioguide.congress.gov), May 2000; James T. Havel, *U.S. Presidential Candidates and the Elections* (New York: Macmillan, 1996); *Presidential Elections, 1789–1992* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1995); John Runyon, Jennefer Verdini, and Sally Runyon, eds., *Source Book of American Presidential Campaign and Election Statistics 1948–1968* (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1971); Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, *Vital Statistics on American Politics* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, various years).

Paolino for their comments and Kimberly Allen, DuBose Kapeluck, and Matt Savrock for their research assistance.

[37] Keith T. Poole, "Recovering a Basic Space from a Set of Issue Scales," *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (July 1998): 954–993. NOMINATE is a scaling method based on analysis of roll call votes taken by members of Congress. For presidents who did not serve in Congress, it is based on their announced positions on bills before the legislature.

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The Nation-State and Its Exclusions

ANTHONY W. MARX

States have often codified or encouraged nationalism selectively, demarcating by specified categories who is included and who is excluded. Such purposeful, internal boundaries of nationhood were long seen as reflecting homogenous solidarities such as ethnicity, falsely assumed to be a fixed or essentialist category. Alternatively, such exclusions have been deprecated as tangential lags in a more inclusionary process; the leading current theories of nationalism focus on economic imperatives toward inclusion or literary-based imaginings of a unified community. But more often, nationalism has been constructed exclusively, not according to fixed categories but instead demarcated by emergent states seeking to manage diversity by manipulating and reinforcing difference. Variations in the form of such state-led nationalism, its particular internal exclusions, have had important consequences and largely remain to be explained. How and why did states act to encourage or codify certain categories of inclusion and exclusions, along what lines, and with what effects?

This is not an idle question. Who is included in the nation—and why some are not, or only partially—is a crucial issue in an age when rights and status are determined by such inclusion for which people have been willing to fight and die. Included constituencies are acutely aware of this issue and seek to protect their privilege. Excluded groups are equally aware, with their very identity shaped by official or informal exclusion and their collective action often aimed at forcing inclusion. Indeed, the demand for inclusion in the nation, for citizenship and/or group rights against discrimination, has inspired many (though not all) modern social movements. This dynamic, framed by the issue of national inclusion, remains a central political issue of our time.

I here endeavor to address this issue, outlining a domination-based, coalition framework of nationalism in which exclusion is structural rather than fixed

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or tangential to nation-building. This discussion of exclusive nationalism begins to reclaim from essentialism, economics, or literary analogy the issue of nation-building as one in which politics is central. In the process, I hope to show how instrumental and cultural approaches can be combined in explaining demarcations of nation inclusion, thereby moving beyond current methodological divisions.

Posing the Problem

The term "nation-state" implies some convergence of an institutionalized polity and collective allegiance to it, with "nationalism" defined here as such bounded solidarity and allegiance to a state. The nation is that group viewed as the legitimate owner of the state; the collective sentiment of such ownership (that is, nationalism) is what gives the state legitimacy.[1] This connection can be established in more or less either direction: state first, building national loyalty, or a national community creating a state, though often these processes occur together. In whichever order, "the nation-state" implies, if not impels, convergence, though we know that in reality there has rarely been such neat convergence.

The traditional idea of a prior civil solidarity giving rise to states goes back at least to Jean Jacques Rousseau, who described a proto-nationalist "act of association [that] creates an artificial and collective body" or polity.[2] Johann Herder, Hans Kohn, and more recently Liah Greenfeld agree that such a sentiment gives rise to forms of state rule.[3] And that collective sentiment has often been assumed to be based on a preexisting group solidarity of ethnicity, seen as a more or less ascriptive category of shared ancestry and culture.[4] In other words, nationalism is equated with "descent-based" ethnicity and with political units built accordingly as homogenous.[5] As described by John Stuart Mill, even nonethnic "fellow feelings" should demarcate "the boundaries of government."[6]

The fundamental problem with this liberal orthodoxy is that it assumes the prior existence of self-conscious, homogenous units of allegiance around which states are built. But such group consciousness is instead often constructed by officials and elites, who use selective evocations of history to project an image

[1] Rogers Brubaker *Nationalism Reframed* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 8, 85.

[2] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (Hammondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1968), 61.

[3] Isaiah Berlin, *Vico and Herder* (New York: Random House, 1976); Hans Kohn, "Western and Eastern Nationalisms" in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds., *Nationalism* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994); Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

[4] Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origin of Nation* (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1986); Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[5] Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1995), 11, 23.

[6] Ibid., 52.

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of prior legitimacy and purposefully forget inconvenient images or experiences of past or present internal division.[7] The images of a common identity, unifying ethnicity, and shared language were gradually invented, constructed, and reinforced, often explicitly, to bolster social cohesion.[8] Ethnicity or other forms of unity were not so fixed nor so firmly established as to be the necessary or only basis of state building.[9] Instead, diversity remained or grew, for instance, with the political incorporation of new territory, peoples, or immigrants into states, threatening political unity.[10] If prior social cohesion is rarely so fixed as to form the prior basis for a nation seeking a state, then theories based on this assumption are challenged or incomplete.

The evocative theory of Benedict Anderson is directed at this problem in liberal theory, for Anderson seeks to explain the emergence of the cohesive nation as an "imagined community," rather than take such a unit for granted. The process begins with the spread of capitalism, with trading requiring a shared language, and with the spread of a printed vernacular encouraging a sense of shared experience and community, the basis of nationalism as Karl Deutsch had argued earlier.[11] For Anderson, the nation emerges as a sort of literary trope out of the spontaneous sense of simultaneous existence engendered by shared language and texts. Anderson agrees with the liberal tradition in that his argument for early social/national cohesion requires no institutional action; there is no state acting to encourage the process of community cohesion or loyalty. To his credit, he moves beyond the traditional tendency to fall back on ethnicity as the purportedly fixed basis of prior cohesion: "from the start the nation was conceived in language, not in blood."[12] But accordingly, Anderson cannot account for and instead assumes that no one is purposefully or even accidentally excluded from the emerging cohesion. As he says, "language is not an instrument of exclusion . . . it is fundamentally inclusive."[13]

Anderson's argument has been disputed less for its inclusiveness and more for its spontaneity. Historians and social scientists have demonstrated that instead of being the basis for state-seeking, collective sentiment may often have been encouraged by states and state ruling elites. Indeed, "nationalizing states" are more common than preexisting nations forming states. Political units formed

[7] See Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation?" in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., *Becoming National* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[8] Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976); Charles Tilly, "Citizenship, Identity and Social History," *International Review of Social History*, Supplement 3 (1996): 5.

[9] Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed.*

[10] Ernest Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1994), 34; Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 10; Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, 22.

[11] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983), 41–2. See also Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1953).

[12] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 133.

[13] Ibid., 122.

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out of warfare or colonialism and the interest in raising revenues faced the imperative of encouraging allegiance with images of nationalism, thereby inviting the masses into the polity.[14] In such instances, the focus of this analysis, states made nations, rather than the reverse; or institutions and sentiments of allegiance were built together. A central mechanism for encouraging such solidarity was the institution of citizenship, with emergent states granting membership and rights in order to encourage internal cohesion and allegiance. According to T. H. Marshall or Reinhard Bendix, the allocation of distinct citizenship rights may vary and its extension to particular groups may lag, but the tendency is toward universal extension, again assuming exclusions to be anomalous.[15] Certainly, if nations are defined and even forged by such official allocations of citizenship, then this cannot be described as a spontaneous process.

The other currently prominent theory of state-led nationalism is that of Ernest Gellner. Like Anderson, for Gellner nation-building begins with the spread of capitalism; in a sense they are both modernization theorists. But there they diverge. For Anderson, capitalism spreads vernacular language, forging a nation which then creates a state. According to Gellner, economic imperatives for a common language of work and culture could only be met by state-provided education ensuring such socialization.[16] Put schematically, capitalism requires a state to spread language and national cohesion. Of course, this cannot account for any early forms of nationalism that emerged before industrialization, though Gellner would deny that there are any such preindustrial nations. But the power of his focus on state action is undeniable. Even Benedict Anderson, in reconsidering the issue, acknowledges that postcolonial states shape the imagined community of the nation.[17]

Amid the turn away from ethnonationalism to spontaneous community building or to state-led theories of nationalism, the image of internal homogeneity and inclusion has largely remained. The common assumption is that states seeking or benefiting from unity, whether for warfare, revenue, or development, encourage the common allegiance of their population with images of shared nationalism, excluding only foreigners. For Anderson, this allegiance emerges out of language. For state theorists, loyalty to the polity is purposefully encouraged, with the state adjudicating disputes to bolster unity.[18] Pervasive

[14] Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990-1992*, (Cambridge, UK: Blackwell, 1990); Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 5; Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 13; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 54, 77; Hobsbawm and Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition*, 10, 80; and John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 19.

[15] T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class* (London: Pluto, 1991); Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964).

[16] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). See also Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 162; Montserrat Guibernau, *Nationalisms* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996).

[17] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991).

[18] Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 32–4, 80, 97.

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fellow feeling cannot be assumed but must be built and is. For Gellner, homogeneity is "imposed by objective. . . imperatives" of the economy, with "industrial society allergic to counter-entropic institutions" or traits.[19] On the inclusive tendency of nationalism, all major theories other than ethnonationalism agree.

Here then is the problem. States have not consistently incorporated all potential internal constituents, but instead have often purposefully excluded some, contrary to the presumed imperative for pervasive unity or ethnic homogeneity. Ethnic subgroups have been retained as subalterns or have been expelled, though the victims have not been preordained. Citizenship rights have often been allocated selectively, not universally. The franchise has been limited. The imagined community has been constrained; fellow feelings and loyalty have been bounded. Nationalism has been internally exclusive, not just along the lines suggested by the old debate about civic or ethnic forms, but also according to race, gender, religion, and class. For instance, Michael Hechter has described the selective allocation of citizenship rights according to a cultural division of labor reinforcing class divisions.[20] Such difference has been institutionalized and reified within and by states, contrary to the assumption that states sought to unify all within. Why? And why has nationalism been bounded differently according to varying categories? As Rogers Brubaker asks, why has nationalism been institutionalized in particular forms as a practical and bounded category or contingent event?[21]

To answer these questions, what is needed is a new conception of nationalism that takes seriously the role of dominant structures, prior conflict, and exclusion, without falling into an essentialist assumption of fixed ethnic exclusion. Currently popular theories of nationalism and related allocations of citizenship rights have tended to assume universal inclusion, at least eventually, with exclusions described as mere lags in the provision of rights. But such omissions and exclusions vary and may not be mere lags but instead purposeful and crucial, with exclusion of some "other" not as accidents but instead designed to solder core coalitions among those included.[22] Nationalism is not an imagined community of inclusion, as a sort of literary trope, nor an institutionalized process toward inclusion propelled by economic development and modernization. Instead, nationalism is often purposefully exclusive, with such exclusion emerging in fits and starts but encouraged or encoded to serve the explicit requirements for solidifying core loyalty to the nation. Rather than diversity precluding cohesion, diversity and selective allocations of nationalism and related rights may be the tools for building cohesion among the core that is included and demarcated. It is important to note that this mechanism is not the only basis for exclu-

[19] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 39, 65, 82.

[20] Hechter, *Internal Colonialism.* See also Tom Nairn, *The Break-Up of Britain* (London: New Left Books, 1977); Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).

[21] Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 16.

[22] John A. Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984).

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sion of groups, which may occur as the result of prejudicial antagonism rather than as a strategy for cohesion. But the latter focus of this analysis is an important basis of exclusion, which often exacerbates conflict over inclusion.

Lineages of Exclusive Nationalism

The question posed is: Why and how is nationalism configured and codified in particular, internally exclusive forms? To answer, we must examine where this process is located, how it works, what explains the motivation for such exclusion generally, what accounts for the specific form of exclusion, and what shapes the resulting dynamic.

To fully explicate this argument is not possible in this brief context, but it is useful to refer to illustrative cases that suggest the recurrence and variety of exclusionary nationalism. Such cases must be drawn from a specific universe to which my argument is limited: examples of state-led nationalism threatened by internal conflict that becomes exclusive in varying forms. I do not include those rarer examples of inclusive nationalism that have most often emerged where there is little internal conflict or perceived threat of such conflict, though such apparent homogeneity itself requires explanation elsewhere. Similarly, exclusion that is preordained by imperial or colonial powers is not the focus of this analysis, for there is little puzzle about these outcomes.[23]

To clarify the argument, I will cite relevant cases of exclusion, which will then be referred to as illustrative of my argument and summarize the overall implications for these cases in the conclusion. For easy reference, I organize these illustrative cases into Table 1 along the vertical axis according to dependent exclusion varying from de facto discrimination, selective legal exclusion, to forced assimilation or expulsion. Along the horizontal axis I specify the independent level of internal conflict varying from contained or absent conflict, civil war after which state authority emerges more consolidated, to civil war from which the form and power of the state remains uncertain and open to further conflict. Each of these terms will be explicated further. Of course, the small number of cases discussed limits the reach of my analysis to variations of exclusionary nationalism, but I hope at least to suggest a more general argument.

Forms of Exclusive Nationalism

I begin by simply clarifying what is to be explained by focusing on state policies and related forms of exclusion as the dependent variable. I agree with Rogers Brubaker that the form of nationness is best understood "as an event, as something that suddenly crystallizes . . . as a contingent, conjecturally fluctuating,

[23] David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict" in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 168.

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TABLE 1

Level of Internal Conflict

Form of Exclusion	*Contained Conflict*	*Civil Wars Ended*	*Civil Wars On-going*
Forced Assimilation or Expulsion			France (16–17th c.) England (17–18th c.)
Selective Legal Exclusion		South Africa (apartheid period) United States (Jim Crow period)	
De facto Discrimination	Brazil (20th c.) India (recent)		

and precarious frame of vision."[24] Such crystallization is arguably most evident in explicit rules of citizenship that are not universal, for these specify who is legally included and excluded, protected or not. In other words, while not complete, a focus on the legal boundaries of citizenship has provided a useful marker for the exclusive forms of nationalism established by nationalizing states. Prior debates about civic versus ethnic nationalism relied on the same legal markers. The dependent variable of this analysis includes such legal markers, but also other forms of less formal and more draconian exclusion along a continuum.

Citizenship rules are a significant indicator of exclusion, established at defining moments and locking in relations that tend to endure for a time and have discriminatory legacies even after codified exclusion is abandoned. Of course, such categories of inclusion or exclusion have historical bases. But while prior prejudice is relevant, it is neither fixed nor does it directly account for the specific and varying forms of exclusion. For instance, some prejudices are institutionalized in citizenship rules that afford selective protections, and others are not. And such internal exclusion does not always occur, though it does more often than liberal theorists assumed. When prejudice is formally encoded, its effects are thereby exacerbated and often become the focus of conflict more than informal discrimination. But less formal aspects of exclusion can also be hurtful and conflictual.

Not all forms of exclusion are made explicit by legal allocations of a full set of citizenship rights. Forms of the dependent variable of exclusion range from rhetorical, social, economic, and informal (that is, not legally encoded) discrimination, partial legal exclusion from some but not all rights, encouraged or forced homogenization, to homogenizing expulsion from the state. These outcomes vary greatly, albeit all loosely characterized as exclusion. I do not include in this framework instances of ultimate exclusion via genocide, which are so extreme and specific to the modern era that they require a distinct analysis.

Hurtful but less institutionalized forms of exclusion include cases of significant socioeconomic discrimination, which is allowed or encouraged by the state

[24] Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 19.

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or leading parties within the state, but not legally codified. One example is the informal exclusion of Afro-Brazilians post abolition. Brazil became a republic in 1889, emerging out of a past of Portuguese rule as the largest slave-holding society in history, with roughly half its population of significant African descent. Under the official policy of "racial democracy," these black Brazilians were granted equal citizenship rights per se, though continued immigration from Africa was long banned and most Afro-Brazilians were long excluded from the franchise by property and literacy requirements. Despite miscegenation and some individual advancement, most Afro-Brazilians were and remain less educated, under or unemployed, and notably poorer. Such inequality is clearly the result of on-going discrimination, which has been and is illegal, but with protections notably unenforced. Poverty disproportionately affecting blacks remains unchecked, and affirmative action for blacks is not legally mandated.[25]

India emerging from British colonialism made similar claims of pluralism to include Muslims, inspired by Mahatma Gandhi's efforts. But once independence was gained, internal antagonisms emerged forcefully, with Muslim separatism complementing an anti-Muslim impetus and culminating in the breakaway of Pakistan. During the resulting conflict, more than 15 million Muslims fled India. Thereafter, an effective compromise was developed under India's Congress party, which balanced Muslim and Hindu interests and priorities.[26] Only more recently, amid the disarray of the Congress party, has the Bharatiya Janata party (BJP) gained strength while engaging in anti-Muslim rhetoric. But amid informal anti-Muslim antagonism, the extent of formal or legal Muslim exclusion has remained limited in the recently BJP-led Indian governments, which apparently have been eager to moderate policies in order to avoid conflict.

The southern United States under Jim Crow would be an example of selective legal exclusion of blacks from particular citizenship rights. The franchise was limited by literacy and other requirements; social and educational services were inferior or not offered; and social and economic discrimination was allowed, if not always encouraged by law.[27] Such alternatives to the liberal tradition of inclusion, and resulting forms of exclusion, have been eloquently discussed by Rogers Smith.[28]

Apartheid South Africa employed a more extensive form of racially categorized exclusion from citizenship rights. The vote was denied to Africans per se

[25] Carl N. Degler, *Neither Black Nor White* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1971); Thomas E. Skidmore, *Black Into White* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993); Pierre-Michel Fontaine, ed., *Race, Class and Power in Brazil* (Los Angeles: Center for Afro-American Studies, University of California, 1985).

[26] Paul R. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism* (New Delhi: Sage, 1991), 82.

[27] V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Knopf, 1949); Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper and Row, 1944).

[28] Rogers M. Smith, *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

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and limited for so-designated coloreds and Asians; specified jobs were reserved by race, public services were denied, education was inferior, and discriminatory segregation in public facilities was enforced by law. By the 1960s, the South African state had even begun to deny South African citizenship to those Africans designated as citizens of supposedly independent homelands.[29]

Selective exclusion was evident even in the self-described "civic," inclusive, emergent nations of early modern Western Europe, suggesting the pattern explored here had roots at the very emergence of centralized states and protonations. Religious minorities were denied certain rights, forced to assimilate, or threatened with expulsion during the early modern period of state consolidation. In France, Protestant Huguenots were massacred on St. Bartholomew's Day in 1572 and then subject to restraints on their religious practice and encouraged to convert until the 1598 Edict of Nantes encoded toleration. That edict was rescinded in 1685, when those Huguenots remaining were expelled, placing early modern France toward the more extreme form of exclusions, ultimately forcing greater homogeneity on the basis of faith.[30] The precise boundaries of such homogeneity were then contested, constructed, and reinforced locally, for instance in the towns on the border with Spain.[31]

Merry Old England was not so merry for Catholics during the seventeenth century and for at least 150 years thereafter. Charles II encoded the Test Acts of 1673 and 1678, banning Catholics from public office or from living and congregating in towns, with those exclusions of rights reinforced by William and Mary after 1688. Those legal discriminations remained enforced in England itself until 1829 and continued for Catholics in Ireland.[32] As a result, many Catholics were forced to convert or to flee, most dramatically with one Catholic-sympathizing monarch beheaded and another Catholic king forced into exile. Again, early modern England's denial of rights, forced conversion, and expulsions of Catholics places it at the extremity of our continuum of exclusions, contradicting the conventional image of liberal inclusion.

Internal Conflict as Causal

States, or more accurately elites controlling states, are eager to avoid disruption of their rule, whether to ensure stability, support in warfare and revenue, or participation in development. They are "rational" in such goal-seeking behavior.[33] In a sense, this argument fits with the literature on state autonomy—states act in their own interest to reinforce their legitimacy and to preserve themselves, their society, and economy.[34] But this autonomous interest of the state

[29] Leonard Thompson, *A History of South Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).
[30] Richard S. Dunn, *The Age of Religious Wars, 1559-1715* (New York: Norton, 1970).
[31] Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
[32] Roger Lockyer, *Tudor and Stuart Britain, 1471-1714* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985).
[33] Michael Laver, *Private Desires, Political Action* (London: Sage, 1997), 2.
[34] Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back In*.

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is not shaped in a vacuum but in response to real pressures and challenges to the state emerging out of civil society, itself divided.[35] If there were no such challenges, the imperative for state action to encourage unity and preservation would be less acute. The form of such challenges shapes state action aimed at establishing, forging, and unifying what the core constituency is. State action guided by this imperative depends on state capacity, which may vary, with states more or less able to codify and enforce exclusion. The level and form of internal conflict is here stipulated as the independent variable that can impel such efforts at the forging of cohesion via exclusion of some group not central to that pressing conflict.

I also further specify the condition of cases applicable to my analysis. Societies that perceive themselves to be homogenous are not included in the universe of cases, though how such perceived homogeneity is itself produced remains a subject for analysis. Where emergent states are faced with internal divisions that threaten central authority rather than strengthen autonomy, elites seek to contain or heal such divisions. Potential, on-going, or past social conflict may be diminished by state action. The juncture points where this process would be most evident and subject to analysis are when such conflict emerges and attempts are made to resolve it in order to preserve the polity.

There is of course a wide range of real, past, or threatened internal conflicts and challenges to state rule. These include concern about possible but largely absent social conflict, civil wars in which preservation of the form and power of the state remains unresolved. The relative lack of conflict is easy to specify with the absence of collective violence. The distinction between civil wars resulting in bolstered state authority or in continued challenges to that authority is evident according to whether large-scale conflict reemerges after war. Where such conflict does continue, then clearly the on-going challenges to the state continue to require state response. Not included in this analysis is the ultimate form of internal conflict, or full-scale revolution, in which prior state authority and social structure is defeated and replaced by another.

This independent variable can also be illustrated. Neither Brazil nor India experienced anything akin to civil war, though potentials for conflict have been a concern to elites. Post-empire Brazil avoided a civil war of the sort witnessed in the United States. Post-colonial India experienced tensions with Pakistan that inflamed internal ethnic conflict, and at least the potential of class and caste conflict which has not exploded. By contrast, the United States experienced the violent Civil War and South Africa the Boer War, both of which left a centralized state intact—further consolidated in the United States and newly founded and enforced within the British Empire for South Africa. In early modern France and England, civil wars left central state authority still fragile, being built or significantly reconfigured into absolutism or greater parliamentarism amid on-going, violent, domestic conflict.

[35] Elinor Ostrom, "Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 85 (March 1991): 241.

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The Logic of Exclusion: Linking Dependent and Independent Variables

The key to my argument is that selective exclusion has been encouraged or encoded to heal past or threatened disunity among those included as the core constituency. Much prior analysis has assumed that the imperative for encouraging national unity should be inclusive, but often this is not possible. Diversity and historical antagonisms, whether the result of territorial incorporation, immigration, or conversion, impede pervasive unity or coordination. The actual or perceived threats to such unity vary. Where such threats exist, a pattern of outcomes emerges that is not explicable by supposedly fixed categories. State elites make deals en route to nation-building, selecting who to include, reward, and encourage loyalty from as the core constituency. To identify and consolidate the core, elites manipulate established antagonisms against some other group thereby excluded. And the core constituency so demarcated and reinforced may itself change over time according to shifting challenges and alliances.

The schematic form of this argument is as follows: states are often not faced with a dyadic issue of imposing their rule over a unified society, but instead they face a more complex triadic challenge, with the sovereign facing competing or antagonistic groups. To avoid being defeated by those competing groups that align, the state plays one group off against the other to forge an alliance with one group that is solidified by the purposeful exclusion of a different group from specified rights. This reinforces prejudice. A more manageable form of rule is enforced by such state action. Or as Barry Weingast has recently suggested, states needing a minimum of support but reluctant to meet the needs of competing groups who are unable to coordinate their demands can solidify their support by transgressing the rights of one group to the advantage of the other group.[36] The result is a form of nationalism akin to the economic theory of the club, in which public goods are selectively allocated and protected from outsiders.[37]

Simplifying schematic arguments can be as misleading as they are useful, so it should help to rephrase the above argument in different terms. Nationalism of all may not be possible in instances of aggravated antagonisms. In such instances, states may learn to encourage the support of a key constituency by acceding to its prejudices, often using a particular prejudice that can unify the key constituency, which is otherwise divided by other antagonisms. By maintaining legal boundaries and excluding an internal "other" as a common enemy, such states encourage the coherence and support of those who are included, focusing tangible benefits and using symbolic manipulations. These devices might not be as powerful or immediately salient if applied only to foreigners,

[36] Barry R. Weingast, "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law," *American Political Science Review* 91 (June 1997): 245–63. See also James D. Fearon and David Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," *American Political Science Review* 90 (December 1996): 715–35.

[37] Todd Sandler, *Collective Action* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), 63–4.

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the more common focus of studies of selective citizenship, though often the exclusion of insiders is reinforced by related and on-going external antagonisms.

Demarcating, demonizing, and depriving "outsiders" found within provides a referent that further unifies and solidifies the support of the "ingroup."[38] Selective exclusion thus serves the interests of the state in avoiding or containing the conflicts where social cleavages make more inclusive "civic" unity of all impossible or difficult to achieve. It is not surprising then that nationalism "is not a shapeless free-floating unspecific unfocused feeling. . . . Its object is normally only too sharply defined, as the love of certain categories of people, and the detestation of others," with that love and detestation working together.[39] Arthur Stinchcombe concludes, nationalism "is a wish to suppress internal divisions within the nation and to define people outside the group as untrustworthy as allies and implacably evil as enemies. . . . It is on the one hand . . . a love of compatriots. . . . But it is on the other hand a spirit of distrust of the potential treason of any opposition within the group and a hatred of strangers."[40]

Referring back to prior points, such organized exclusion is often, though not always, designed to encourage the unity and allegiance of those included; and it is evident in informal discrimination, state policies of citizenship, forced assimilation, or expulsion. Such exclusion certainly builds upon the habitus of prior social dispositions constraining the state, most notably "the primordial tacit contract whereby they define 'us' as opposed to 'them.'"[41] The result combines Marxism's traditional focus on self-interest and strategic calculations with the symbolic power of historically determined but seemingly natural habitus.[42] But as Pierre Bourdieu notes, precisely when antagonisms threaten to go out of control, to threaten the state itself, more rigid or legal codification is more likely. Such codifications then "minimize ambiguity . . . making clear cuts" upon which sufficient state support can be built. Moments of codification are then the moments in which nationalism is crystallized.[43]

There are at least two other factors that contribute to this outcome of selective exclusion. On the macrolevel, there are transnational influences, most notably historical waves of interest in nationalism that encourage or force the adoption of such rhetoric in places where diversity precludes inclusive forms of nationalism. International tensions and antagonisms can reinforce internal exclusions, for instance, with those insiders suspected as being aligned with for-

[38] Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, 48.

[39] Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism*, 65.

[40] Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Social Structures and Politics" in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 3 (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 600–1.

[41] Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 478.

[42] Rogers Brubaker, "Rethinking Classical Theory: The Sociological Vision of Pierre Bourdieu," *Theory and Society*, 14 (November 1985): 723–44; Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Loic Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

[43] Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 76–82.

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eign enemies and therefore more likely subjects of internal exclusion. From the microlevel, there are psychological factors encouraging selective inclusion. A rich tradition of psychological theories and experimentation has demonstrated that the cohesion of any in-group is solidified by discrimination against an out-group, with the demarcation of an "other" giving a sense of common characteristics or fate to the core.[44] The actual basis of the category of those excluded is relatively irrelevant, reflecting what Sigmund Freud too dismissively called "the narcissism of minor differences."[45] But to augment core cohesion, often a scapegoat is selected precisely because it is present, visible, and powerless to resist. The scapegoat is useful for displacing aggression from some faction of the in-group too powerful to exclude. The combination of international pressures and psychological tendencies adds to a powerful impetus to exclude, magnifying otherwise minor difference.

This general argument suggests a connection between the forms or levels of threats to a polity and the form or level of exclusion used to heal or prevent such conflict; and our cases (summarized in Table 1) illustrate this coinciding variation. Where conflict has not exploded into organized violence or war, potential conflict within a core constituency may be contained by limited exclusion of some third party. For instance, in postindependent and relatively peaceful Brazil, and more recently India, largely rhetorical and limited informal discrimination against Afro-Brazilians or Muslims has been approved or at least permitted by the state. In India, the weakening of unifying control by the Congress party has led to a rise in de facto anti-Muslim discrimination. In both Brazil and India, central state authority has been consolidated without a regional, class, or caste civil war impelling more vigorous accommodation via exclusion.

Where social conflict had exploded into civil war in which the polity has successfully fought for its perseverance, prior conflict had to be healed more strenuously and national unity had to be built through legal exclusion. Blacks seen as inassimilable were excluded from the franchise and other rights in Jim Crow United States after the Civil War, thereby appeasing the South, which demanded such discrimination after Reconstruction. This set the stage for a gradual regional reconciliation under a centralizing state. After the Boer War, South Africa was formed and gained capacity from the British Empire, which allowed for the exclusion of the black majority to provide a basis for reconciliation between Afrikaners and English unified as whites. That racial exclusion was then further systematized under apartheid after World War II had

[44] Michael Billig and Henri Tajfel, "Social Categorization and Similarity in Intergroup Behavior," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 3 (January 1973): 27–52; Henri Tajfel, "Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination," *Scientific American* 223 (November 1970): 96–102; Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior" in Stephen Worchel and W. G. Austin, eds., *Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986), 7, 16; Henri Tajfel, *Differentiation between Social Groups* (London: Academic Press, 1972), 66, 83.

[45] Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents* (New York: Norton, 1961), 61.

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reignited ethnic intrawhite conflict. Afrikaner separatism came to power and enforced segregation, enriching all whites and again allowing for gradual reconciliation among them.[46]

The connection between internal conflict and exclusion was also evident in the early modern emergence of states and nations before states had been consolidated or developed enough capacity for more finely tuned legal exclusions. Prior violent conflict leaving the state less in control was healed by the more blunt instrument of forced assimilation or expulsion. Religious groups seen as assimilable were forced to convert or lose rights after the French religious wars of the sixteenth century threatened the crown, and again when absolutist rule was shaken by revolt in the next century. Catherine de Medici and her sons maneuvered to retain power against noble challengers by harnessing the passion of anti-Protestantism, consolidating an alliance with the Guise faction, which was cemented with the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre of the Huguenots. Toleration and order were restored only by the Catholic-converted Henri IV, who inherited the throne after the death of the last of Catherine's sons. But Louis XIV again faced challenges from restive nobles and peasants, forcing the monarch to flee Paris during the Fronde. To further consolidate his rule, the sun king restricted the Huguenots and in 1685 expelled those remaining, thereby aligning himself further with the Catholic Church, which reciprocated by offering offices to idle nobles. The absolutist French state was thus built with the crutch of religious exclusion, except for the notable period when relative peace allowed for toleration under Henri IV's Edict of Nantes.[47] By the time of the French Revolution, expulsion had produced relative religious homogeneity allowing for a liberal rhetoric of more inclusive nationalism.

Seventeenth-century England also followed a pattern of religious exclusion enacted in the aftermath of civil war and amid efforts to reconfigure central state authority. Contests for power between monarchy and landholders culminated in civil war and the beheading of Charles I, accused of ignoring Parliament and of Catholic sympathies. When Charles II was restored to the throne, he soon encoded a set of anti-Catholic exclusions, building upon prior anti-Catholic prejudice to unify his core constituency of Protestants across the dividing lines of power contestation. But monarchical power remained contested, particularly in 1686-89, resulting in a repetition of the pattern of consolidating and reconfiguring state authority through exclusion. When rebellion and unrest led to the flight of a Catholic monarch, James II, he was replaced by William and Mary, who further encoded anti-Catholic measures. The exclusion of Catholics to unify Protestants became the bedrock for English nation-building, reinforced later by foreign wars in which the French were seen as religiously linked to the internal "other."[48]

[46] Anthony W. Marx, *Making Race and Nation* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

[47] N. M. Sutherland, *The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict, 1559-1572* (London: Macmillan, 1973).

[48] J. G. A. Pocock, *Three British Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Linda Colley, *Britons* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

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Specification of the Excluded Group

The prior argument suggests why states may purposefully exclude some category of people to unify others, but it cannot in itself account for which group or category is so utilized. As David Laitin argues, states "piggyback" or "free ride" on social cleavages or prejudices, using tradition as a resource in order to organize and utilize bias.[49] But in doing so, elites must select among a variety of groups which may be subject to exclusion; their selection is not fixed.[50]

Rational choice and coalition theories have put forward an important possible answer to this puzzle of selective exclusion. According to William Riker, for instance, alliances are shaped by the imperative for establishing a coalition of minimum size necessary to win privileges, thereby ensuring that maximum benefits will be shared as narrowly as possible.[51] But individuals are not free agents able and willing to change and barter loyalties. Historically informed ideology or prejudice, or the "embeddedness" of identities, pose a constraint on permissible coalitions.[52] The deeper the ideological or identity cleavage, the more a winning coalition will be determined by efforts to minimize such differences, rather than being determined by Riker's "size principle." Conjunctural background conditions shape the strategic perceptions of elites about what is rational, limiting the possible choices and bargains at moments of high tension. Thus, exclusionary outcomes are shaped by a combination of "rational" and historically determined calculations.

Nationalizing states inherit and are faced with the legacies of prejudice and internal antagonisms, with such challenges to unified rule creating an imperative for state action. States may then act to purposefully exclude a category of people so as to encourage the unity and allegiance of a core, forging a nation so defined by those included. The particular category so employed reflects the historical legacies of antagonism that posed the problem of internal discord in the first place, with an image of the past imposed on the present.[53] As Elie Kedourie argues, "nationalists make use of the past."[54] The particular past cleavage that is enforced to encourage unity depends upon imbedded historical ideology and narratives informing strategic debates among elites about what target and form of exclusion will heal pressing internal conflict within a core judged indis-

[49] David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict" in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 311.

[50] See Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (London: Macmillan, 1974), 16; Russell Hardin, *One for All* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[51] William Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). See also Steven J. Brams, *Rational Politics* (Washington: CQ Press, 1985), 175.

[52] Steven J, Brams, *Game Theory and Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1975), 228–32; Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Studying Institutions," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1 (April 1989): 131–47.

[53] Edwin N. Wilmsen and Patrick MacAllister, eds., *The Politics of Difference* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 3.

[54] Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1960), 70.

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pensable. Precisely because we are not all "geldings," as Ernest Gellner would have us cut off from our past, bias from our past is reworked to shape exclusive nationalism.[55]

Crucially, when a potential core constituency is divided by one issue or category of antagonism that blocks essential national unity, a different category of antagonism is more likely encoded to overcome that constraint and to unify that core. A group is excluded which is not itself a major faction of the most pressing internal conflict, but whose exclusion can help unify the major factions of a potential core constituency. The form of exclusion used to build national unity must then have sufficient torque to unify those key constituents otherwise in conflict or even at war with each other. For instance, race may be projected to unify across regional or ethnic divides, ethnicity may be used to unify class divisions, or class may be used to unify across ethnic tensions. Minimizing coalition size is not determinant; building a workable coalition that is enforced by past prejudice is. Institutional and selective nationalism then reifies the category of exclusion, reinforcing false but nonetheless believed assumptions of primordial difference. The result is an institutionalized coalition piggy-backing on culture.[56]

The particularities of the real or threatened social conflict to be redressed via exclusion thus specifies the group to be so excluded as a third party against which intracore factions can be unified. At least in part to avoid class or caste conflict among Hindus no longer as unified by the Congress party in India, Hindus were encouraged in their prejudice against Muslims, a strategy effectively embraced by the BJP in its recent and successful bids for power. Containing regional or class conflict among white Brazilians was achieved by unifying them via discrimination against Afro-Brazilians, the subject of prejudice dating back to slavery. To heal the regional conflict of the U.S. Civil War impelled excluding blacks against whom whites across regions shared a racial prejudice. To heal the ethnic conflict between white South Africans during and after the Boer War, Afrikaners and the English were unified in their common racism against blacks. To contain the early modern conflicts over power between French nobles or between crown and nobles in England, religious minorities were excluded. In England, this exclusion included two monarchs, whose beheading or expulsion allowed for gradual consolidation of constitutional rule. In contrast, France's exclusion of Huguenots forged the loyalty of Catholic nobles and strengthened the monarchy (even under a convert) as it moved toward absolutism before the then more unified nation turned to revolution.

This argument explicitly borrows from both cultural and instrumental approaches, denying to either sole power. Culturalists argue that inherited or

[55] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 18.

[56] See Peter Hall, *Governing the Economy* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1986), 19; Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Mark Granovetter and Richard Swedberg, eds., *The Sociology of Economic Life* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992).

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evolving meanings and beliefs about primordial ancestry and linkages have determined national units.[57] However, ideas that appear to come to us from the past change, as do their uses, and such change cannot be explained by some seemingly unchanging inheritance or essentialism. Culture itself varies, and such variation cannot be explained by reference to culture itself. For instance, prejudice and encoded exclusion against blacks, Muslims, Huguenots, or Catholics have in each of our cases varied in salience and practice.

Instrumentalists counter that tradition and belief are a resource for strategic calculations of interest. They reject cultural approaches as essential for implying an unchanging nature and focus instead on how different views are strategically pursued or enhanced for narrow advantage.[58] But beliefs and collectivities often persist even when they become costly rather than profitable.[59] Or more fundamentally, basing analysis on rational calculations of interest takes for granted the preferences so acted upon. Such analysis ironically bends back toward primordialism in assuming that preferences are somehow historically fixed as "the comforts of home."[60] But again, those discriminatory "comforts" have varied, and exclusions are maintained even when not strictly "rational."

Rather than reject either form of argument, I am explicitly using and combining both. As Jurgen Habermas has argued, "interpretation and formal analysis are simply dimensions of the same process of inquiry."[61] In other words, cultural and historically informed identities constrain and identify strategic options, foreclosing and disclosing possibilities. Culture produces preferences that are then acted upon via rational calculation. Put differently, identities make some equilibria more likely.[62] Choice is conceived and interpreted according to past history.[63]

This combining of approaches creates some odd bedfellows. Exclusive nationalism does reflect often long-standing preferences, identities, and prejudices, as suggested by ethnonationalism. But we need not accept that such biases are primordial or fixed to see that people often believe and act as if they are and that this belief is powerful. Karl Marx argued, "the tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living."[64] An in-

[57] Marshall Sahlins, *Culture and Practical Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 206.

[58] David Laitin, *Hegemony and Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 99, 180–2; Wilmsen and MacAllister, eds., *The Politics of Difference*, 27.

[59] Abner Cohen, *Two Dimensional Man* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 3.

[60] Hardin, *One for All*. See also Michael Hechter, *Principles of Group Solidarity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 30.

[61] Kristen Renwick Moore, ed., *The Economic Approach to Politics* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 120.

[62] Ian S. Lustik, "Culture and the Wager of Rational Choice," *APSA Comparative Politics Newsletter* 8 (Summer 1997): 11–14; John Ferejohn, "Rationality and Interpretation" in Kristen Renwick Moore, ed., *The Economic Approach to Politics* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 298.

[63] Hardin, *One for All*.

[64] Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" in David McLellan, ed., *Karl Marx: Selected Writings* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1977), 300.

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strumental logic helps to explain this power. As Thomas Schelling has argued, coordination is expedited by signaling and convergence, and that signaling often rests on prominent focal points.[65] Cultural and historical inheritances, even as redirected in current context, can provide such visible focal points as a crutch for coordination otherwise known as nationalism. In other words, culture and historical prejudice may provide a sense of bounded group loyalty that strategic calculation can rest upon. This is where preferences come from that are then rationally calculated. In this sense, cultural and instrumental logic can reinforce each other.[66] Once we recognize that a purportedly inclusive collective good such as nationalism can actually be an exclusive club, then we can see that the rules of such exclusion may reflect strategic calculation building upon cultural signaling.[67]

The process of exclusion occurs under particular circumstances in the universe in which exclusive nationalism emerges. When a polity is threatened, solidarity can be and is reinforced by distancing from or exclusion of an "other." And once such a demarcation is reinforced, it becomes self-fulfilling in preserving the social order.[68] The conviction of difference may be false, but "by their effects they are real; this is the power of primordial arguments."[69] Interest groups manipulate culture to solve basic organizational problems and achieve stability in which their interests can be met.[70]

The most important and troubling critique of this position is posed by John Comaroff, who argues that such "neo-primordialism," implying an instrumental use of primordial attachments, leaves "the bedrock of essentialism intact." Comaroff argues that supposedly primordial ethnicity is based on relations and ongoing historical constructions.[71] But those relations and constructions, particularly in moments of crisis, are often guided by cultural foundations that lay claims to primordial images. Elites are constrained by such established beliefs and values, which they then simplify, distort, and select to serve the purpose of unifying a core group.[72] Primordial imagery is what gives power to this process. That such prejudice or primordial imagery is contested or constructed does not diminish its power. Instead, it is the image of such prejudice coming out of the

[65] Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 57. See also Karen Shweers Cook and Margaret Levi, *The Limits of Rationality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 380.

[66] Jack Knight, *Institutions and Social Conflict* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 43, 46, 98.

[67] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 38.

[68] Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press, 1968), 475–77.

[69] Wilmsen and MacAllister, eds., *The Politics of Difference*, 2.

[70] Cohen, *Two Dimensional Man*, 15, 31.

[71] John Comaroff, "Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Politics of Difference in the Age of Revolution" in Wilmsen and MacAllister, eds., *The Politics of Difference*, 164, 174.

[72] Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 16, 74.

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past that gives to elites such a powerful tool. In terms of the psychology of scapegoating, it is what makes the subject group "visible" and vulnerable.[73]

Contradictions of Exclusion

Exclusive nationalism does serve the interests of the state in forging and bolstering the allegiance of its core constituency, without which the polity would lose its legitimacy. It and its economy might not survive. Seeking that consequence is the cause of state action. But I do not mean to suggest that exclusive nationalism is static or emerges systemically as a coherent and uniform response by a strong state. That would be too robust or efficient an image of historical processes. At the same time, it is too mechanical an explanation to account for ferocious and deadly outcomes.[74] Indeed, the state often is itself uncertain, wavering, divided, and challenged by real social pressures. But those divisive pressures may lead state elites at pivotal moments to purposefully, if fitfully, find a resolution to internal divisions with strategic actors making choices within constrained repertoires. Antagonisms within the core often continue nonetheless, as reflected by local tensions and party or class competition, which reinforce the ongoing logic or causal chain of selective nationalism refined in an iterative fashion as a salve for unity. But this outcome emerges from real actors acting intentionally to resolve real problems.

In a sense, my argument fits the criteria for functionalist causality described by Arthur Stinchcombe.[75] Different behaviors, as in different forms of exclusion, have the same consequence of unity. As situations change, for instance, with more or less antagonism within the core, so does state policy vary between more or less exclusion; but it still aims at fostering allegiance. The more there are intracore tensions blocking this outcome, the more the policy of exclusion is reinforced to unify that core, in a feedback loop. The official reasons for such a policy are generally erratic and unconvincing, referring more to prejudice than to the imperative for core unity.

As much as selective nationalism may serve for a time to build cohesion, in the longer term it may also create its own challenges as an unintended or dysfunctional consequence. Purposeful exclusion may forge and unify a core constituency. Lewis Coser argues that resulting social conflict that appears harmful may in retrospect appear functional after it has been forged.[76] Over time, however, such exclusion also gradually unifies and provokes the strategic protest of its victims, creating vulnerabilities not as evident if exclusion were

[73] Richard D. Ashmore, "The Problem of Intergroup Prejudice" in Barry E. Collins, ed., *Social Psychology* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1970), 270.

[74] See Hall, *Governing the Economy*, 6; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions* (New York: Free Press, 1989), 3; Guibernau, *Nationalisms*.

[75] Arthur L. Stinchcombe, *Constructing Social Theories* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 99.

[76] Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe IL: Free Press, 1956).

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applied only to foreigners. State actors may make exclusionary deals at crucial moments, but resulting discrimination or codification then becomes part of the infrastructure shaping responses and creating new and unforeseen problems. Institutionalized discrimination shapes the contingent identity of those victimized in a relationship of exclusion, whose cultural understandings are forged by that historical experience.[77] "Outsiders" within then push to become "insiders," often resorting to violence to overcome their codified exclusion. State policy thus creates its own adversaries, as the logic of "political opportunity structures" suggests.[78] As Elie Kedourie powerfully concludes, "the attempts to refashion so much of the world on national lines has not led to greater peace and stability," at least in the longer run. "On the contrary, it has created new conflicts, exacerbated tensions, and brought catastrophe to numberless people."[79]

Again we can illustrate how exclusion can have unintended consequences in fostering counter efforts. Muslims in India resent efforts at their exclusion, though they have been mollified by the BJP's constraints, and the lack of more rigid discrimination has produced little protest response. Afro-Brazilians have a long history of attempts at protest mobilization, forcing recent discussions of affirmative action, though again the relatively limited form of exclusion has generated a similarly limited protest response.[80] Black South Africans and Americans pressed for inclusion through the anti-apartheid and civil rights movements.[81] France's Huguenots resisted their exclusion from afar, notably the Netherlands. Their claims for equal treatment informed the toleration enacted by the French Revolution. England's Catholics resisted their exclusion and forced the end of the Test Acts in 1829. Irish Catholics continue their resistance.

Implications

Official allocations of rights, demarcating who is part of the nation and obliged to serve and be served by the state, have often been internally exclusive. States have thus encouraged selective loyalty rather than uniform allegiance within a territory. The imagined community of the nation has been purposefully constrained by policies or practices bounding who is part of that community. The exclusion of specified "others" has been central to such imaginings rather than tangential, providing a referent unifying those selectively included in the nation-state and thereby solidifying crucial support for states. Most notably, states

[77] Charles Tilly, "Citizenship, Identity and Social History," *International Review of Social History*, Supplement 3 (1996): 5.

[78] Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Pierre Birnbaum, *States and Social Movements* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[79] Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960), 134–5.

[80] Michael Hanchard, *Orpheus and Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[81] George M. Fredrickson, *Black Liberation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Marx, *Making Race and Nation.*

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have used exclusion as a tool for nation-building, encouraging nationalist loyalty of a specified core constituency by allowing or encouraging exclusions of some other group, which selectively and instrumentally builds upon historical prejudice. The more extreme of such policies has then had unintended consequences, reinforcing major social cleavages along the lines of official exclusion, consolidating subordinated identities, and often provoking their resistance.

This argument has been reinforced and refined here by a preliminary discussion of illustrative cases of how exclusion has been used to forge an alliance of nationalism. And in all these cases, such solutions did not emerge at one time but were instead revised in response to ongoing challenges. Within this framework, a number of patterns emerge. The more violent conflict has, does, or is perceived to present a profound threat to the polity, economy, or ruling elites, then the more likely and stricter will be efforts to avoid or heal such conflict through exclusion of some "others." Fears of more explosive conflict have been met by allowing or encouraging informal discrimination, as in Brazil or India, but with exclusion remaining relatively limited. Where such violent conflict exploded, with threats to the unified polity defeated but remaining a threat, more strict exclusions and denials of rights have been legally codified, as in South Africa and the United States. Violent conflict among elite factions vying over the construction of central state authority have been resolved through legal restrictions and forced assimilation or expulsion, as in early modern France or England. While these early examples of exclusion predate state capacity for more finely tuned policy, they suggest the applicability of my argument and the imperative for building national cohesion to an era before state and nation were fully institutionalized.

The specific group excluded reflects both the salience of a particular historical prejudice shared by a potential core constituency and a strategic assessment by elites of which prejudice so encouraged or encoded will unify that core with minimum collateral damage. Exclusion of blacks in Brazil, South Africa or the United States, Muslims in India, Protestants in early modern France, or Catholics in early modern England all did serve to unify a core constituency of whites, Hindus, Catholics, or Protestants. Exclusions of other ethnic, racial, or class groups risked losing crucial components of a viable national core.

It is suggestive to note that in none of the examples discussed here was nationalism forged on the basis of an exclusion by class by itself. Elites seeking to solidify national allegiance do so in large part in order to ensure that conflict does not impede economic activity from which those elites benefit. For instance, economically important ethnic groups, such as Jews in nineteenth-century Europe or overseas Chinese, are often spared from full-scale exclusion, though not always: France's Huguenots, England's Catholics, and India's Muslims were economically important but still excluded. To exclude from the nation an entire class, not just an ethnic faction thereof, risks economic dysfunction, as indicated by the travails of those countries that have sought effectively to exclude all capitalists. Instead, where social conflict has superimposed class

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and ethnic or racial antagonisms, an ethnic or racial group rather than class per se has been excluded in an effort to adhere to the core other factions of this class.

Where social conflict was more starkly based on class antagonism alone, no group was excluded and a more supposedly civic form of nationalism was built as a form of class compromise. For instance, Mexico around 1910 experienced a violent internal revolution, but postrevolution reconciliation was not based upon any official exclusions of "others."[82] After the 1920s, Mexico's ruling party did not represent only the peasants or landed elite, but instead sought compromise that combined limited land reforms with capitalism.

The implication is that class as a social category is less amenable to strategic exclusion, not just in terms of economic requirements. For class based on economic status does not have the primordial imagery of race or ethnicity, which provides greater salience for building national unity. Race and ethnicity are projected and felt as more fixed, more prone to tension and distrust, more amenable to instrumental antagonism, even if they are constructed rather than ascriptive.[83] The very language of ethnicity and race refers to such primordialism, hiding the role of the state and implying boundaries, which remain despite fluidity.[84] Class by itself does not have this implication. Perhaps the assumed changeable nature of economic disparity, allowing for compromise, leaves class per se less salient than cleavages that are projected as more primordial, fixed, or zero-sum. Certainly, ethnicity appears to often "trump" class.[85] The seemingly less ascriptive nature of class—belief in potential class mobility, cooptation of working-class leadership, middle-class ambivalence, and the "extralegal processes" of class differentiation—may diminish its applicability to the logic of exclusionary nationalism, at least in capitalist countries.[86]

Beyond the distinctiveness of class, we should acknowledge that this argument does not account for all forms of legal exclusion or discrimination. Most notably, state power has often developed with the formal exclusion of women from voting or from rights and duties of citizenship, including military service.[87] Perhaps such gender exclusion provided a template for later, more instrumental forms of exclusion. But often women were so excluded for such instrumental purposes. For instance, in Africa women have often been used as scapegoats by political leaders, who attack women traders or those in modern dress in order to divert attention and conflict over more general economic failure. Urban women

[82] John Womack, Jr., *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1968).

[83] Fearon and Laitin. "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation."

[84] Fredrick Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Boston: Little Brown, 1969).

[85] Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 15, 333; Guibernau, *Nationalisms*.

[86] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press, 1960); Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism*, 4, 6.

[87] See Jan Pettman, *Worlding Women* (London: Routledge, 1996); Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Reflections on War and Political Discourse," *Political Theory* 13 (1985): 42.

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often fit the criteria of scapegoats as highly visible, powerless, and seemingly expendable.[88] But we must be careful not to extend the logic of this argument too far, nor to suggest that nation-building explains all cleavages or forms of exclusion.

Finally, the argument outlined here also has important potential implications for the study of democracy, which can only be suggestive at this point. In a major contribution to the literature, Dankwart Rustow argued that national unity was a prerequisite to democracy.[89] The assumption was that such national unity would be inclusive of all within a state's territory. But I have here argued that such national unity is often exclusive, and when so, it similarly limits inclusion in democracy. Just as nationalism can be exclusive, so can and has been democracy, for boundaries about inclusion in the nation also set boundaries on the rights and privileges associated with democracy, thereby setting the terms for conflicts over inclusion within democracy as well. The liberal assumption of inclusion is then as problematic for democracy as for nationalism.

Conclusions

Analysis of nationalism has often been divided between those focusing on hot-blooded assertion of difference and cold-blooded analysis of strategic interest. To resolve this Gordian knot of nationalism, we must focus on institutionalized outcomes. Ira Katznelson suggests that institutions reify identities often based on or referring to culture, and shape the groups who then seek to maximize their interests within the rules of the institution.[90] Institutions are built and confer identities by polarizing and excluding, though such institutions are themselves caused or built on grounds of identity and interests.

Nationhood is such an institution, as it is codified in more or less formal rules ranging from allowing discrimination, to selective allocation of rights, to forced assimilation or expulsion. These rules are often built on the focal point of cultural/historical divides or conflicts, and then they reinforce and simplify these distinctions. These distinctions in turn become the basis for group interests and collective action. The nation is a set of relations, which not surprisingly refer to inclusion and exclusion. As such, nationhood constitutes the rules that reinforce identity and codify the preferences, which then form the basis for strategic calculation.

[88] Robert Fatton, Jr., "Gender, Class and State in Africa" in Jane L. Parpart and Kathleen Staudt, eds., *Women and the State in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1989), 47–60; Claire C. Robertson, *Sharing the Same Bowl* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 240–4; Audrey Wipper, "African Women, Fashion and Scapegoating," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 6 (1972): 329–49.

[89] Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2 (April 1970): 337–63.

[90] Ira Katznelson, "Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics" in Mark Lichbach and A. Zuckerman, eds., *Comparative Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 104–5.

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The argument presented here is an attempt to combine and refine prior efforts and approaches. Liberals assume nationalism to be inclusive or based on essentialist ethnicity. Others have stressed the imagining of community reinforced by language. Theorists informed by modernization assumptions about the imperatives for economic development similarly see nationalism as inclusive. Yet nationalism is often not so fixed or inclusive. Instead, exclusions have been encouraged or codified by dominant structures that pursue their interest in cohesion and control by building upon prior conflicts and beliefs about identity. The power of nationalism is drawn from its being both hot and cold blooded. It builds on historical passions to serve modern interests as a state-enforced simplification of cohesion.[91]

Given that "ontology recapitulates methodology" only by including such varied forms of cultural and interest-based analysis can we account for the essence of processes.[92] Otherwise, we will remain partial in our understanding and divided by prior assumptions. Progress in the substantive, historical study of nationalism, and in social science more generally, requires that we learn to borrow from various approaches and recognize that human behavior is drawn from as wide a mix of motivations as there are schools of analysis.

I have sought to demonstrate that only by so incorporating varying approaches can we account for the history of nation-building, the most prominent element of mass political engagement during the last half millenium. Efforts to cohere nations from above or below emerged in the context of varying degrees of conflict, with efforts to resolve such conflict building upon both culturally informed passions and strategic machinations. These combined processes not only account for the emergence of political units of allegiance to states, but also for the on-going conflicts and exclusions according to which such units were solidified. The legacies of these processes still plague us, as reflected both in on-going inequalities where nations have been so cohered, and also in the current conflicts and exclusions evident in more recent efforts to build nations or allegiances where they have not been forged earlier. We are not yet free of the inheritances of our past, reverberating and replayed in current tragedies. Such is the awful legacy of the age of the nation-state, which we now fitfully seek to move beyond*

[91] See James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

[92] Marshall Sahlins, *Culture and Practical Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 89.

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Book Reviews

America's Choice 2000: Entering a New Millenium *edited by William Crotty. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 2001. 213 pp. Paper, $22.00.*

The Perfect Tie: The True Story of the 2000 Presidential Election *by James W. Ceaser and Andrew E. Busch. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2001. 256 pp. Paper, $15.95.*

Books about the 2000 presidential election have suffered a cruel fate: the terrorist attacks of September 11 are a terrible swift yardstick against which to measure predictions about the Bush presidency. The cruelty lies partly in the unfairness of expecting any author to have imagined such an astonishing turn of events. But it lies equally in the finality of those events; the consequences for the presidency along with everything else are impossible to ignore or explain away. How do these books measure up? More specifically, would their analysis of the election give us any reason to predict that President George W. Bush could respond effectively, less than a year later, to a crisis far worse than disputed ballots? On these grounds especially, *The Perfect Tie* by James W. Ceaser and Andrew E. Busch is superior to *America's Choice 2000*, a collection of essays assembled by William Crotty.

The title of *The Perfect Tie* is a play on "the perfect storm"—an overlapping of natural events whose combined force was much greater than the sum of the parts. The events in question—changes in party allegiance, ideological shifts, culture wars, demographic changes, among others—all worked to create a nearly perfect balance of political forces in 2000, not only in the closest presidential election in history, but in House, Senate, and state legislative races as well. The result is an election that delivered "no popular mandate of any kind. George W. Bush received nothing more than a key to his office" (p. 20). But Ceaser and Busch shrewdly note that the lack of a mandate "offers some new possibilities for governance," depending on the "techniques and tone" adopted by the President as he settles into his role (p. 21). This sense of the presidency as an office unfettered by mandates points to a truer constitutional understanding of the president's role as leader rather than servant. It is a conception vindicated by subsequent events: a president without a mandate but with strong partisan backing and an abundance of patience may be well placed to make the most of what fortune throws his way.

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The most important themes and conclusions of *The Perfect Tie* can only be briefly summarized here, but it is a book rich in analysis and detail, well-written, and laced with a sometimes impish humor. (See the "mathematical model for post-election campaigns" on p. 176.)

- Retrospective voting models took a serious beating. Al Gore's own mistakes and the long shadow cast by the moral failings of his patron overcame the general sense that the country was on the right economic track.
- This election was an "election of bases" (p. 166)—both Gore and Bush were more popular with strong partisans and had less cross-party appeal than any candidates in recent memory. The close balance between Democrats and Republicans meant it was the swing voters' election to decide; the difficulty they faced in doing so is one reason why the game went into extra innings.
- The most interesting part of the campaign was the three-way race for the loyalty of those independent voters attracted to the idea of reform—a cross-party contest between John McCain and Bill Bradley. McCain's victory over Bradley in open primaries as well as in the opinion polls meant that Bush would have competition only on his left, and Gore would have no competition at all.
- The rules governing primary elections continue to skew presidential elections in unhappy ways. Ceaser and Busch note three problems, which appear to be semi-permanent: the extreme front-loading of the primary season; the large number of open and blanket primaries; and the absurdly long "interregnum" between the effective end of the primary season and the party conventions, when the "real" campaign is supposed to begin. This long hiatus, they conclude, gave Gore a chance to "reinvent" himself one time too many, but played to one of Bush's strengths, which was his patience.

In some ways, however, the finest hour for Ceaser and Busch comes in their analysis of the long postelection crisis. Their summary is much more comprehensive than the shorter version found in William Crotty's chapter ("Elections by Judicial Fiat: The Courts Decide"); and it is far more judicious than either Crotty's chapter or the contribution by John Kenneth White. Disgruntled Democrats will want to confront the careful case that Ceaser and Busch make for the justice of the final outcome—especially their discussion of the competing interventions of the Florida and the United States Supreme Courts (pp. 171–212).

The authors of *The Perfect Tie* are thus not persuaded that the Bush presidency has begun under a cloud of public suspicion. After all, winning the electoral college while losing the popular vote is a legitimate way to win the presidency. Far more dangerous, in their view, would have been an effort to recount every vote in Florida in the absence of objective standards for determining voter intent.

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By contrast, Crotty concludes that "through it all, a sense of the political fragility and vulnerability of the most fundamental of institutions in the world's oldest democracy emerged from the conflict" (p. 37). Yet in light of the government's response to the attacks in September, this judgment now seems overly dramatic, even hysterical. Equally doubtful is White's conclusion in his chapter that "although Bush is the duly-elected president in the eyes of the law and the Constitution, his ability to govern is likely to be severely impaired by the refusal of so many Americans to confirm him as president in their hearts" (p. 183). Either the election did not seem so outrageous to so many people after all, or the public's faith in the basic fairness of the system and the normality of court interventions is stronger than it appeared in December. What is undeniable is that the voices in both camps urging caution and restraint saved the country from a catastrophe whose full dimensions September 11 has made frighteningly clear.

DENNIS HALE
Boston College

Presidential Mandates: How Elections Shape the National Agenda *by Patricia Heidotting Conley. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2001. 239 pp. Paper, $17.50.*

For years I have taught the common wisdom about "mandate uncertainty" in presidential elections. Because newly elected presidents cannot discern from the returns alone which of many possible factors is responsible for their victory—their stand on any one of many issues, the mediocre performance of their predecessor, their reputation for unimpeachable integrity, their opponent's lackluster campaign, and so on—they have considerable latitude in claiming a mandate for proposed policy departures.

Patricia Conley's cogent book forces us to rethink the received wisdom on the important subject of the relationship between presidential elections and policy change. Using several approaches, she argues that newly elected presidents do not have considerable latitude in claiming a mandate. Instead, their options are constrained. The likelihood that a newly elected president will claim a mandate will depend more on the extensiveness of his ambitions for a policy innovation, the decisiveness of his electoral victory, and the partisan and ideological composition of Congress than on his personality or political skills. In short, structural regularities come to the fore and individual characteristics of presidents recede in the explanation of variations in mandate claiming by new presidents.

A real strength of Conley's analysis is her use of multiple approaches. She begins by putting her logic in the form of a formal model, complete with the math. Then, she uses multivariate analysis and data about presidential elections

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as far back as 1828 to test her logic, and she shows that mandate claims are more likely either when the president's victory is decisive or when the president's victory is more modest but his party dominates Congress. Finally, she uses archival material to present brief cases studies of three kinds of postelection outcomes.

Unfortunately, crucial parts of the model are hard to measure systematically. Most importantly, how do we know when a mandate has been claimed? Conley gives only vague criteria for when a mandate has been claimed and no criteria at all for gauging how much policy change the mandate claimer actually seeks. The illustrative statements she quotes from mandate claimers are gleaned from extensive reading, but they do not represent any kind of systematic assessment of postelection statements by either winners or the media. To illustrate the potential for confusion, Conley states that "In 1888, when Benjamin Harrison defeated incumbent, Grover Cleveland, his victory was interpreted as a victory for protectionism because Cleveland had been devoted to lowering the tariff" (pp. 43–44). However, Harrison actually lost the popular vote in 1888, and the election of 1888 is not listed as one in which a mandate was claimed.

The 1980 election is relevant here: Ronald Reagan's margin was much larger than expected but was far less decisive than Richard Nixon's victory in 1972. Conley argues that after an election, a common interpretation emerges automatically, as the inside-the-beltway types produce "a collective conventional wisdom" (p. 33) about its meaning. However, at least within political science, there was no consensus as to whether Reagan's victory reflected issue voting for policy change in a conservative direction or retrospective voting in disapproval of the economic and foreign policy failures of the Carter administration. Because he had an issue agenda about which he cared and because he commanded formidable political skills, Reagan was able to claim a mandate and in spite of divided control of Congress, to preside over a major policy departure. In the end, while Conley's model makes an important contribution in clarifying the structural factors that constrain presidential options for claiming a mandate, we should not overlook the significance of the president's character and skills.

KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN
Boston College

John Adams *by David McCullough. New York, Simon & Schuster, 2001. 751 pp. $35.00.*

For generations, John Adams languished at the shallow end of the gene pool of American heroes. Obstinate, egocentric, irascible, he personified the cramped conservation of New England federalism. Defeated for a second term by

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Thomas Jefferson, he became the first president to boycott his successor's inauguration, a fact that speaks volumes about Adams's sorehead attitude toward life in general and politics in particular. Adams left the presidency in disgrace, his administration pilloried for passage of the odious Alien and Sedition Acts and an equally ill considered last-minute attempt to pack the federal judiciary.

David McCullough, the nation's preeminent popular biographer, attempts to resurrect Adams's reputation, proving that no president is beyond historical redemption. The result is a chatty tale, pursued in such tedious detail that it strains even McCullough's admirable prose, but sheds little insight into the early years of the republic. There is delightful scene setting and costuming, but scarcely any analysis of the issues of the day or the economic and social context in which great events took place. In short, there is less here than meets the eye. McCullough has provided a loving portrait of the man who became the second president, but there is insufficient texture to make it meaningful.

McCullough makes extensive use of the voluminous Adams family papers, and there is commendable attention to getting the quotations right. Fortunately for McCullough, the Adamses wrote well. Drawn to a life of books and scholarship, their correspondence sparkles with wit, clarity, and candor. Yet the letters that passed between Adams and his family, or later with Jefferson, cannot substitute for an author's careful analysis of historic context. The last two chapters of *John Adams* suffer especially from lengthy quotations with minimal textural explication—as if McCullough had become weary of his task.

The question of emphasis nags throughout. McCullough devotes twelve pages to Adams's shipboard experience crossing the Atlantic in 1778, but less than two to the Alien and Sedition Acts. The appearance of Admiral Richard Lord Howe is set forth in exquisite detail, yet the dispute over the Bank of the United States and the subsequent formation of American political parties merits only five lines. A 1786 tour of English gardens by Adams and Jefferson lingers for five pages whereas the Treaty of Paris that established American independence, and which Adams helped negotiate, is dismissed almost cursorily.

How well McCullough understands the history of the founding of the republic is open to question. Take the Treaty of Paris. Great Britain granted United States independence but only in return for repayment of the debts owed by Americans to English creditors and the restitution of British property that had been confiscated. These issues roiled American politics for the next twenty years, delaying British withdrawal from the Northwest Territory and necessitating two additional treaties with Great Britain, to saying nothing of the subsequent supremacy clause of the Constitution making treaties the supreme law of the land. McCullough virtually ignores the issue, though it did as much as anything to topple Adams and the Federalists.

In like manner, the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, drafted by Jefferson and passed in response to the Alien and Sedition Acts, are scarcely alluded to, though they contributed enormously to states rights doctrine that culminated in secession in 1861. Adams's political thought is also shortchanged. McCullough

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seems unaware of the link between the Sedition Act and the British common law tradition of seditious libel and prior restraint. Like many American lawyers trained in the common law, Adams failed to recognize that the Bill of Rights went far beyond the legal protections afforded Englishmen. Freedom of speech and of the press, the separation of church and state, prohibitions against double jeopardy and fictitious indictments, the requirement for grand jury and the right to remain silent clothe the individual American with rights unknown at common law. Even Thomas Jefferson, despite his liberal virtues, was unable to comprehend that the Constitution abolished the common law rule of constructive treason and substituted a much narrower test.

This is biography for the coffee tables of America—a book written to be sold and not read. The numbing accumulation of trivia that substitutes for insight and analysis suggests that one should look elsewhere for an understanding of the important role Adams played in history.

JEAN EDWARD SMITH
Marshall University

Tip O'Neill and the Democratic Century *by John A. Farrell. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 2001. 784 pp. $29.95.*

Jack Farrell, prize-winning Washington editor of The Boston Globe, has written a biography as big as his subject—and Tip O'Neill had to search long and hard to find a size 52 stout mourning coat to wear to Ronald Reagan's 1981 inauguration.

Farrell traces his subject's roots back many generations to Ireland through immigration to the United States and socialization into American political culture, and through childhood and young adult experiences that led to a political life. He provides details of Irish life in North Cambridge, distinguishing that experience from those of the Fitzgeralds and the Kennedys across the Charles River in Boston. Farrell's descriptions are rich and powerful and poignant.

But what truly distinguishes this work is implied in the subtitle. This is not a book just about Tip O'Neill; it is also a book about politics, Democratic politics through the period in which the Democrats dominated the American political scene from the 1930s to the 1980s. For the serious student of American politics, the stories are familiar. However, Farrell collects them in one place and reminds us of the importance of certain events and of certain pivotal figures. For those less familiar with these events, Farrell's eloquent style captures personalities and events in a way sure to enthrall. His research is exhaustive. Much of his material comes from the O'Neill papers, but he worked with archival materials from most of the other political leaders about whom he writes; and he conducted over 200 interviews, though unfortunately none with O'Neill, who had died before this book was begun. He is also thoroughly familiar with

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the political science and journalistic literature on the Congress, the presidency, elections, and the men and women about whom he writes.

Much of what we see relates to Massachusetts; we are reminded that the most Democratic state in the union was not always such. Tip O'Neill led the charge of the Democrats (and of Irish Democrats) to wrest power from the dominant Repubican Brahmins. We look back at the civil rights movement in the north, at Louise Day Hicks and the extent to which the issue of bussing dominated the political landscape. We recall that the Massachusetts Irish are not a monolithic bunch, that there were real conflicts between the Kennedys and the McCormacks—and that O'Neill never really felt accepted by the Kennedy clan.

The titans on the national level, particularly those in the Congress, are paraded before us in revealing vignettes—the powerful Sam Rayburn and his two less successful successors John McCormack (O'Neill's sponsor whose career achievements O'Neill clearly eclipsed) and Carl Albert; the rivals for power in the House at midcentury, Hale Boggs, Dick Bolling, Phil Burton, Jim Wright, Dan Rostenkowski. We learn important lessons about the House as an institution, about leadership, about struggles for power, and about luck and timing. We gain important insights into Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and especially Ronald Reagan, from the perspective of a legislative leader who worked with and against them. We even come to understand how it was possible for O'Neill to fight Reagan on so many issues, to chafe at how Reagan had forgotten his roots, while O'Neill's were so important to him, but still to sit down and to swap Irish stories after the day's work was completed.

If this masterful biography has a flaw, it might well be that, immersed as he was in his subject, Farrell has lost some objectivity. While he criticizes O'Neill and his performance at various points, the criticism is always tempered with praise: "In a lifetime in politics he'd gouged eyes, thrown elbows, bent the law and befriended rogues and thieves. He could be mean and small-minded. But at his core there lay a magnificence of spirit, deep compassion and rock-hard set of values" (p. 541). But perhaps even that slight flaw is understandable. For, as Democratic pollster Peter Hart concludes about O'Neill, "He knew what his party was all about, what it had to be and ought to be. . . . He was a remarkable leader in a time that couldn't have been worse for the Democrats" (p. 677). And this is a most praiseworthy book about that leader and the times in which he lived.

L. SANDY MAISEL
Colby College

War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals *by David Halberstam. New York, Scribner, 2001. 543 pp. $28.00.*

While this is not an analysis of the Clinton administration's overall foreign policies, it is the best detailed account available of the administration's love/

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hate relationship with military interventionism that was both possible and—in the view of some, such as Madeleine Albright—necessary in the post-cold war world. Halberstam's account is important not only for its in-depth analysis of the Balkan tragedies between 1993 and 1999, but especially because it is based on nearly 150 personal interviews in which many interviewees set out to settle personal scores.

The personal rivalries are well developed, most notably the decades-long clash of ambitions between Anthony Lake, head of the National Security Council, 1993–1997, and Richard Holbrooke, a friend of Halberstam who emerges as a hero. The emphasis is not on bureaucratic or organizational politics, but on rivalries shaped by personalities and, within narrow limits, ideologies. The mistrust and sometimes bitter dislike of U.S. military officials for their commander-in-chief run like a red thread through the narrative. Nor is the Pentagon's anger focused only on civilians. General Wesley Clark's meteoric military career climaxed when he commanded the surprisingly triumphant air war against Serbia in 1999. But Clark's constant demand to intensify the war and bring down Slobodan Milosevic (whom Clark personally despised), even if it meant deploying ground troops, put him at cross-purposes with the Pentagon officials, who were frightened of another Vietnam, and the White House, frightened of anything that might be politically embarrassing. Americans just cannot seem to kick the Vietnam syndrome. The rapidly growing mistrust culminated when the Pentagon deftly forced Clark to retire and, according to top West-Wing officials, misled Clinton into thinking Clark was merely being rotated to another plum job. With good reason, Halberstam indicates that in this particularly brutal version of Washington politics, the Pentagon officers rid themselves of a highly capable commander who was not one of the boys. Clark was, after all, a Rhodes Scholar, which made him instantly suspect among some of the military. The White House was either hypocritical or incompetent in declaring it did not realize what was going on.

Halberstam makes clear that the victory over Serbia in 1999 was largely due to new air force technology that was far advanced over the weapons used against Iraq in 1991. The administration that blundered into the Somalia catastrophe in 1993 had not, according to this account, improved greatly by 1999, but the high-tech weapons had nevertheless saved it. Clinton had begun his first term by telling Congressman Lee Hamilton that Americans, other than a few journalists, did not care about foreign policy, so he intended to concentrate on domestic affairs. After the 1999 success over Serbia, Senator Joe Biden told Clinton, "Congratulations—you've got your sea legs" (p. 480.) Seven years into the President's tenure, the words drip with irony.

There is little or nothing on NAFTA, the World Trade Organization, Middle East negotiations, the President's uncommon devotion to globalization, or even NATO expansion and Iraqi policies (which historians may judge the greatest of Clinton's failures.) But this is the place to begin for an understanding of what the President liked to think was the Clinton Doctrine—a doctrine for

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interventionism, which Halberstam sees as concealing a clash of personalities and policies that often prevented Americans from seizing post-cold war opportunities to help create a better world order.

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies *by Dennis Kux. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. 470 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $22.95.*

The incredible thing about U.S.–Pakistan relations is that it keeps coming back. In June 2001, Pakistan was just another nuisance to Washington. The Bush administration was looking to build a new relationship with India, even at the cost of relations with Pakistan. President Bill Clinton's *yatra* (journey) to the region in 2000 featured five glorious days in India and five gloomy hours in Islamabad. September 11 altered the calculations one more time.

Each time Pakistan has been abandoned by the United States, geopolitics has forced American attention back to it. The last "upisode" in relations was prompted by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan received billions of dollars of American military and economic assistance (much of it destined for the Afghan *mujahidin*), support for its sterile military dictatorship, and a wink on nuclear proliferation. It was also a period that sowed the seeds of radical Islamic terrorism. Following Soviet withdrawal and disintegration, Pakistan returned to Washington's list of mild headaches.

In his comprehensive history of U.S.–Pakistan relations, Dennis Kux captures the essence of this seesaw ride. When freedom arrived in the subcontinent in 1947, Pakistan's leaders quickly recognized the importance of having a solid relationship with the United States, but were rebuffed by the Truman administration, which preferred the promise of a secular India over the reality of a religion-driven Pakistan. Kux writes of U.S. diplomats stationed in the region being repeatedly overruled by Washington on more favorable American policy toward Pakistan.

During the Eisenhower presidency, with the cold war under way, Washington switched gears to make Pakistan "America's most allied ally in Asia" and initiated a program of military assistance. By this time, the country had experienced its first military coup, but it hardly mattered: Ike, as Kux writes, liked Ayub (Khan, Pakistan's then-president and coup leader).

The Democratic administrations that followed, however, preferred India's vibrant, model Third World democracy over Pakistan's military dictatorship. Though Ayub managed to impress the Kennedys more than Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru during their respective visits to Washington, the arc of history pointed away from Pakistan. In 1965, as Pakistan fought a war with In-

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dia, President Lyndon Johnson stopped the shipment of weapons and military supplies to both countries. The move hurt Pakistan more (it was more dependent on American military supplies) and originated Pakistani distrust of American friendship. The following decade saw a similar pattern: the Nixon–Kissinger plan to open China was sealed through the good offices of Pakistan, but was followed by a low point under the Carter presidency. Had the Soviets not invaded Afghanistan in 1980, U.S.–Pakistan relations might not have recovered.

If the United States is going to be engaged in the region—particularly with Pakistan—for the long term, this involvement has to be both stable and stabilizing. Kux explains the seesaw ride in President Zia-ul Haq's shrewd observation that Pakistan and the United States were in a "union of unequals" (p. 361), which meant that one had global interests, while the other was limited to its neighborhood. The lessons of Kux's book should help reconcile these unmatched grand strategic perspectives and enable a more lasting relationship between the United States and Pakistan.

Kux has a long association with the region, first as a foreign service officer and, following his retirement, as a remarkable diplomatic historian. *Disenchanted Allies* complements his accompanying volume on U.S.–India relations (*Estranged Democracies*, 1993). Together, the two constitute a body of work that will continue to inform policy makers and provide valuable historical material for political scientists seeking explanations for what makes and unmakes relationships between "unequal" countries.

SUNIL DASGUPTA
Brookings Institution

The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia *by Alan Collins. New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000. 237 pp. $46.50.*

This book raises questions about the nature of security relations in the major areas of Southeast Asia while effectively demonstrating the limited utility of the security dilemma in the Southeast Asian context. As such, it is a valuable contribution to the literature on the region. Collins takes a refreshingly balanced view of emerging China, a welcome contrast to the many recent alarmist analyses on this question. However, he fails to develop some of the theoretical implications of his argument.

According to Collins: "(t)he security dilemma describes a situation in which war can occur between two or more participants where none of those involved desired such an outcome" (p. 3). In an anarchical international environment, states provide their own security. If one state increases its military power, other states must match this increase to ensure their own security. This dynamic

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causes a competitive security spiral. The tragedy is that no state may have aggressive intentions, but uncertainty causes all to act in ways that may cause conflict. Collins reviews the development of the security dilemma and applies it to Southeast Asia, emphasizing the illusion of conflict as a key part of the concept.

The book is divided into three parts: intrastate security dilemma, interstate security dilemma, and state-induced security dilemma. Part I applies the security dilemma to tensions between the state and ethnic groups within its borders. The dilemma applies where the state and ethnic groups have an unjustified fear that the other is hostile to its continued existence or identity. Part II examines the security dilemma between the states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Collins credits the "ASEAN way," ASEAN's method of interaction, with mitigating the effects of the security dilemma. The ASEAN way embodies a commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, respect for state sovereignty, and consensual decision making. Part III explores the relationship between China and ASEAN. Collins argues that these states have avoided the security dilemma due to their shared need to prevent conflict. He is optimistic about the rise of China as a benign regional hegemon. In Parts II and III, however, Collins emphasizes that ongoing circumstances—such as tensions in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis—may provoke latent security dilemmas.

Collins's application of the security dilemma to state-ethnic tensions in Southeast Asia is the most novel part of his analysis. However, it is not clear how to determine whether the antagonism between states and ethnic groups is illusory and, therefore, a security dilemma. Collins recognizes the difficulties facing weak states that are trying to develop coherent national identities. His prescription—introducing greater autonomy and respect for ethnic groups—can be reached without resort to a security dilemma analysis.

In Part II, Collins describes ASEAN's concept of regional resilience as important to intra-ASEAN comity: the national resilience (stability and prosperity of each ASEAN state) reinforces the security of all. In practice, national resilience is linked to state-building. Collins uses Indonesia's efforts to exemplify what not to do during the process; yet "regional resilience" originates with Indonesia. Thus, there is a tension between Parts I and II of *Security Dilemmas* that Collins does not develop.

Finally, the book raises interesting theoretical issues that merit greater development. Collins's analysis demonstrates that numerous factors mitigate the effects of the security dilemma in Southeast Asia. This suggests that the security dilemma may be far less pervasive in the international system as a whole than realists commonly accept.

SHAUN NARINE
University of British Columbia

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Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network *by James Der Derian. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 2001. 249 pp. $26.00.*

James Der Derian has written a postmodern travelogue of his ventures into what he calls MIME-NET, the military-industrial-media-entertainment complex. The chronicler begins his journey at the National Training Center (NTC) in California and continues on to peace operation exercises in Germany, conferences showing off military software in Florida, and the offices of the financial and intellectual backers of research into the revolution in military affairs (RMA). The scenery is the relationships between politics, war, and what Der Derian refers to as the means of reproduction, or the new media. For notional traveling companions, Der Derian takes along French and German cultural theorists who comment on the ways in which new technologies and media are said to shape reality and how politics, in turn, appears to mimic art and culture.

Der Derian argues that "the sanitization of violence" misleads publics and policy makers regarding the reality of war (p. xvi). In his view, this process began with the Gulf War and then permeated Western approaches to communal wars around the globe. He also claims to strive for a "virtual theory" of military strategy and ethical issues surrounding the future of war. Specifically, he claims there is a wide chasm between the power of technology and the ethical questions that it begs. Virtuous war seems to relate both to the recent uses of U.S. power to stop murderous regimes and to notions that war can indeed be virtuous. Der Derian thinks it cannot.

The centerpiece of his case is simulation. In theory this is everything from movies about war to computer games that simulate it, but in practice he focuses on military exercises. Der Derian claims simulations such as those at the NTC distance the theory and planning of war from its real violence and chaos, reducing "the ethnical question of killing to a matter of maximizing efficiency" (p. 14). Taken to the extreme, Der Derian argues, one may arrive at the genocidal mentality of a Slobodan Milosevic or a Timothy McVeigh.

Genocide occurred before simulation and mass media, however, and is frequently carried out in societies least affected by technology. More to the point, U.S. military leaders and grunts alike appear to use technology effectively and to have a healthy respect for the reality of war. Also, NTC-like training was critical to success in the Gulf War, and peace enforcement exercises in Europe helped enormously in Bosnia and elsewhere. A host of simulations helped the United States to secure effective victories in the first stages of the Afghan War, as well as to get the humanitarian effort off the ground.

Der Derian is at his best when relating fresh insights into the works of classics by Bacon, Nietzsche, and Machiavelli. He moves with ease between these, the social critics, and a series of interviews with movers in the military and policy worlds. For a post-modernist, Der Derian is a delightful writer with a sense of humor and self-irony. He also rejects the notion that critical thinkers should not tackle policy and hard issues.

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In the end, however, the anecdotes and intellectual juxtapositions do not add up to a convincing argument about either the mimetic relationship between technology and war or its moral bankruptcy. Secretary of Defense William Cohen's interest in simulation is reduced to the notion that "information plus technology equals security" (p. 115). Research into the RMA is viewed merely as the means for creating threats. John Hamre is cited as an example of what happens when mistaken notions about virtuous war are used on the homefront. Unfortunately, Hamre was warning in April 2000 that a terrorist attack might be "absolutely the most stressful thing to confront the country since the War of 1812" (p. 123).

A sequel to this book might correct some of the hyperbole and highlight the more insightful connections that Der Derian makes during his intellectual travels, which are always stimulating and provocative. Otherwise one would be tempted to conclude that cyberwar's first casualty is truth.

JOHN GAROFANO
Harvard University

Tabloid Justice: Criminal Justice in an Age of Media Frenzy *by Richard L. Fox and Robert W. Van Sickel. Boulder, CO, Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2001. 223 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $22.00.*

At no point in American history have so many criminal cases been brought to public attention by mass media as in the last decade. Beginning with the William Kennedy Smith trial in 1991, escalating during the O. J. Simpson case in 1995, and continuing with the trials of Lorena Bobbitt, the Menendez brothers, Jonbenet Ramsey's killer, and countless others, the increased attention to the criminal justice system is one of the most significant trends in news coverage. Scholarly investigation into this phenomenon, however, has not kept pace. Fox and Van Sickel's work is a much needed exploration into media coverage and audience reaction to high-profile criminal cases. The authors take a comprehensive approach, as they examine the tabloid justice phenomenon within the context of the current mass media system, evaluate the content of landmark media trials over time, and assess the effect of tabloid justice on public attitudes and opinions.

Fox and Van Sickel argue that the press's foray into criminal justice is an extension of the tabloidization of news that has come to characterize American media, and as such it is driven by commercial interests. Prime-time television news magazines devote substantial time to criminal justice stories and work in conjunction with national news broadcasts to ignite feeding frenzies around trials that can last for months, even years. The new media environment of cable television, talk shows, and online sources contributes to frenzies, as pundits seek career-making exposure and invite the public to join the debate. Main-

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stream media have followed the lead of more entertainment-orientated venues in portraying the criminal justice system resulting in a uniformity of coverage that features drama, personalization, and scandal.

The authors' analysis of the audience for criminal justice media is perhaps the most significant contribution of the project. There is much speculation about whether increased media exposure to criminal cases educates citizens about the judicial process, with some alleging that it contributes to enhanced knowledge. However, empirical evidence to test these propositions is scant. To fill this gap, Fox and Van Sickel conducted a national survey in 1999 that focused on the public's awareness of seven high-profile criminal cases and related attitudes toward the criminal justice system. They found that people are highly conscious of high-profile criminal cases and claim that their knowledge of the criminal justice system has increased as a result of heightened coverage. However, the proliferation of misinformation and the trivialization of criminal trials provide the public with a distorted view of the system. Further, public exposure to most tabloid justice cases results in diminished confidence in the criminal justice system, judges, juries, and prosecuting attorneys. Tabloid justice also undermines people's belief that they will be treated fairly by the system. Fox and Van Sickel conclude, "Lacking both a responsible press and an engaged and civic-minded public, these cases have not provided the much-needed forum for a meaningful civic discussion of important criminal justice issues" (p. 146).

Tabloid Justice is noteworthy for its appeal to multiple audiences. Clearly written and accessible, it is well-suited for classroom use and is certain to generate much student discussion. In addition, Fox and Van Sickel present serious audience analysis research in this volume that is sure to be of interest to communications scholars, political scientists, and journalists. This work lays a strong foundation upon which other research should build.

DIANA OWEN
Georgetown University

Presidents and Prime Ministers: Conviction Politics in the Anglo-American Tradition *by Patricia Lee Sykes. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2000. 416 pp. $45.00.*

The origin and core of Sykes's study is the relationship between Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, both undeniably conviction politicians who dominated the politics and transformed the political agenda of their respective countries in the 1980s. Sykes's extensive examination of the parallels, differences, and complementary relationship between these two neoliberals in "conservative" clothing is thorough and illuminating (particularly in Chapter 9, "The Global Arena"). It is from these recent examples that Sykes derives her thesis that con-

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viction politicians rather than parties are the main instruments of ideological adaptation in both the United States and Britain.

Sykes defines a conviction politician as one who exercises "strong leadership based on pursuing principle . . . and infusing political discourse with meaning that transcends 'politics as usual'" (p. 1). She takes a more negative view of political parties than is common among political scientists, viewing them as the vehicles for "politics as usual" and as constraints on conviction leaders (Chapter 6), while the media, with their focus on personality, facilitate conviction leadership (Chapter 7). To test her thesis Sykes extends her study back in time to examine three other roughly contemporary pairs of leaders: Andrew Jackson and Robert Peel in the 1830s, Grover Cleveland and William Gladstone in the 1880s, Woodrow Wilson and David Lloyd George in the 1910s.

The thesis is an interesting and original one. An obvious difficulty, however, is that neither of the leaders who brought about the most significant ideological adaptations was a conviction politician. Franklin Roosevelt was the ultimate pragmatist whose response to crisis transformed his party, the presidency, and the public philosophy. Clement Attlee was the consummate party leader whose reassuring presence held his party together as it transformed British ideology in a social democratic direction after World War II.

A quick review of Sykes's leaders also suggests that the relationship between leaders, parties, and ideological adaptation is a complex one. Jackson and Peel both shattered politics as usual, but Jackson's lasting legacy was the Democratic party, while Peel consigned his party to the wilderness for a generation. Like his mentor Peel, Gladstone first built a party and eventually split it through the force of his political conviction. Cleveland, a man of rectitude rather than conviction, was a conventional Jacksonian whose failure to adapt ideologically sent his party back to minority status for twenty years. Wilson almost succeeded in adapting his party and the presidency to the needs of the industrial age before conviction turned to rigidity over America's role in the postwar world. Lloyd George split his party out of ambition not principle, depriving himself of the vehicle that might have enabled him to bring about a "new deal" adaptation of liberal ideology after 1929.

Sykes's analysis stimulates arguments like these, and she concedes the difficulty of extending a thesis drawn from recent politics back into a different political universe. Another strand of her argument is her insistence throughout on the similarities between the American and British systems rather than the familiar differences. This seems overstated in a couple of important respects: it is misleading to focus solely on liberal ideology in Britain where, unlike the United States, both conservative and social democratic ideas have played a formative role. U.S. presidents have been largely unconstrained by party in the twentieth century, but parties continue to play a central role in Britain, as Margaret Thatcher discovered when her own party abruptly ended her career.

GEORGE BRECKENRIDGE
McMaster University

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Shades of Citizenship: Race and the Census in Modern Politics *by Melissa Nobles. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2000. 248 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $16.95.*

Bushmanders and Bullwinkles: How Politicians Manipulate Electronic Maps and Census Data to Win Elections *by Mark Monmonier. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2001. 208 pp. $25.00.*

These volumes take very different perspectives on the census. Monmonier brings the interests and training of a geographer to the task of explicating the major consequences of the census for U.S. legislative districting. While this topic is widely studied by political scientists, that is not his approach, and he goes so far as to urge librarians and book sellers not to categorize his effort with political science books. Nobles, although a political scientist, brings the concerns of the demographer to her study of how race has been handled in the U.S. and Brazilian censuses. The authors share a common interest in documenting that the activities they observe are not strictly administrative but instead have political consequences and are used to promote political agendas.

That redistricting is highly political—some might say the most political activity of a legislature—will come as news only to the most naive. A larger number of readers may be surprised to learn that the racial categories defined by the census are political decisions. This, however, is a key point for Nobles. Census officials typically profess that all they are doing is counting and that their goal is to be as thorough and objective in that task as possible. Nobles challenges the adequacy of this bean-counter explanation and demonstrates that census treatment of race makes it a party to the debate over race in the broader society. This was particularly true during the last century in the United States, when eugenicists succeeded in getting mulatto included as a category in order to test theories that involved comparing biracial individuals with the racially pure.

Despite sharing a basic interest in showing the politics behinds the decisions they study, the two volumes cover little common subject matter. They intersect at the point of considering efforts to expand the range of racial categories available on the U.S. census. Nobles devotes half of one of her five chapters to the American multiracial movement, while Monmonier spends five pages on the decision to increase options for showing multiethnic origins and reviews arguments for and against that decision.

Bushmanders and Bullwinkles provides a thorough primer on redistricting. The author explains a range of topics that trigger widespread interest at the beginning of each decade as the results of the census are turned into decisions about representation. Often the explanations include a history lesson, as when Monmonier describes the various formulas that have been used to reapportion seats among states. The thorough descriptions include an explanation of the Alabama paradox, where if the size of the House were increased by one seat, Alabama would lose a seat.

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Monmonier's training as a geographer shows in the numerous, detailed maps included in this volume. Where a political scientist might be tempted to illustrate a point with a table, Monmonier turns to his specialty and provides one or more maps. The author also makes effective use of hypotheticals as when he shows how a geographic information systems program goes about drawing a compact district that minimizes population differences.

The primary controversy of districting in the 1990s, the racial gerrymander, receives extensive attention. The challenges to the use of race to create additional districts with either an African-American or an Hispanic majority that reached the Supreme Court are reviewed with accompanying maps to illustrate the kinds of shapes produced. Measures of compactness, a factor that took on heightened significance in the challenges launched in the mid-1990s to the racial gerrymanders, are clearly explained, again with multiple maps.

Other topics that are deftly explained are the undercount, incumbent protection, and how geographical information systems—the technology used in redistricting since 1990—operate. The author also explores alternatives that have been proposed as being fairer to minorities, such as proportional representation and multimember districts combined with cumulative voting.

Redistricting is not among Nobles's concerns and the term does not appear in the index to her book. Much of her effort is a comparative history of the census in the United States and Brazil. She shows how during the course of the twentieth century Brazil went from a nation that professed to take no consideration of race other than to claim that it was becoming whiter to a land in which there is a significant effort to acknowledge racial differences and especially to do a full count of its black citizens. In contrast, the United States, which many Brazilian officials disparaged in the past for its racial violence, has come to acknowledge more openly its racial variations than has the South American nation.

Nobles sees a parallel in the multiracial movement in the United States and the black movement in Brazil as both seek greater precision in how their census measures race. In the United States, the push has been to acknowledge the existence of a multiracial population rather than force respondents to fit into a few categories. In Brazil, the effort goes in the opposite direction, as a country that prided itself for avoiding the racial tensions that plagued the United States now confronts attempts to get blacks to acknowledge their African heritage and separate themselves from a more socially acceptable multiracial category.

Careful attention is given to how racial and ethnic categories are defined. Among the few tables is one that shows the racial categories used in the United States census from 1850 to 1990. A second table provides similar information for Brazil from 1872 to 1991. For both countries, Nobles explains the significance of the inclusion or deletion of categories and the debates surrounding the choice of specific terms.

CHARLES S. BULLOCK III
University of Georgia

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Color Lines: Affirmative Action, Immigration, and Civil Rights Options for America *edited by John David Skrentny. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2001. 363 pp. Paper, $18.00.*

John David Skrentny, author of the excellent book, *The Ironies of Affirmative Action* (1996), has assembled a superb collection of fourteen essays from a distinguished group of scholars who come from all sides of the affirmative action debate. The papers make three particular contributions.

The authors look unblinkingly at the degree to which immigration has complicated the affirmative action debate—an issue not even mentioned in the Clinton administration's review of affirmative action policies. Hugh Davis Graham's chapter probes whether a program whose moral authority stems from America's mistreatment of blacks should be used to benefit minorities who are recent immigrants. This practice is particularly troublesome when immigrants use the language of "under-representation" as a sword against blacks who are, for example, over-represented by a factor of four in the U.S. Postal Service. Nor is it clear, George La Noue and John Sullivan note, why Korean Americans, who rank number one in business formation among sixty American ancestry groups, should be included in some government set-aside programs. Even the widespread effort to affirmatively hire blacks in ghetto stores in order to better reflect the customer base often ends up aiding immigrants. Jennifer Lee's research on New York City employers, for example, found they often prefer hiring Carribean and West African blacks to American-born blacks.

On the flip side, should recent immigrants whose ancestors are not to blame for slavery and segregation bear the burden of making room for under-represented minorities? John Aubrey Douglass's chapter notes that at the University of California, Asian-American students were disproportionately hurt by affirmative action policies and disproportionately benefited from its repeal. Because Asian Americans as a group are far more academically prepared than other ethnic groups, European Americans have actually been under-represented at the University of California in recent years, he notes.

The collection sheds light on the much-neglected question of how other countries have handled the affirmative action dilemma. Sunita Parikh's chapter notes that India's longstanding program of preferences for lower castes was saved by adding economic criterion so that the policy could no longer benefit the most advantaged within beneficiary castes at the expense of the poorest members of more privileged castes. Steven Teles notes that in Britain, working people "are not broken down into different constituencies, with possible conflicting interests," and that "special dispensation based on race" is not part of the mainstream dialogue (p. 260). Erik Bleich writes that in France, a nation which experienced the horrors of Nazism, the left wants nothing to do with race-conscious programs and instead pursues a color-blind model that unites different ethnic groups behind a highly egalitarian welfare state.

In the area of public opinion, the essays take us beyond the unhelpful single-shot question on affirmative action (are you for it or against it?) to probe

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the often conflicting responses. Americans are essentially torn about affirmative action: they don't like the blunt instrument of racial preference but, Carol Swain and her coauthors find in a series of focus groups, they support race-blind need-based policies. "A majority of members in each group seemed to concur with the general public that poor people, regardless of race or ethnicity, should be among the beneficiaries of affirmative action" (p. 227).

In all, the book makes an important contribution to the scholarship on affirmative action, adding to our knowledge about the complexity introduced by immigrants, the experience of nations abroad, and the nuances of public opinion. It remains to be seen whether policy makers, bound by interest group and business pressure, will listen.

RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG
The Century Foundation

Ending Welfare As We Know It *by R. Kent Weaver. Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 482 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

Historically, welfare has been a lightening rod for broader political divisions in the United States, serving as a touchstone for commitment to either the market or the state as the ultimate arbiter of who should get what, most especially in economic terms. Overlaid with class, race, and gender divisions, the politics of welfare has for much of the country's history proved basically intractable. Numerous commentators have provided a dreary recitation of polar positions between those who want to insist on the priority of allowing markets to determine how and to what extent people will procure their self-support versus those who want to protect those who are at risk of being marginalized by the excessives of capitalism. In recent decades, one reform attempt after another went down to defeat, caught between the polarizing poles of the lightening rod of welfare politics. How did welfare finally get so dramatically reformed with the passage in 1996 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act? This is the question posed in Kent Weaver's latest book, an ambitious, comprehensive, detailed examination of the process that led to the passage of this historic legislation.

Weaver frames his knowledgeable study by suggesting that welfare has often been trapped in dilemmas—in particular, the dual clientele trap of helping children and not rewarding parents who should be working. There is also the money trap that it takes increased expenditures to facilitate families' movement off welfare and eventually reduce the welfare burden to government. He adds that structural constraints in the political economy, the political system, the public opinion cycle have added their own complications. He notes, however, how structural changes began to make conditions more ripe for reform in the early 1990s, especially as welfare burdens came to appear more intolera-

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ble and less defensible. Conservative campaigning to market key ideas—often propped up by think-tank studies of varying levels of credibility—underscored welfare dependency as a supposedly real condition that needed to be weeded out, thereby shifting the focus from poverty reduction to reducing reliance on welfare as the primary responsibility of social welfare policy. Yet, Weaver is at pains to say that structure and ideas, while important, were together not enough to bring about the dramatic reforms of 1996. Instead, something more was needed—the unpredictability of political contingency wrought as it was by the distinctive political circumstances of the Clinton years. No, it was not Monica Lewinsky so much as it was something more fundamental: New Democrat presidency of William Jefferson Clinton in combination with other distinctive features of the politics of that time added the extra charge needed to finally break the welfare reform log-jam and put the dramatic changes of 1996 over the top.

This book not only has a sophisticated frame, it also exhaustively details the process by which the bill became a law, emerging from stalled initiatives by the Clinton administration, the overblown proposals of the Republicans' "Contract with America," multiple vetoes of early incarnations of the law, and finally the last minute machinations that led an at-first reluctant president to decide to sign the final version. The third time was the charm, even though Clinton was ahead in the polls in the reelection summer of 1996 and perhaps did not need to prove he could make good on his initial promise in the 1992 campaign to "end welfare as we know it." Perhaps Monica did play a role, but only Clinton and advisers like Dick Morris know for sure whether anticipation of the coming impeachment tribulations was factored into the calculus to sign the bill as a way of building up extra public opinion support. Weaver won't say. Perhaps one stone was not turned in this thorough study.

This book is well-written, meticulous in its use of research, extensively documented, and comprehensive in its coverage of the process leading to welfare reform. It is a bit too circumspect in its assessments. Striving to achieve judicious balance in reporting, it avoids telling the story in a more politically charged way. Weaver is aware that this is a profoundly conservative shift in social welfare policy, yet he withholds judgment, begging for time for the evidence to come in. That evidence could eventually prove that welfare reform was not designed to be consistent with the prevailing class, race, and gender biases of the dominant culture, but I doubt it.

SANFORD F. SCHRAM
Bryn Mawr College

Regulating from the Inside: Can Environmental Management Systems Achieve Policy Goals? *edited by Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash. Washington, DC, RFF Press, 2001. 256 pp. $22.95.*

This useful volume assesses the utility of the environmental management system (EMS) as an alternative to traditional forms of environmental regulation

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as well as to many free market policy ideas being bandied about in the United States and elsewhere.

What is an environmental management system? Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash write that it "consists of a regulatory structure that arises from within an organization . . . a collection of internal efforts at policymaking, planning, and implementation that yields benefits for the organization as well as potential benefits for society at large" (p. 1). As Richard Florida and Derek Davison note, the EMS, like any management system, is a formal mechanism for "articulating goals, making choices, gathering information, measuring progress, and improving performance" (p. 83). In effect, it is a corporation that crafts its own EMS to enhance its capacity to do good for itself while doing right by society. It makes environmental goals central to its entire mode of operation, if only as a byproduct of an organizational effort to cut down on environmentally-destructive waste and inefficiency. The EMS concept is permeated by enlightened self-interest: the organization that always looks to reuse, reduce, and recycle helps itself and society at large.

While recognizing the anecdotal evidence for the effectiveness of the EMS approach, the authors represented in this volume pose a few tough questions. First, does the impetus behind a company's decision to create and, more important, abide by its EMS stem primarily from internal factors (corporate leadership) or external ones (compliance with regulations or gaining accreditation from a trade association)? Second, and related, does implementation of an EMS by itself make a difference? That is, separate from organizational factors, does an EMS matter?

The various authors find that a company with a culture of innovation may not need a formal EMS, while laggards may adopt an EMS process simply to comply with environmental regulations. By itself, an EMS may do little more than force the reluctant to adhere to certain procedures and reporting functions, which is not necessarily a bad thing.

Finally, what should public policy makers do to promote the effective use of an EMS by as many companies as possible? Assessing the findings offered by their contributors, the editors conclude that the best policy response may simply be to continue to enforce meaningful environmental regulations. Faced with the need to comply with the law, corporations may turn to the EMS as a flexible and organizationally-sensitive means to achieve their goals.

As with all edited volumes, the quality of the respective parts varies, and there is some inevitable repetition as different authors address similar questions. The most useful substantive chapters are those by Jennifer Nash and John Ehrenfeld on factors that shape EMS outcomes in firms, Shelly Metezenbaum on enhancing the role of information and environmental performance standards, and Cary Coglianese on public policy responses. The editors also do a good job in pulling it all together in the introductory and summary chapters.

Taken as a whole, this volume is good policy analysis. It looks systematically at an important question and offers areas for future research. Most impor-

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tant, it tries to establish a causal link between action and effect. That the authors conclude that such a definitive link is hard to pinpoint only speaks to their lack of hubris. This volume is most useful for more specialized graduate seminars on public policy, regulation, and management.

CHRISTOPHER J. BOSSO
Northeastern University

Big Government and Affirmative Action: The Scandalous History of the Small Business Administration *by Jonathan J. Bean. Lexington, The University Press of Kentucky, 2001. 240 pp. $29.95.*

Historian Jonathan Bean describes the cold war origins and gradual expansion of the Small Business Administration (SBA) over nearly fifty years. As a whole, the work is provocative, meticulous, and engaging. Two important and related questions motivate the history: How do agency leaders adapt existing programs to new political objectives? Why are government programs so difficult to terminate? The book does not draw upon either theoretical work on agency survival (well developed in the public choice tradition) or the wide variety of agency histories that have been produced by political scientists. But Bean nevertheless provides a number of insights into the role of agency leaders as entrepreneurs, the institutionalization of new ideas, and obstacles to program termination.

Despite the lack of a well organized core constituency, SBA programs expand in the face of scandal, malfeasance, and efforts to reduce federal expenditures. Bean explains this growth by appealing to the ability of SBA administrators to reinvent their agency. During the peak of the cold war, proponents positioned the agency as an advocate for the threatened values of independent free enterprise and individualism. Later, SBA leadership promoted their programs as essential tools for the war on poverty, structuring leading programs to channel capital to geographic areas of particular need. Similar instruments were proposed for urban renewal in the 1970s. In each period, SBA programs were advertised as solutions to pressing social concerns. The SBA also plays an unexpected role in the Reagan revolution. Despite targeting SBA for elimination, Ronald Reagan not only failed to scale back the SBA loan programs but deliberately expanded the scope of procurement set asides for minority contractors. This expansion both compromised the goals of fiscal conservatives and breached the promise of color blind governance that Reagan articulated in his first campaign.

Bean makes the case that the SBA was an early and continuing leader in the use of racial preferences, both in the development of numerical quotas for employment and in the use of procurement set asides for minority contractors. This innovation led to a visible role for SBA in implementation of the Civil Rights Act, and Bean finds lessons for affirmative action, broadly defined, in

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this SBA experience. The practical challenge in defining, first, what constitutes small business, and, second, what constitutes a disadvantaged minority led to occasionally laughable and often scandalous outcomes. The massive American Motors Company gained small business status. A minority contracting firm, Wedtech, was at the center of an independent counsel investigation in 1987. An SBA-financed venture supported the Whitewater Development Corporation. For Bean, these experiences illustrate the perils of social activism realized through government programs. Well-intentioned federal efforts are distorted by a combination of individual greed and administrative economy into subsidies for not-so-small firms and affluent individuals.

As a broad history of the SBA, the weakness of the book lies in the neglect of SBA programmatic and management successes. SBA accomplishments are either given scant attention (a brief description of successful management assistance programs) or not mentioned at all (the relatively low costs of the programs). As a lender and guarantor, the SBA is compelled to confront the tension between social activism and administrative pragmatism on the agency bottom line. And, in fact, the costs of SBA subsidies are consistently lower than costs for comparable agricultural or housing guarantee programs. These aspects of SBA performance and related accounting reforms that affect all federal credit programs are overlooked. Despite this weakness, the book is extremely useful and reveals substantial common ground for political scientists and historians who share an interest in the political development of federal agencies.

J. KEVIN CORDER
Western Michigan University

The Politics of Breast Cancer *by Maureen Hogan Casamayou. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2001. 208 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $19.95.*

How and why did the issue of increased funding for breast cancer research emerge on the national policy agenda in the late 1980s? How and why were advocates for those with the disease able to prevail in their battle for increased funding in a federal budget defined by constraints on new spending? Casamayou's case study ably answers both questions and along the way provides observations and insights for students of numerous disciplines including public policy, organizational theory, women's studies, and Congress.

Possibly the most important lesson to be garnered from this relatively brief yet rich work is that frequently politics rather than merit determines the course of public policy. Perceptions to the contrary, between 1959 and 1989, cancer deaths from all 224 specific cancer sites (including the breast) had not decreased. Additionally, in 1987, lung cancer overtook breast cancer as the leading killer of women.

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Not surprisingly, to women afflicted by breast cancer, these facts were irrelevant. Angry and frustrated by the fact that treatments for breast cancer had not changed fundamentally over the years and fearing disfigurement and death from the disease, "a new breed of woman," well educated and professional, organized to fight for increased federal funding (p. 66). That these women were also typically younger (age 35–54) than those diagnosed with breast cancer was the ironic result of intensified detection efforts by a supposedly indifferent and unresponsive federal government and medical establishment. Many of these women initially met in support groups for the disease for reasons ostensibly unrelated to politics. It was here, says Casamayou, that things such as "sharing, collaborating and cooperating became the new norms readily transferable" to politics (p. 155). The author suspects that "inherent agenda differences reinforced by socialization processes" led to the creation of a movement characterized by "collective leadership" and a marked absence of interorganizational conflict or competition (ibid.).

The skillful methods wielded by the breast cancer advocates and their allies to win public and congressional support make for a compelling story that is richly detailed by the author. For instance, there was the movement's successful media campaign. Despite the fact that the disease is far more likely to strike women as they grow older, "it was women as young mothers who were given attention by the movement and the media" (p. 106). Such images undoubtedly served to make breast cancer a "safe issue" for members of Congress to support in contrast to the more controversial AIDS issue (p. 142).

Breast cancer advocates also cleverly utilized two other tangentially related issues to improve the political climate for increased funding. The first involved 1990 congressional hearings on the absence of women as research subjects in National Institutes of Health (NIH) clinical trials. The hearings contributed to the perception that "women and their distinct health concerns did not register" with NIH bureaucrats and that a major reason for this "was the relative absence of women in top administrative positions" (p. 135). Breast cancer advocates deftly manipulated the "political hype" surrounding these issues to shift the spotlight to the underfunding of women's health research (p. 138). The second issue involved the Clarence Thomas–Anita Hill hearings of 1991. This episode reinforced the impression that women's issues, in this case breast cancer, were being neglected by the male-dominated political establishment.

Ultimately, efforts for increased breast cancer funding succeeded with the aid of some savvy legislative maneuvering by Senator Tom Harkin. At the time, domestic spending was constrained by the presence of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, which divided spending into three categories (domestic, international, and defense) and imposed "fire walls" on each so that no money could be transferred between them. Harkin identified a little known breast cancer research effort located in the Department of Defense and then persuaded the Senate to allocate $185 million for additional research. Essentially, the in-

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creased funding for breast cancer research would be paid for by the peace dividend resulting from the end of the cold war.

The political success of the breast cancer movement has had wider implications as other "disease groups" have emulated "their strategies and rhetoric" (p. 162). As a result, according to one commentator quoted by Casamayou, "Appropriations bills now read like medical dictionaries: osteoporosis, lupus, rheumatoid arthritis, hypertension and on and on . . ." (ibid.). Casamayou, herself a breast cancer survivor, is ambivalent about this development, praising the movement's success but worrying that such efforts, in the words of one expert, have "introduced a potentially dysfunctional particularism into American politics" (ibid.). Arguably, however, such normative issues are beyond the purview of this otherwise enlightening case study.

RICHARD HIMELFARB
Hofstra University

Made by the U.S.A.: The International System *by Alex Roberto Hybel. New York, Palgrave, 2001. 340 pp. $49.95.*

Anyone who teaches international relations encounters many students who lack even the most elementary knowledge or understanding of international history. Alex Hybel's book is one remedy for that, albeit one with a decidedly American point of view. He sketches the history of the international system over the last two centuries, focusing on how the foreign policy of the U.S. government has been fashioned in response to that system. The chronological narrative of events is interspersed throughout with commentary from the perspective of a contemporary American political scientist. As such, it gives students a sense of how a political scientist looks at historical events and how commonly used concepts ("contradiction," "hegemony," "national interest," etc.) can organize an understanding of that history.

Hybel seeks to demonstrate the usefulness of an explanatory framework whose components are easily summarized. History is "framed by the presence of conflicting forces that originate within the international system itself, and within different states" (p. 239). Governments of the principal states (for some unknown reason Hybel often refers to them as "entities") are "compelled" to enact policy responses to these "contradictions" that succeed in reducing tensions or even in replacing the previous system with a more "effective" one. A "hegemon" that performs this task well will more likely retain its dominant position. In turn, its performance is shaped by its economic and military capabilities, the attributes of its own politicoeconomic system, and the lessons that the country's leaders believe that they have learned from history.

This core argument is essentially Realist, with many of the more recent departures from Realist positions pressed into service to supplement it. Through-

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out, systemic forces are seen as pressing any government subject to them into similar if not identical responses, usually policies intended to block or defeat rivals. Domestic politics, primarily in the form of public opinion, intrudes from time to time, but interest groups, classes, and regions are invisible.

Although specialists who concentrate on a narrower range of events may disagree with Hybel over some of his specific judgments, they probably would agree that he provides a competent and useful overview of the place of the United States in the international system in the last two centuries. His historical judgments are generally in accord with mainstream thinking. His conceptual framework is not likely to trigger many objections either, though this is more a result of the innocuous nature of its claims than of the strength of his arguments for its virtues.

To a knowledgeable reader, one of the most interesting aspects of his book is Hybel's attempt, often implicit but occasionally quite explicit, to fashion an account that stands in contrast to that of John Lewis Gaddis. In an all too brief appendix, "The Cold War Was Not a Matter of Culpability," Hybel argues against Gaddis's contention that Stalin caused the cold war. He argues that the political constraints on leaders—even a leader such as Stalin—impel them to respond to political situations in ways that are broadly similar and hence broadly predictable. In Stalin's case, "It is most unlikely that the Soviet political system would have tolerated a leader who was unwilling to exploit the opportunities offered by the international system that emerged at the end of the Second World War" (p. 280).

I suspect that Alex Hybel has much more to say about the differences between the way political scientists and historians understand international history. Let us hope that his future work examines that issue in more detail.

TIMOTHY J. MCKEOWN
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Understanding European Foreign Policy *by Brian White. New York, Palgrave, 2001, 196 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $22.95.*

This is an ideal textbook for undergraduate and graduate students of European politics. The book is short, but it covers a large field. It is written in a direct and accessible manner. It contains a good balance of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence. The literature cited is extensive and accurate. And the book's structure is logical and appealing. If one is wondering what European foreign policy is all about, this books provides the opportunity to learn much within a relatively short period of time and without excessive effort.

In conceptual terms, the book tries to apply foreign policy analysis (FPA) or what Americans often call comparative foreign policy to understanding Europe's external relations. FPA has fallen from grace lately among students of international relations, but Brian White offers good arguments why FPA can

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still be very helpful, although in a refined and modernized version. This means in particular disassociating FPA from traditional state-centered realism, and the study of the European Union and its foreign policy offers a good opportunity to do that. After all, the EU is not a state and it usually acts in a way that defies the principles of *realpolitik*. Different authors have called the Union a fuzzy state, a civilian power, or even a postmodern prototype. But the question is whether a postmodern prototype is able to cope with the premodern politics of terrorists and ethnic warriors. White's book was written before the tragic events of September 11, 2001 but after the EU's rather disastrous performance in the Balkan conflict.

However, White is very reluctant to judge the EU's international performance at the start of his book. This is partly because criteria for establishing success or failure of European foreign policy are not easily established. But more importantly, he wants first of all to establish how to analyze and explain this performance. To understand European foreign policy, he argues, one cannot just look at the European Union as an institution or at a broadly defined Europe as a foreign policy actor. One must look at three different but interacting subsystems: community foreign policy, union foreign policy, and national (member state) foreign policy. Application of the "foreign policy framework" (p. 24) to the study of these three subsystems constitutes the essence of his successive chapters. The author acknowledges that despite a long process of European integration all three subsystems remain separate. However, there has been a growing interaction between them: "Community, Union and national foreign policies are increasingly intertwined at both policy-making and policy implementation levels" (p. 166). The development of transnational policy networks operating across these subsystems prevents any of the European actors from controlling European foreign policy and produces a "coordination reflex" among them (p. 166). The problem is that after reading the entire book, it is still not very clear whether this increased "interaction" guided by a "coordination reflex" results in a swift and purposeful collective action, especially in a situation of crisis. Instead, the author openly acknowledges that his book is more about "process than outputs" (p. 167). Thus the reader will not really know whether European foreign policy is likely to be effective in addressing international terrorism, ethnic conflict, or economic interdependence. But he will know more about how this policy is made and applied for different purposes.

JAN ZIELONKA
European University Institute, Florence

European Foreign Policy *by Simon Nuttall. New York, Oxford University Press, 2001. 294 pp. $55.00.*

Simon Nuttall continues to develop his history of the EC/EU's foreign policy with a second excellent volume. *European Foreign Policy* takes the story of

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European Political Cooperation (EPC) from the Single European Act of 1987 to its transformation into the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It, therefore, covers barely six years, but they were six years of the utmost significance for Europe and for the global system.

Not surprisingly, German unification and the EC member states' reactions to it feature prominently. Although the EC and the European Commission were sometimes deliberately excluded from the process by the German chancellor intent upon keeping it within a 2 + 4 framework, the Commission, nonetheless, proved especially helpful toward the end in bringing the former GDR within the EC framework. It thereby gained significant credit with Helmut Kohl, which was vital in the run up to the Maastricht Treaty. Important, too, though seemingly it came about almost by accident, the commission found its role greatly enhanced when the United States pushed it forward to take responsibility for coordinating aid and assistance to the countries of central and eastern Europe beginning with the Polish-Hungary Aid for Reconstruction of the Economy program.

Nuttall follows the course of international events further via the Gulf War to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. On the Gulf, he suggests that the EC's limited role was largely determined by the pressure of domestic events. On Yugoslavia, he points to the initial imaginativeness of the EC and its member states before the European effort disintegrated into quarrels over recognition of the break-away republics, the use of military force, and the role of the United States. All this is done with a shrewdness and finesse that derives in part from Nuttall's privileged position as a former commission representative in the EPC structure. This time, though, the value of the book is heightened still further by the enormous range of sources Nuttall has consulted and referenced.

But it is in the interleaving of substantive foreign policy (even if sometimes insubstantial and weak) with institutional reform that the book shows its real strengths. Here, on the Maastricht negotiations that brought the CFSP into being, Nuttall is magisterial. It is not simply that his command of both international and domestic events and the existing literature is impressive, but the analysis, too, is both deep and subtle. It is also extremely well written: the CFSP provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, for example, are "sedimentary" in that they are all that is left after everything else was washed away. Of course, Nuttall is biased and reckons that the provisions were weak, determined by member states (and by permanent representatives rather than political directors who might have had a better grip on foreign policy) who looked to "their own needs and foibles rather than by any reference to a good defined in common" (p. 128). But he does not believe that the chances of more fundamental reform of EPC would have been achieved if the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union had been better prepared. The CFSP disappointed expectations because "it never had a clearly defined objective and purpose, agreed by consensus" (p. 13). The so-called Asolo list of common values and interests was "banal" (p. 123); they could fit any and every occasion without providing any guide to

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effective action. The result was inevitably a dissatisfaction with incrementalism and pragmatism without anyone being able to suggest alternatives. In contrast to that, Nuttall has produced a book for which there are no alternatives and which will rapidly become a classic. If only the publishers would bring both this and *European Political Cooperation* out in paperback.

GEOFFREY EDWARDS
University of Cambridge, UK

The Politics of the Euro-Zone: Stability or Breakdown? *by Kenneth Dyson. New York, Oxford University Press, 2001. 311 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $24.95.*

Kenneth Dyson has written a penetrating assessment of the political stress points and fault lines in the new Europe, defined not by the end of the cold war as is commonly cited in much of the current literature, but by the phased implementation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The book is noteworthy for both its scope and depth, and for the careful way in which the author blends empirical insights with skilled application of contemporary social science theories.

At the heart of the Euro-Zone is the European Central Bank, which crowns a robust set of institutional arrangements designed to perpetuate a sound money regime beyond the control or meddling of politics. This institutionalized regime, Dyson is quick to point out, represents the triumph of neoliberal economic doctrine; in this manner, he highlights the mutually constitutive effects of ideas and institutions in the contemporary European context. As a consequence, Dyson argues, many features of the European Union (EU) that we have come to take for granted are in the process of being recast. For example, the synergistic tensions in the Franco-German relationship, which provided the impetus for all the milestones in the European integration process up to and including EMU, have been transformed and even defused to a great extent by the EMU framework, with profound implications for the future.

A recurring theme in *The Politics of the Euro-Zone* is the juxtaposition of stability and breakdown. Put another way, the construction of a European Central Bank creates both strengths and weaknesses. Promoting stability are the technocratic mechanisms at the heart of the EMU regime, which hold out the potential to create predictable and long-lasting economic fundamentals and to prompt European leaders to intensify efforts to improve coordination in the realms of fiscal and social policy, to name just two. Threatening breakdown, on the other hand, are the glaring weaknesses in what one might term the democratic construction of this new regime: the deficits in public transparency, accountability, and control that ultimately could call into question the legitimacy of this grand undertaking.

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Two factors stand poised to determine whether the Euro-Zone ultimately heads toward stability or breakdown: the incidence and severity of external shocks, for which the current framework is ill-prepared at present; and the spread of a supportive "Kantian" political culture and identity at both the elite and mass levels. The two factors are linked, Dyson argues; the capacity of European elites to respond effectively to an exogenous shock will depend on the extent to which their actions spring from a world view that privileges the principles of partnership and mutual aid. This link to culture represents another interesting theme in the volume; Dyson sees the eventual ascendancy of a Kantian culture over rival Hobbesian and Lockean perspectives as essential to the success of Europe's new "stabilization state" (p. 267). The mere fact that Europe has managed to achieve an "imperfect Kantianism" (p. 245) over the course of a half-century of integration gives Dyson cause for cautious optimism.

The introduction of single currency, which went off with nary a glitch on 1 January 2002, was still a year off in the future when *The Politics of the Euro-Zone* appeared. Nevertheless, the book retains a freshness and acuity that renders it must reading for anyone wishing to master the political complexities of this most recent stage in European integration. Readers conversant in the literature will find that many of the specific issues discussed in this volume—disagreements between prosperous and poor members, the democratic deficit, interorganizational rivalries within the treaty framework—will sound familiar. But the Euro-Zone lenses employed so adroitly by Kenneth Dyson generate fresh perspectives and novel insights.

JEFFREY J. ANDERSON
Brown University

France and European Integration: Toward a Transnational Polity? *By Michel R. Gueldry. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2001. 256 pp. $69.95.*

France's postwar economic, social, and cultural model—which the French like to view as the "French exception"—has been increasingly challenged by the process of European integration. Because France has to operate within the constraints of its membership in the European Union (EU), it has been forced to tone down some of its dirigiste features with a strong state managing the economy and to adapt to the requirements of a liberal, globalized world economy. Similarly, its ambition of autonomy and grandeur in foreign policy has been gradually tamed by the reality of being one of fifteen EU members. The relationship between France and Europeanization, however, has not been only a passive one. At the same time, France has also used the process of integration for its own benefit and shaped Europe in its image, mostly in the fields of trade and agricultural policies, where it has long been setting the European agenda.

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Moreover, Europe is giving France the platform and resources that it needs to project its views on the international scene, since common policies give the voice of individual countries larger international resonance.

Michel Gueldry's *France and European Integration* examines the Europeanization of the French polity: what the process of European integration has changed to the French state, economy, social policy, foreign policy, and sense of identity. The book, which is not intended for specialists of French politics, starts with an overview of the distinctive features of the French model in the postwar era, focusing on the omnipresent role of the state in the French economy and society. Chapter 2 examines the move toward multilevel governance in the European Union and reflects on how the French legal order has been transformed by the new division of competence between the national and supranational levels. Chapter 3 surveys the evolution of the French economy from dirigisme to economic liberalism, arguing that the French state has been forced to turn over many of its powers to regulate the economy to the European Union as well as the international market. Chapter 4 examines how the evolution of French capitalism and European integration are affecting social policy and the welfare state in France. Chapter 5 recounts the changes in French monetary policy and the transition from a national to a supranational currency. Chapter 6 describes the passage from Gaullist-inspired policy of grandeur and autonomy to the contemporary objective of a strengthened European foreign policy and security community. Chapter 7 examines how the Europeanization of France has transformed the nature of "Frenchness," both in terms of territory and identity-based policies. In the end, Gueldry argues that France is a "transnational polity": "it operates in a European system of shared governance that is no longer entirely national nor fully federal" (p. 191).

In sum, Gueldry's book is a good survey of the existing literature on France and European integration, both in French and in English, summarized into a coherent, easy-to-read package. One can regret, however, the lack of focus on two questions. First, domestic political analysis is almost absent from the book. It would be helpful to know whether and why the debate (or absence thereof) on Europe has had any impact on French domestic politics. Second, a fundamental question that comes to mind when reading *France and European Integration* is the extent to which some of the change witnessed in French policies can be attributable to European integration versus the broader process of globalization. Gueldry makes only one reference to the link between Europeanization and globalization, noting in passing that "While for France, Europe operates as a key agent of globalization of trade and finances, thus forcing changes to its national structures and procedures, the EU is also being used as a shield against some of the most dislocating aspects of globalization" (p. 176). This interesting paradox of how Europeanization serves both as a catalyst for and a shield against globalization in France would be worth exploring further.

SOPHIE MEUNIER-AITSAHALIA
Princeton University

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A Farewell to Arms? From "Long War" to Long Peace in Northern Ireland *edited by Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen. Manchester, UK, Manchester University Press, 2000. 360 pp. Cloth, $74.95; paper, $32.95.*

This volume might alternatively be called "A Handbook of the Peace Process and Belfast Agreement of 1998," because it combines essays by the acknowledged experts on Northern Ireland politics, succinct historical coverage of the peace process and its background, a variety of analytical essays explaining the roles of key groups, and insightful discussions of the regional and international context of the agreement. The comprehensive appendices and an extensive glossary of terms and acronyms make it relatively easy to navigate the nuance of discussions about the implementation of the agreement and the interactions of various North/South bodies.

While the compendium very much reflects "active" political science on Northern Ireland, with some essays updated through mid-2000, it will remain valuable as an historical resource and can be recommended for library acquisition. The introductory essays on the background of the peace process are commendable in their detail. Paul Bew's concise essay provides a guidepost to the agreement and perspective on its underlying philosophy. Essays on the strategy of the Social Democratic and Labour party under John Hume and the Unionist response emphasize the fragility of the consensus upon which the agreement was built. Contributions on the main stumbling blocks to permanent peace (protection of human rights, community policing, decommissioning, and amnesty for politically motivated criminal acts) provide excellent foundations for understanding the continuing precarious evolution of these issues. Kate Fearon's discussion of the role of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition in the agreement and its implementation is also worthy of special note given the continuing pivotal role of this numerically tiny party in maintaining the viability of the Northern Ireland government.

For the American audience, the greatest strength of the volume may lie in its section on "International and Comparative Dimensions" of the conflict. Paul Gillespie's analysis of the changing relationship between the Irish Republic and the United Kingdom goes a long way in explaining the reconceptualization of the problem that has allowed the two governments to work in concert to shepherd the Belfast Agreement through difficult moments. Elizabeth Mehan's detailed analysis of the "Europeanization of the Irish Question" does an excellent job of establishing the context of the agreement within the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Union.

In the wake of Northern Ireland Secretary John Ried's decertification of "loyalist" paramilitary compliance with the ceasefire (13 October 2001) on the one hand, and the start of IRA decommissioning (23 October 2001) on the other, a certain limitation in the scope of the volume does become apparent. In their title, the editors accept what is essentially a Sinn Fein construction of

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"The Troubles" as a "long war" between a nationalist army and the British government. The majority of the contributions in the volume also pays thoughtful attention to the construction of the problem as one of civil rights for the "nationalist" (that is, Catholic) minority. Nowhere, however, is it possible to get a perspective on the psychology of "Triumphalism," or the organized intimidation of the Catholic minority such as the siege of Holy Cross School in the Ardoyne area of Belfast. For a conflict still characterized in the generic press as one between Catholics and Protestants, it is surprising that no attention is given to the religious fundamentalism that fuels the "loyalist" mentality. This blind spot is well illustrated by a chapter on "The Effect of Violence on the Irish Peace Process," which focuses exclusively on the IRA and its splinter groups. While this limitation does not undermine the overall value of the volume, it does suggest a pressing need for further research that considers the full range of threats to the complete implementation of the agreement.

KATHLEEN KNIGHT
Barnard College

The Northern Ireland Peace Process: Ending the Troubles? *by Thomas Hennessey. New York, Palgrave, 2001. 256 pp. $45.00.*

The current conflict in Northern Ireland is notoriously complex. The Social Democratic and Labor party (SDLP), the region's largest Nationalist party, and Sinn Féin, the largest Republican party, both advocate the eventual unification of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in order to form a single Irish nation-state that would be sovereign over the entire island. The two parties agree on little else. The Ulster Unionist party (UUP) and the Democratic Unionist party (DUP) both want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom, yet they are often more contemptuous of each other than they are of Nationalists. The government of Great Britain has historically been pro-union, while the government of the Republic of Ireland has been politically and, until very recently, constitutionally bound to support unification between the North and the South. These tendencies not withstanding, the positions of Britain and Ireland have varied considerably over time, often depending on which domestic political party has had control of their respective governments. In addition, there are numerous Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, often tied to political parties, that have perpetuated a vicious cycle of violence, and these groups have had a disproportionate influence on the peace process.

Thomas Hennessey has done an exceptional job of untangling this complex political conflict. He chronicles the Northern Ireland peace process from the Sunningdale Agreement of the early 1970s through the Belfast Agreement of 1998 (often called the Good Friday Agreement) and its halting implementa-

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tion. The book is well structured, growing increasingly detailed and complete as the narrative approaches the present.

Hennessey's study is a history of elite negotiations, not of the cultural, social, or economic dynamics of the conflict. The author covers the give and take of multiparty bargaining with aplomb, describing each side's interests and strategies in their own terms. He is at his best when he explains the perspectives of the main groups and their leaders. For example, the book demonstrates how David Trimble and his UUP were willing to allow the establishment of North-South bodies, but only if such institutions were consultative in nature and drew their authority from a Northern Ireland Assembly. Otherwise, unionists feared North-South political institutions, or worse a single North-South body with its own areas of authority, would lead down a slippery slope to a single government for the island. John Hume and his SDLP, however, insisted that the political identity of nationalists must be acknowledged in some form of North-South institution with executive powers. Only a North-South body with real functions could allow Irish nationalists to express their political identity. Nationalists had already agreed that Northern Ireland would remain part of the United Kingdom unless a majority in Northern Ireland voted in a referendum to end the union, and thus they found the slippery-slope argument unconvincing. Nationalists insisted on a "parity of allegiance." Unionists already had a way to express their British identity and allegiance to the crown through the House of Commons. Nationalists demanded a North-South body, one that would be more than wall decoration, through which they could express their Irish identity. In the end, a single North-South Council with six guaranteed areas of competence but only consultative powers was agreed to by all parties.

The Northern Ireland Peace Process should prove indispensable for anyone interested in the Troubles. With this his third book on Northern Ireland, Thomas Hennessey has established himself as an important chronicler of the conflict. But it must be noted that the author draws little in the way of conclusions from his own study. A pro forma conclusion of barely three pages is tacked onto the end like an afterthought. After a detailed history, there is almost no reflection on or analysis of this weighty subject. It is disappointing that someone who obviously knows so much would offer so little.

JEFFREY M. TOGMAN
Seton Hall University

Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe *by Norman M. Naimark. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2001. 248 pp. $24.95.*

Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War *by Stuart J. Kaufman. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2001. 246 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $19.95.*

Fear and testosterone make a highly combustible mix for ethnic conflict. Together they have created havoc in most parts of the world, particularly in the

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twentieth century. Indeed, the last century might go down as the bloodiest period in human history. Witnessing the unspeakable savagery of fratricidal frenzy, it is natural for politicians and journalists to take the cynical position that ethnic conflicts are the inevitable outcomes of ancient hatreds, and that they will continue to be the scourge of our global society as long as humans remain on this planet. Based on casual observation, it is not difficult to imagine that tribes of the Caucasus or the factions in the Balkans have always been at each other's throat and that today's ethnic cleansing is one more chapter in their sordid saga. Coming from two distinct disciplinary backgrounds, political scientist Stuart Kaufman and historian Norman Naimark quickly reject the simplistic notion of historical enmity and offer two interrelated but different sets of explanation of some of the major ethnic conflicts in Europe and central Asia.

Parts of their differences rest with their respective pedagogy. While some historians insist that their discipline is the application of social science methodologies to explain the events and trends of the past, others argue that it is more akin to storytelling, using data from the past, but imposing some ulterior overarching theme on this data and then selecting accordingly. Regardless of the outcome of this debate, unlike social scientists, historians tend not to offer generalized behavioral explanations for past events. Naimark traces ethnic violence and ethnic cleansing as a continuing tale of sectarian conflicts occurring soon after the dissolution of the last of the continental European empires: the German, the Russian, the Austro-Hungarian, and the Ottoman. The forces unleashed by these epochal events brought to the fore mutual fear and apprehension among groups fractured along the fault lines of ethnicity, language, and/or religion. In the ensuing battle for the development of modern nation states, the authorities in power extended their wars into ethnic cleansing and genocide. In 1915, to the Young Turks, who took over power from the putrid Ottoman Empire, the aspirations of the previously well-integrated Armenians were viewed as acts of treason, justifying their expulsion in the name of national integration. Ethnic cleansing manifested itself many times in Europe with cruel regularity. It followed its shameful script in the expulsion of the Greeks by the Turks in 1921–1922, the Chechen-Ingush and the Crimean Tatars in 1944 by the Soviet Union, the Holocaust of the Jews and the Gypsies between 1942–1944, the Polish and Czechoslovak expulsion of the Germans in 1944–1947, and finally the Yugoslav war in the mid-1990s.

Kaufman, in contrast, finds his explanation of ethnic conflicts in the use of symbols dredged up from the groups' collective history and mythologies by the demagogues to offer an historical purpose for the total annihilation of other groups within their political boundaries. To him, the three central causes of ethnic war are fears of ethnic destruction, myths justifying hostility to the other groups, and opportunity to mobilize. The myths supply the testosterone among group members by telling them exaggerated stories of their past glories. The pantheon of gods and demons defines good and evil in the clearest of terms. The hyperxenophobic paranoia propels them to engage in hostile ac-

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tions. Clever political elite, by using religious and/or nationalistic symbols, reinforce the volatile mix, thereby creating opportunities for actions leading to ethnic cleansing and genocide. In the hands of the mythmakers, history becomes telescopic; what happened five-hundred years ago suddenly becomes just as relevant as what took place a month ago. By using this age-old technique, the demagogues throughout ages have created sufficient conditions for unspeakable cruelty by cleverly weaving stories that resonate with a large number of people. According to Kaufman, where ethnic hostility is lacking despite widespread social injustice, it is primarily due to the absence of one or more necessary conditions—in particular, the appropriate myth of ethnic pride and prejudice. Kaufman's case studies include such little known, but increasingly relevant regions of the Caucasus, Moldova, and Yugoslavia.

The differences in the approaches of these two books show up in their respective views of the future. Since Naimark does not theorize about human motivations for joining the forces of genocide and ethnic cleansing, he casts a halfway optimistic glance at the willingness of the international community to get involved. To him the solution to the human rights catastrophes rests with an engaged international community. Unfortunately, more often than not, the history of international intervention has been motivated by realpolitik or self-serving claims to moral authority.

There is hardly a quick fix for ethnic wars for Kaufman either. In the short run, he proposes that the spread of ethnic politics should be stalled within the body politics. As a medium-term solution, he suggests the development of economic and political institutions. However, for him, the long-run solution to sectarianism is to "recast nationalist myths and erode the bases of ethnic hostility" (p. 216). A tall order, no doubt. Although it is refreshing to see the emphasis on national mythology as a primary catalyst for collective actions, the problem with Kaufman's arguments is that his explanatory variables seem all too aggregated. For instance, the term "opportunity" can encompass a very large area of social and political environment. Such aggregation might make their operationalization difficult, to say the least. Also, I find his distinction between elite-led conflict and mass uprising less than convincing. It is hard to imagine a leader without a significant degree of support within his constituent groups. Similarly, no mass movement can crystallize without leadership, large and small, known to the world and almost obscure to anybody but those inside the localized groups.

The events of September 11, when collective hatred left its indelible calling card on U.S. soil, heightened people's need to make sense of the catastrophe. Although, these two detailed works on the history of hatred do not directly involve the incidents that suddenly placed the comfortably cocooned country into the cauldron of ethnic conflicts, they provide a thoughtful perspective of events and motivations that should fascinate any serious reader.

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Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia *by Jane Boulden. Westport CT, Praeger Publishers, 2001. 176 pp. $62.00.*

Hamstrung almost immediately by the cold war, the United Nations never developed the military capacity to enforce peace envisaged by its founders. On a few exceptional occasions (Korea and the Gulf War), UN-authorized coalitions have fought a full-scale war. And on many occasions the UN has deployed monitors or soldiers as peacekeepers to observe cease-fires, provide a buffer between opposing troops, monitor elections, and so forth. Jane Boulden's book is about an intermediate category of UN missions. The term "peace enforcement" denotes "UN operations where force is involved short of full-scale enforcement operations, such as the UN response to the Iraq-Kuwait war, but more than traditional peacekeeping operations" (pp. 2–3). Peace enforcement is meant to be impartial, but does not necessarily require the belligerents' consent. Because it fell between Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld dubbed traditional peacekeeping "chapter six and a half." The operations under consideration here are six and three-quarters. The intermediate nature of these operations makes them particularly difficult.

After a brief overview of the relevant aspects of the UN charter and the organization's history with peacekeeping and peace enforcement, Boulden provides three case studies: the Congo in the early 1960s, and Somalia and Bosnia in the 1990s. Her descriptions of these cases give a very good account of the problems and dilemmas of operations which by definition have neither full consent of the parties to the conflict nor sufficient political backing or resources to use force effectively. More than traditional peacekeeping operations, these missions are bound to generate enemies, but they are ill-equipped to defend themselves or to carry out their mandates when these enemies make life difficult. It should come as no surprise that the Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia were, if not outright failures, highly problematic missions.

Boulden's descriptions of these cases make clear that anyone contemplating peace enforcement as a relatively cheap and easy solution to on-going conflicts (Afghanistan comes to mind) should read this book and think again. Boulden's account and her recommendations give strong support to the findings of the recent UN report on peace operations. Peace enforcement missions will fail if they are not given more resources—money, troops, and political backing.

This is an important point, and by helping to make it this book is a significant contribution. But one wishes Boulden had provided more political analysis of these cases, particularly the decisions to deploy these missions and not to support them more fully. She raises these important analytical issues throughout the book, but does not address them systematically or forcefully. The organization of the chapters, focusing on "operational issues" and "mandate issues" gives the trappings of an analytical framework, but very little is done to compare the three cases systematically.

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The most frustrating shortcoming of the book is that it never answers its central question. Boulden tells us that the basic question she set out to answer about peace enforcement is "Does it work?" (p. 2). This is an extremely important question, and it is admittedly difficult to answer. Most of the literature on peacekeeping does not even raise the question of whether it works, so Boulden deserves credit for at least asking. But the closest we get to an answer is that "the United Nations can have a negative influence as easily as it can have a positive one" (p. 138). In the end, we still do not know whether peace enforcement can work if it is given adequate support. Boulden seems to assume so, but does not make the case. By its intermediate nature, is it doomed to fail?

PAGE FORTNA
Columbia University

Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention *by Anthony F. Lang, Jr. Albany, SUNY Press, 2002. 242 pp. Paper, $21.95.*

Anthony Lang's work takes an innovative approach to the study of intervention. For Lang, in an intervention, "states seek to justify their actions according to some larger norm of behavior shared in the international system," whether it be creating democracy, guiding young nations to political maturity, or saving lives (p. 5). Lang tries to analyze the course of events through an alternate lens, arguing that the existence of norms and multiple sources of authority and rival visions may ensure intervention failure.

Lang ambitiously connects the conventional constructivist approaches to discuss the role of agency in intervention with the political theory of Hanna Arendt and Hans Morgenthau, two authors generally never bridged in the theoretical literature. Lang borrows heavily from the constructivist theories of Peter Katzenstin and Martha Finnemore and suffers from some of the same empirical and theoretical pitfalls of taking too seriously politicians' rhetoric and ex-post facto justifications of humanitarian or other good intentions. A case in point is Lang's discussion of the intervention in Russia as being motivated by liberal norms, when he later acknowledges that the Whites were often no more humanitarian than the Reds. When discussing Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, Lang notes that in some instances the allied governments gave some hope to nationalist's claims but did not follow up with action. It is precisely this point that begs the question as to when rhetoric needs to be dismissed versus when it represents something tangible. Lang needs to separate the wheat from the chaff and weigh the legitimacy of such statements. Lang writes that moral positions were not merely a question of "mere" image (p. 41) without offering adequate evidence to prove his assertions.

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The three cases investigated (the British and American interventions in revolutionary Russia; the British, French and Israeli tripartite intervention in Egypt in 1956, and the U.S.–UN intervention in Somalia 1992–1993) are meant to represent three different normative approaches: liberal, colonial, and humanitarian. Although Lang asserts that he is using Alexander George's method of structured focused comparison, the comparisons are "most dissimilar case studies" of very different phenomena. Lang would have been better served to focus on one type of intervention and do several case studies in order to prove more convincingly that normative impulses explain the motives for and failures of intervention. Beyond saying that the three cases represent the different kinds of intervention at different historical periods and under different systems, Lang does not sufficiently defend his case selection. The most problematic aspect of the thesis, however, revolves around Lang's interpretation of colonialism as paternalistic responsibility to explain why the British and French intervened in (invaded?) Egypt in 1956. Although the literature review nods toward traditional balance of power and security theories, Lang omits any discussion of dependency theory or V.I. Lenin's *Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism* to provide an alternative hypothesis to presenting colonialism as helping Third World development and protecting these areas from rapacious megalomaniacs like Gamal Abdel Nasser. Lang argues that colonialism "revolves around a feeling of responsibility" (p. 7). However, colonialism was arguably motivated by economic incentives, the exploitation of raw materials, and the search for markets rather than Lang's colonial "norm." Lang acknowledges this when he writes "the three terms are not always considered as 'norms' because of their negative valences, especially colonialism. Nevertheless they are norms because they justify and explain political action in moral terms" (p. 7). What Lang considers to be a norm ranges along a spectrum from the norms of humanitarianism to the racist and Orientalist mutterings of British officials. Overall, Lang's idea is interesting, but its execution is flawed. The work's strength lies in the wealth of details presented in the case studies, of which the Somalia chapter is the most convincing theoretically, and the Russia chapter is the richest in detail.

MIA BLOOM
Princeton University

Courts and Transition in Russia: The Challenge of Judicial Reform *by Peter H. Solomon, Jr. and Todd S. Fogelsong. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 2000. 222 pp. $25.00.*

This study offers more prospectus than analysis. Peter H. Solomon, Jr., a leading specialist on Soviet law, and Todd S. Fogelsong, Solomon's former student, have blended a survey of Russia's efforts at judicial reform since the end of the Soviet era with a detailed proposal for further efforts. Their intended audience,

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in addition to the broader community of scholars interested in the post-Soviet world, are the major foundations and aid agencies that over the past decade have poured millions of dollars into the project of reconstructing the Russian legal system. Their plea, in a nutshell, is for more concrete action by the Russian government to bolster the independence and efficacy of the Russian judiciary and for the expenditure of greater sums by outside donors in pursuit of this goal.

Working with the institutions at hand at the end of the Soviet era, Russia's rulers established four judicial systems: the Constitutional Court, which had its antecedents in the former Soviet Congress of Deputies' Committee for Constitutional Review and addresses constitutional questions; the *arbitrazh* courts, which had their antecedents in the former system of *Gosarbitrazh* (State Arbitration) and address noncriminal disputes among companies and between companies and the state; the military courts, which operate essentially unchanged since the Soviet period and which have the Supreme Court as their highest level; and the regular courts, which in terms of personnel and structure have not changed radically since Soviet times, which hear all nonmilitary criminal cases and all civil suits involving people as opposed to companies, and which also have the Supreme Court as their highest level. Solomon and Fogelsong concentrate on the last. At the heart of their study is a survey they administered in 1997 to judges in the regular courts, which attempts to assess the perception of those judges as to their independence. The book's recommendations largely involve the work of those judges and those persons who might assist them, including bailiffs and criminal investigators.

Fundraising is not often the occasion for critical analysis. Someone asking others to part with their time and money cannot easily raise difficult questions about the objectives of the project, the uneasy lessons of history, or the right choice of analogies. One cannot extend one's hand for help and simultaneously wonder if the whole enterprise needs to be rethought. Yet it is difficult to look at the experience of the last decade and wonder whether the waves of foreign technical assistance tendered to the Russian judiciary have borne much fruit, if any. Solomon and Fogelsong describe the difficulties faced by judges in light of the failure of the Russian state to pay their salaries and maintain their courtrooms, and dwell on threats to judicial integrity caused by the judges' dire dependence on both the judicial hierarchy and local political figures, who control access to housing, food allotments, and other basic needs. Equally significant, but not addressed in this book, is the dog that didn't bark. To a remarkable extent, Russians do not take their important disputes to court. The criminal docket by and large has no cases of official corruption, corporate looting, tax evasion, and similar free-booting, even though such behavior is widespread and substantive law already criminalizes this misconduct. Nor do significant disputes among business people often end up in court, excepting perhaps those over which the *arbitrazh* courts have jurisdiction.

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Why the rest of Russian society does not pursue judicial remedies is a deep issue that one might think comes prior to questions about empowering judges. If the Russian judiciary is not helping the state to perform its fundamental function of providing security and stability for the general population, one has to wonder whether it is a worthy object of our reforming zeal. The centrality of the judiciary to Anglo-American societies does not in and of itself prove that a robust and independent judicial culture is a prerequisite to prosperity and a decent civil society in other, significantly different cultures.

In particular, Solomon and Fogelsong do not consider the implications of the "transition" that appears in their title. Students of the post-Soviet experience have tended to fall into one of two camps. People who have devoted a large part of their lives to the study of the Soviet system and the cold war duality emphasize the uniqueness of the Soviet background and the significance of ongoing U.S. engagement, including the exporting of U.S. technical assistance. Others, mostly those who have not made the aforementioned investment in Soviet or Central European studies, believe that all transitions, postauthoritarian as well as postcommunist, share some common characteristics and will reward comparative analysis. Standing as they do foursquare in the first camp, Solomon and Fogelsong overlook the possibility that the United States, Canada, and even Germany and France have little to offer Russia, and that, for Russia, the more relevant places for mining insights gained from judicial reform might be Chile, Argentina, and in particular Italy.

For readers who find these speculations uncomfortable, *Courts and Transition in Russia* will seem a congenial book. Working within the premise that real benefits will flow from increasing the authority and autonomy of Russian judges, especially those at the lowest level of the general court hierarchy, Solomon and Fogelsong offer sensible and balanced, if sometimes pricey, proposals for moderate bolstering of an embattled institution. Those who wish to explore more deeply the shortfalls of the last decade's reforms in Russia should look elsewhere.

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Mexico: The Struggle for Democratic Development *by Daniel C. Levy and Kathleen Bruhn with Emilio Zebadúa. Berkeley, University of California Press, 2001. 362 pp. Paper, $18.95.*

Daniel Levy, Kathleen Bruhn, and Emilio Zebadua have written a first rate introduction to the contemporary politics of Mexico. The book focuses on democratization: To what extent has Mexico progressed on the path toward competitive and fair elections and basic guarantees of civil rights and freedoms? It examines this question in eight chapters. The introduction provides a colorful

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overview of key political issues, demographics, geography, and culture—from the presidency to the Virgin of Guadelupe. Chapter Two cogently and concisely reviews Mexican political history. The authors imbed descriptions of important events, names, and dates in a broader analysis of the main trends of each period of Mexican history. The remaining chapters cover the following topics: political actors and institutions, civil liberties and the rule of law, socioeconomic development, Mexican foreign policy, and U.S.–Mexico bilateral issues such as trade, drug trafficking, and immigration. The concluding chapter outlines the dilemmas that Mexico faced in 2000 on the eve of the election of President Vicente Fox.

The main strength of this book lies in its accessibility to a general audience. The authors present the specific historical details of the Mexican case in a way that alerts the reader to current theoretical issues in comparative politics. They provide sufficient detail to understand the complexities unique to Mexico, but always in the context of broader questions about democracy. In Chapter Three, for example, they discuss the role of labor unions in terms of general hypotheses about state-labor relations: "Where unions develop institutional ties with parties, as in Mexico, the governing coalition tends to stay in the political center and manage potential threats to the system. Where unions do not have such ties, they tend to challenge the state from outside, using strikes and demonstrations that may threaten the economic elite" (p. 73). These claims may not constitute cutting-edge theory, but they make students aware of alternative paths of development. The authors achieve the same effect by comparing Mexico to other countries. In describing foreign investment under President Carlos Salinas, for example, they write "unlike Chile, which required investors to leave their money in stocks for a specified period of time, Mexico permitted high levels of speculative portfolio investment with no restrictions on when or how fast investors could get out" (p. 173). This book goes beyond simply introducing readers to Mexico: it teaches them how to think comparatively about a particular case.

This book would work very well as a text for courses in Latin American politics. All graduate students in comparative politics should read it as a basic primer on Mexico. In general, if students want to read only one book on Mexico, this is the one to read. Nonetheless, the authors give short shrift to several important themes. Gender issues, for example, merit only a few paragraphs in this 360-page book. Lack of attention to gender issues not only gives the reader an incomplete account of contemporary politics in Mexico, but perpetuates the false belief that women's activities are irrelevant to politics. Similarly, while the authors address important aspects of institutional reform, they devote little attention to important changes in the judiciary. Both of these issues constitute an essential part of the process of democratization in Mexico.

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Transcending Neoliberalism: Community-Based Development in Latin America *edited by Henry Veltmeyer and Anthony O'Malley. Bloomfield, CT, Kumarian Press, 2001. 247 pp. $23.95.*

Since the 1980s, nearly all Latin American countries have adopted neoliberal policies to promote economic development. Latin American policy makers chose market-oriented reforms to address economic failures associated with thirty years of import-substitution industrialization policies. Despite the "consensus" in favor of market opening, neoliberal reforms have aggravated wealth disparities, increased poverty levels, and contributed to ecological degradation. Because of neoliberalism's failures, Henry Veltmeyer, Anthony O'Malley, and several contributors, argue for an alternative theory of development based on popular participation, decentralization, and community-based decision making.

Breaking away from market criteria, these authors contend that grassroots development strategies that empower local communities, especially in rural areas, are the basis for greater democratization and economic welfare. Building on case studies in Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, and El Salvador, this book suggests that community-based development is the most fruitful means for generating socioeconomic betterment. Sustainable development that considers material progress for the poor is only possible with the direct participation of community members who are affected by the policies.

Although the book emphasizes local development and self-sufficiency to reduce exposure to world markets, most of the authors do not deny a role for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The cases suggest that national and international NGO support empowers the poor and enhances local communities. In fact, NGOs are needed to fund local projects, provide technical assistance, and apply pressure to resistant local and national politicians and institutions. O'Malley, by contrast, claims that NGOs are not capable of mobilizing diverse social forces against international interests. Instead, he argues that peasant-based social movements hold the potential to bring about political and economic changes. Despite their different views on NGOs, all agree that broad-based democratic participation is essential for a more equitable distribution of wealth and sustainable development.

Given the contributors' concerns for improving living standards for the poor and halting environmental degradation, the book deserves praise. The effects of neoliberal policies on wealth and ecological issues are vital matters, and this book shows their impact on local governments. Attempts to address such issues through community-based development, however, may underestimate domestic politics and the urban-rural divide. The book favors rural communities and grassroots movements working together to obtain government supports to break away from cash-crop production and to encourage subsistence farming. However, the costs of such farming techniques are borne by urban consumers in the form of higher agricultural prices, more taxes to support rural subsidies, and concomitant lower overall economic welfare for workers.

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Since most voters live in urban areas, politicians also target investments and resources toward larger towns and cities, creating another obstacle to subsistence development. How rural interests, with the assistance of grassroots movements, are able to convince urban sectors and politicians to fund impoverished agricultural communities requires greater investigation.

Another concern is how to achieve empowerment and democratization at local levels. Apparently, a peasant-based social movement is the best means for achieving community-based development. However, over the past two centuries there are relatively few instances of successful peasant-based movements. A recent *New York Times* article (26 September 2001) shows that many former Colombian rebels are taking the capitalist road. A more effective remedy, perhaps, lies in the agrarian experiences of Bangladesh and Israel. In Bangladesh, the Grameen Bank provides equity finance to companies and entrepreneurs that promise future growth as well as direct and indirect benefits for the rural poor. In Israel, many kibbutzim offer successful rural, community-based examples. Working within the international market, poor peasants in Bangladesh and members of the Kibbutz community have prospered relatively. Instead of pursuing policies in opposition to the market, another solution is to propose policies that take into account world market constraints.

Aside from these minor criticisms, the book is valuable because it provides fresh and compelling evidence regarding the consequences of neoliberal policies and the need for community-based development. The development of critical theory and empirical case studies bolsters the importance of community-based participation and empowerment for successfully addressing poverty and economic dislocation. In this way, the book makes a substantial contribution to grassroots movements and should be of interest to activists and scholars.

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The State and Identity Construction in International Relations *edited by Sarah Owen Vandersluis. New York, Millennium, 2000. 207 pp. $69.95.*

Remaining agnostic about "the eventual fate of the state," the authors in this volume question transformations in the state, sovereignty, the nation, and identity in the face of changes occasioned by "the different demands, expectations, and constraints being placed upon" states by globalization and the cold war's demise (p. 1). The first section discusses the nature and role of the state—as understood in international relations (IR)—and its relation to national identity; the second addresses nonnational identities (colonial, regional, and religious). The central conclusion: "the forms and functions of the state can no longer be taken for granted. In truth, perhaps, they never could" (pp. 3–4).

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The volume avoids simple-minded globalization cant about the demise of the state, recognizing that the state is instead being transformed. It offers a range of arguments relevant to our collective rethinking of the state, sovereignty, the nation, and identity. Martin Shaw offers "a globalist historical sociology of the state" as the "axis of a new postinternational" theory (p. 8) that can challenge Realism on its own state-centric terrain by providing an alternative "global state theory" (p. 16). Shaw reminds us that "state politics is the core of globality, not its epiphenomenona" (p. 17). Christopher Clapham highlights the state-like qualities of many insurgency movements, particularly after the cold war (pp. 39–42) and the simultaneous "privatization" of state power in some African states (pp. 43–45). Others problematize the nation and nationalism: Dominique Jacquin-Berdal demonstrates that "Eritrea" is the modern product of colonialism and war, not a primordial ethnonational unit (p. 50); while Peter Shearman attributes the end of the cold war to the interrelated dynamics of globalization and nationalism and recalls our attention to "mass politics at the domestic level" (p. 98). The remaining chapters examine nonnational identity: Tim Dunne studies processes of identity construction in colonial Australia to defend a "radicalised Rationalism" (that is, English School) based on the work of Martin Wight (p. 124); Hari Singh explains that "hegemonic power [India, China, the United States] is critical to the construction and deconstruction of regions" such as Southeast Asia (p. 130); and Naomi J. Mobed offers a subtle and fascinating genealogy of the constitution of identity and (in)security by the Gulf Cooperation Council and its collective security cultures.

While the conclusion that we can no longer take the state for granted is salutary in a discipline whose mainstream remains nearly fossilized by its statist creed, the conclusion lacks novelty. Nor does it go far enough. Marxists, for example, came to this conclusion several decades in advance of IR's belated (re)turn to the state, highlighting the transformation of the state—as a mechanism of regulation and 'legitimate governance' (p. 187)—in the face of capital's transnationalization. The literature on the internationalization of capital and the state is largely ignored in this volume. Shaw's chapter is a partial exception, but he only briefly mentions Marxian IR scholars to dismiss them. Moreover, the rethinking of the state, nationalism, identity, and change offered here could have been extended further both by a sustained engagement with the notion of empire, a concept sadly neglected in contemporary IR, and by a more rigorous and critical understanding of processes of "construction," a term used repeatedly but uncritically (except by Mobed). The volume, in short, suffers from being too constrained by the established boundaries of IR.

That being said, this collection offers interesting analyses suitable for both undergraduate and postgraduate teaching. It raises a variety of fruitful, but not necessarily constructivist, challenges to the surprisingly tenacious, but fundamentally anachronistic, concept of the sovereign nation-state.

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Commonsense Constructivism, Or the Making of World Affairs *by Ralph Pettman. Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 2000. 256 pp. Cloth, $65.95; paper, $25.95.*

Ralph Pettman proclaims an interest in how ordinary people experience world affairs, and while the book can't escape jargon completely, he makes a valiant attempt to talk in terms that nonphilosophers might understand. It's not always clear, however, how that standpoint links to his main agenda, a critique of rationalism. He makes a case for thinking about a cultural or social sphere that should be taken into account as much as military and economic affairs, but most of the book retells the perspectives he's rejecting rather than putting forth his alternative. Those without a substantial background in international relations (IR) theory will get lost, regardless of the relatively accessible language.

Consistent with his goal of taking individuals seriously, he starts with an intellectual autobiography that begins with his first exposure to the classical realists and the English school through his discovery of Marxian political economy, and now a flirtation with postmodernism, which he apparently embraces with equal fervor as in each previous stage. Coming from such a background, we might then expect an in-depth discussion of the similarities and differences between strands of constructivist IR and those influenced by, say, E. H. Carr or Antonio Gramsci. But we only get one paragraph about Gramscians, for example, with no detailed discussion of how the notion of ideological hegemony has influenced a substantial amount of work in IR (notably Robert Cox and his many followers). Similarly, Pettman quickly dismisses constructivist IR as being conservative, mainstream, and otherwise too modernist, without actually discussing more than a paragraph or two excerpted from one or two authors. If I didn't know better, I'd assume there was no body of constructivist literature in IR (of either the positivist-leaning or post-positivist type), let alone a thriving debate about its epistemological implications and methodological disputes.

The bulk of this book criticizes conventional thinking but does little to offer a systematic alternative framework or, less ambitiously, a convincing discussion of ways in which constructivism might complement some (though presumably not all) of the mainstream. In the end, Pettman offers an eclectic take on a wide array of philosophical and social science literatures, with the main goal of challenging the rationalist or modernist roots of much IR theorizing. Unfortunately, even those sympathetic to his critiques may get frustrated trying to find anything all that distinctive or new in this book. Pettman's title is thus misleading, because this book offers neither a commonsense approach to abstract debates about constructivist theorizing, nor is it really that much about the practice of world affairs. Do not assume that this is a primer for constructivism in IR.

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Collective Action under the Articles of Confederation *by Keith L. Dougherty. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 211 pp. $49.95.*

Over the past decade, political scientists armed with modern social scientific techniques and models have revisited time-worn issues of American political history. Keith L. Dougherty makes a welcome contribution to this enterprise by taking on the fundamental question in our constitutional history: why did the Articles of Confederation prove to be an inadequate blueprint for the governance of the United States? Rather than defend the Federalist view that the Articles were inherently unworkable or the anti-Federalist view that the central government was underfunded due to the states' inability rather than unwillingness to support it, Dougherty develops a more nuanced view based on a theory of collective action derived from the economics of public good provision.

As Mancur Olson pointed out long ago, almost no individual should contribute to the production of purely public goods—that is, those like national defense whose consumption is nonexcludable and nonrival. However, as Dougherty points out, this prediction was not borne out by actual state behavior under the Articles, for states did make substantial and costly contributions to Congress and the national government. Dougherty argues that the explanation of these contributions lies in the fact that Congress did not provide purely public goods but rather a combination of public and private goods. Since noncontributors could be excluded from the consumption of private goods, states were willing to pay for the benefits they derived from these goods. Thus, Dougherty's model predicts that state contributions to the national government would be positively correlated with the private but unrelated to the public benefits.

To test this model, Dougherty collects a rich data set on state compliance with troop and monetary requisitions made by Congress. For both types of requisitions, he creates measures of the private benefits to be provided to states by the requisition. In the case of troop requisitions, Dougherty measures these benefits in terms of the distance of the Continental troops from the state's capital, assuming that states closest to the army stood the most to gain from its support. For monetary requisitions, outstanding national debt held by citizens of each state measures the private benefits. Unfortunately, he is only able to measure the public benefits of troop requisitions that he assumes to be proportional to the number of British troops in North America. The results are generally consistent with his theoretical perspective. In each case, compliance with congressional requisitions is positively related to the measures of private benefits, while the effect of public benefits is never statistically different from zero.

Though recognizing the severity of the data problems inherent in such a project, I have two substantial concerns about the analysis. The first is that the paucity of the data and the expense of its collection precludes consideration of alternative hypotheses about variation in compliance. In particular, the anti-

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Federalist claim that compliance was driven by dire economic conditions that constrained the states' ability to pay goes untested. If this argument is correct and ability to pay is correlated with the location of the army or the amount of debt held by a state's citizens, the inferences of the statistical models may be called into question. The second concern deals with the linking of the theoretical model to the data analysis. While the data analysis is conducted on state compliance, the theoretical model makes no predictions about compliance, only the absolute level of contributions. The amount requisitioned from a particular state should have no bearing on how much that state pays. In fact, a clear test of congressional authority under the Articles would be to examine whether the level of requisition had any independent effect on the level of payments. By looking at compliance levels, such a test cannot be conducted and the possibility is raised that an important prediction of the model is inconsistent with the data.

Despite these problems, *Collective Action under the Articles of Confederation* is a laudable effort to bring modern social science to bear on key problems of political history.

NOLAN MCCARTY
Princeton University

Under Army Orders: The Army National Guard during the Korean War
by William M. Donnelly. College Station, Texas A & M University Press, 2001. 271 pp. $34.95.

During World War II, all National Guard units would be pressed into federal service even before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In sharp contrast, virtually no National Guard units were mobilized for the Vietnam War, and the Guard often served as a refuge for young men seeking to avoid selective service. The mobilization of the National Guard during the Korean War fell somewhere in between. Some units would never be called up, while others would be deployed to the front lines of Korea.

William M. Donnelly, a military historian with the U.S. Center for Military History and a former Ohio National Guardsman, has written a valuable addition to the literature on the Korean War by examining the role of the National Guard in this conflict. The National Guard, like the regular army, was unprepared when the war broke out in June 1950. Short of officers and enlisted personnel, ill trained, and often bereft of essential equipment, the National Guard was not capable of serving as this war's "minutemen." Virtually all units mobilized required substantial infusions of manpower and equipment as well as additional training in order to meet the minimum standards for combat efficiency. Although no Guard units would be mobilized in time to participate in the desperate fight to hold the Pusan Perimeter or participate in the campaign

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to roll back communist forces to the Yalu River, nondivisional units and two divisions did start to make it over to Korea by 1951. Overall these units performed well, and Donnelly devotes an entire chapter assessing the mobilization and deployment of Oklahoma's Thunderbird Division (45th).

Not all Guard units mobilized went to Korea; others were called up to fill other defense needs. Several anti-aircraft units were deployed in the continental United States to defend against a possible Soviet air attack. The Pentagon sent the Keystone Division (28th) to Germany in order to strengthen NATO defenses. America's conventional forces were spread thin in the early 1950s, and Donnelly examines the struggles that Guard units assigned to the United States or Europe faced in achieving combat readiness in a period when most available military resources in personnel and equipment were being sent to Korea. To the frustration of senior Guard officers, several mobilized units assigned to the Zone of the Interior (continental United States) were stripped of their trained guardsmen so that they could be deployed overseas as individual replacements and replaced by draftees. As a result, these units lost virtually all their combat effectiveness and became little more than places to train new soldiers.

The National Guard has survived in the twentieth century in no small measure because of the continued effectiveness of the National Guard Association in lobbying for political support. Donnelly is cognizant of the important ties that existed during the Korean War between the Guard and influential congressional and state leaders. One theme Donnelly could have expanded upon is the impact of the civil rights movement in shaping the Guard in this era. Until federalized, state governments had significant power over the Guard. In the 1940s, many states excluded African Americans from their Guard ranks, while New Jersey actively desegregated its Guard units.

This study is essential reading for scholars seeking to understand how American society has raised armies in the twentieth century. One wishes that Donnelly had extended his analysis past 1953 and examined how the senior military leadership in the late 1950s and early 1960s viewed the Guard's performance during the Korean War. Did they share Donnelly's positive assessment of the Guard?

G. KURT PIEHLER
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

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

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

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

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

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

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